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ABSTRACT 
 
 
As rightly put by Sealy (1996), the law has to strike a delicate balance in cases of 
tussles between the majority and minority shareholders. Although the legal and 
regulatory apparatus in Malaysia have shown great alacrity in the recent years 
endeavouring to rewrite the corporate rules and revamp its legal landscape, it remains 
nigh impossible to legally define a thin crystal clear demarcation line between the 
protection afforded to the minority shareholders and the consideration of the corporate 
interest as a whole. Such thorny situations may arise when the court is faced with the 
dilemma of giving overwhelmed support to the majority at the expense of prejudicing 
the minority where the court is prepared to condone unfair acts and decisions of the 
majority. Conversely, the day-today operation of the company may be hindered if the 
court tends to favour the exasperating demands and objections of the dissatisfying 
minorities. This predicament inevitably devolves an onerous task of striking a balance 
upon the court in leaving the internal management to the company whilst ensuring that 
the interest of the minorities is not imperilled. Hence, it is high time for the best 
practices of corporate governance to step in and act as the golden scale to complement 
the imperfection of law in balancing the rights of the majority and the minority 
shareholders with the holistic view of enhancing shareholder values. As an alternative 
remedy, the protective measure of corporate governance may well hold the answer to 
the din of corporate malpractices. This study has an international magnitude but with a 
focus on Malaysian public-listed corporations which involve the public investors at 
large. The methodology of this study aims at providing positive descriptive analysis of 
the corporate governance best practices for the purpose of minority shareholders’ 
activism and protection. The methodology adopted was mainly premised on a 
qualitative approach via massive literature review and identification of governance 
mechanisms that focus on the best practices of corporate governance. This study delved 
into the issues of corporate governance based on content analysis with specific reference 
to case studies and reports in order to derive a set of best practices of corporate 
governance for the protection of the minority shareholders. The findings of this research 
will have significant implications for improving the overall corporate governance 
practices in Malaysia in that they highlight the protection of the minority shareholders 
in the corporate governance regime. Unlike most studies on corporate governance issues 
in Malaysia and East Asian countries which are based on strong quantitative 
methodological focus and being scattered in numerous disciplines, this research aims to 
provide a more in-depth legal insights and understanding of corporate governance 
practices, using qualitative and analytical study based approach. Ultimately, the golden 
parachute of corporate governance best practices will land the minority shareholders on 
gold mine of corporate prosperity in order to achieve a higher standard of Malaysian 
corporate governance. The main objective of this dissertation lies in the formulation of 
corporate governance best practices for the protection of the minority shareholders. 
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ABSTRAK 
 
 
Seperti yang dinyatakan oleh Sealy (1996), undang-undang perlu mewujudkan suatu 
keseimbangan yang sesuai dalam kes-kes persengketaan antara pemegang saham 
majority dan minoriti. Meskipun rangka undang-undang dan peraturan di Malaysia telah 
menunjukkan kemajuan besar pada tahun kebelakangan ini dalam usaha untuk menulis 
semula peraturan-peraturan korporat dan mengubah landskap undang-undang, ia tetap 
hampir mustahil untuk menentukan penandaan garisan tipis yang jelas dari segi 
undangundang di antara perlindungan yang diberikan kepada pemegang saham minoriti 
dan pertimbangan kepentingan korporat secara keseluruhannya. Situasi sukar ini akan 
timbul apabila mahkamah berhadapan dengan dilema bahawa sokongan yang terlalu 
banyak diberikan kepada pemegang saham majoriti padahal ia akan memprejudiskan 
pemegang saham minoriti di mana mahkamah bersedia untuk menyokong tindakan dan 
keputusan pemegang saham majoriti yang tidak adil. Sebaliknya, operasi harian syarikat 
akan tergugat jika mahkamah lebih cenderung untuk memihak kepada permintaan dan 
bantahan yg menjengkelkan daripada pemgang saham minoriti yang tidak berpuas hati. 
Kesusahan yang tidak dapat dielakkan ini merupakan suatu beban pengimbangan besar 
bagi mahkamah dalam meninggalkan pengurusan dalaman kepada syarikat dan pada 
masa yang sama memastikan bahawa kepentingan pemegang saham minoriti tidak 
terjejas. Justeru itu, ia adalah masanya untuk amalan tadbir urus korporat terbaik 
memainkan peranannya dan bertindak sebagai skala keemasan untuk melengkapi 
ketidaksempurnaan undang-undang dalam mengimbangi hak-hak pemegang saham 
majoriti dan minoriti demi meningkatkan nilai-nilai pemegang saham secara 
menyeluruh. Sebagai remedi alternatif, langkah perlindungan yang dilaksanakan melalui 
tadbir urus korporat mungkin memegang jawapan kepada masalah penyelewengan 
korporat. Kajian ini mempunyai magnitud antarabangsa tetapi dengan fokus kepada 
syarikat-syarikat awam tersenarai di Malaysia yang melibatkan pelabur-pelabur awam. 
Metodologi kajian ini bertujuan untuk menyediakan analisis deskriptif yang positif 
mengenai amalan tadbir urus korporat terbaik bagi perlindungan pemegang saham 
minoriti. Kaedah yang digunapakai terutamanya berdasarkan pendekatan kualitatif 
melalui kajian literatur yang banyak dan identifikasi mekanisme tadbir urus yang 
memberi tumpuan kepada amalan tadbir urus korporat terbaik. Kajian ini mengulas 
tentang isu-isu tadbir urus korporat yang berdasarkan analisis kandungan dengan 
rujukan khusus kepada kajian kes dan laporan untuk menggubal satu set amalan tadbir 
urus korporat terbaik bagi perlindungan pemegang saham minoriti. Penemuan-
penemuan kajian ini akan mempunyai implikasi yang besar dalam memperbaiki 
keseluruhan amalan tadbir urus korporat di Malaysia di mana perlindungan pemegang 
saham minoriti dalam rejim tadbir urus korporat akan diberi perhatian. Tidak seperti 
kebanyakan kajian mengenai isu-isu tadbir urus korporat di Malaysia dan negara-negara 
Asia Timur yang berfokuskan metodologi kuantitatif yang kuat dan bertaburan di 
pelbagai disiplin, penyelidikan ini bertujuan untuk memberi satu pandangan dan 
pemahaman undang-undang yang lebih mendalam tentang amalan tadbir urus korporat, 
dengan menggunakan pendekatan berasaskan kajian kualitatif dan analisis. Akhirnya, 
payung terjun keemasan amalan tadbir urus korporat terbaik akan dapat mendaratkan 
pemegang saham minoriti di atas lombong emas kemakmuran korporat demi mencapai 
standard tadbir urus korporat Malaysia yang lebih tinggi. Objektif utama disertasi ini 
terletak dalam penggubalan amalan tadbir urus korporat terbaik untuk perlindungan 
pemegang saham minoriti. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
This dissertation will set out to show that there is a dire need for a set of corporate 
governance best practices for the protection of minority shareholders. It will argue and 
make a case for the adoption of the notion of corporate primacy over the concept of 
shareholder primacy and director primacy. The overriding purpose of this dissertation is 
to propose the formulation of a set of best practices for the protection of minority 
shareholders. It is argued that this will go a long way in preventing corporate scandal 
like those we have seen in the recent past. 
 
First of all, chapter 1 will carry out a literature review of the current state of minority 
shareholder protection regime in Malaysia. This chapter will also provide a background 
to this study. The purpose is to identify any knowledge gap that gives rise to the 
research question of this dissertation. This will be followed by an elucidation of the 
research objectives and justification of this study. The methodology used will also be 
explained in this chapter.  
 
Chapter 2 will then embark on an overview of the well-established corporate 
governance principles and models. This will be followed by chapter 3 which will review 
the existing corporate governance framework in the context of the protection of 
minority shareholders. In chapter 4, the concept of corporate primacy that will set forth 
 the formulation of corporate governance best practices in Malaysia will be examined.. 
Chapter 5 will discuss a 
the utmost safeguards to minority shareholders. Before reaching the realm of the desired 
protection, paramount consideration is given to the essential elements (see Illustration 
1.1 below) that constitute the pillars of corporate governance best practices in the long 
run. Finally, a set of corporate governance best practices will be spelled out in chapter 6 
based on the discussions in chapter 5. 
 
Illustration 1.1 Pillars of corporate governanc
 
1.2 Literature Review
 
In the pages that follow, literature review is carried out to examine background to this 
study and the ongoing discussions on the subject of corporate governance in relation to 
set of corporate governance best practices which will provide 
 
e best practices 
 
2 
 
3 
 
the research question of this dissertation. From such literature review, any knowledge 
gap will also be identified and addressed in order to provide justification for this study. 
In addition, this chapter will also examine whether there is any need for study on any 
single governance model or structure that may better protect minority shareholders. The 
discussion on the protection of minority shareholders, therefore, provides a theoretical 
background to this study which will then lead to the formulation of corporate 
governance best practices. 
 
1.2.1 Background 
 
Generally, a majority of the stock investors, unless they manage and control the 
companies, are minority shareholders.  They include those who buy few lots of shares in 
the stock market and those who invest in unit trusts or any investment-linked products 
controlled by corporations, banks or financial institutions, whether listed or unlisted. 
Previously, minority shareholders have largely depended on two common law principles 
set out in Foss v Harbottle (1957)1 where only corporation, not individual shareholders 
can take action against any wrong that has been done to a corporation, and that the 
wishes of majority members of a corporation should, in general, prevail in the running 
of the corporation’s business, not minority (Drury, 1986).  
 
Furthermore, a common dilemma faced by minority shareholders is that of majority 
shareholders’ control over the board and management of a corporation. Often, such a 
control is done unfairly by a few, acting in concert for their own interests which 
minority shareholders feel could be at their expense. More often than not, oppression 
occurs when majority shareholders, having substantial control of a corporation, 
                                                            
1
 (1957) Camb LJ 194. 
4 
 
dominate and exercise their power to run and manage the corporation’s affairs for their 
personal gains in total disregard to minority shareholders. Similarly, minority 
shareholders would normally have no control or complete information over how 
directors and management conduct their duties in entering into substantial transaction 
involving the corporation’s property as well as the hidden motives behind such 
transaction. Having no access to inside information, they are unable to block any 
transactions concerning with “connected persons or related parties” between 
corporations on the one hand and directors or majority shareholders or persons 
connected with them. Such transactions can often be manipulated at the expense of 
minority shareholders or investors.  
 
In Malaysia, Section 181A-E of the Companies Act 1965 now allows shareholders to 
take a direct action against the company, therefore avoiding the rule in Foss v. Harbottle. 
Under the Companies (Amendment) Act 2007, the statutory derivative action was 
introduced via Section 181A-E to further enhance remedies available to minority 
shareholders where they may bring, intervene in or defend an action on behalf of the 
company in the company's name with the leave of court. Nonetheless, this kind of 
derivative action normally entails a potentially long and expensive trial which often 
ends up in futile exercise of rights by minority shareholders. As a matter of law, it 
appears that the Malaysian court would not simply entertain a lawsuit taken by a 
minority shareholder who is unhappy over some decision made by a board which has 
acted within its executive powers as “such matters should and could be resolved by 
shareholders in general meeting” (Soh Jiun Jen v. Advance Colour Laboratory Sdn Bhd 
& Ors [2010]2). This majority rule was also affirmed by the Privy Council in Re Kong 
Thai Sawmill (Miri) Sdn Bhd; Kong Thai Sawmill (Miri) Sdn Bhd & Ors v. Ling Beng 
                                                            
2
 [2010] 4 CLJ 897. 
5 
 
Sung [1978]3 where Lord Wilberforce agreed that “those who take interest in companies 
limited by shares have to accept majority rule”. The predominant majority rule also 
means that a minority shareholder would usually face difficulties in challenging the 
wrongdoings done by directors who also control a majority stake in a corporation.  To 
make matter worse, the sanctity of Section 181 can also be manipulated by majority 
shareholders to their advantage since the term “member” is not limited to minority 
shareholders per se. In Owen Sim Liang Khui v. Piasau Jaya Sdn Bhd [1996]4, the 
Federal Court held that Section 181 is also made available to majority shareholders 
“where they are unable to exert their will at a general meeting of the company” although 
the decision of the High Court in Ganeswary d/o Ponnudurai v. Prismatic Sdn Bhd 
[1994]5 spoke to the contrary. 
 
As rightly noted by an eminent author, the law has to strike a delicate balance in cases 
of tussles between majority and minority shareholders (Sealy, 1996). Although the legal 
and regulatory apparatus in Malaysia have shown great alacrity in the recent years 
endeavouring to rewrite the corporate rules and revamp its legal landscape, it remains 
nigh impossible to legally define a thin crystal clear demarcation line between the 
protection afforded to minority shareholders and the consideration of the corporate 
interest as a whole. Such thorny situations may arise when court is faced with the 
dilemma of giving overwhelmed support to majority at the expense of prejudicing 
minority where court is prepared to condone unfair acts and decisions of majority. 
Conversely, the day-to-day operation of a company may be hindered if courts tend to 
favour the exasperating demands and objections of the dissatisfying minorities. This 
predicament inevitably devolves an onerous task of striking a balance upon the court in 
                                                            
3
 [1978] 1 LNS 170. 
4
 [1996] 4 CLJ 716. 
5
 [1994] 4 CLJ 671. 
6 
 
leaving the internal management to the company whilst ensuring that the interest of 
minorities is not imperilled.  
 
In the absence of sound corporate governance system, how directors and management 
can be entrusted to play their role honestly and accountably in such transactions is a real 
challenge. As a result, there is no one set of laws or regulations that is adequate in 
protecting minority shareholders in view of the fact that it, at most, provides cause of 
action for them to seek remedy against majority shareholders or board in the court of 
law. The damage or harm caused to minority shareholders could not simply be undone 
with such initiation of court proceeding via derivative claim since it is a “mere matter of 
procedure in order to give a remedy for a wrong which would otherwise escape redress” 
(Burland v. Earle [1902]6). Rather, the discussion on good corporate governance will 
certainly provide the necessary preventive measures for the purpose of preserving the 
value of minority shareholders via the advertence of corporate malfeasance. 
 
Having said, the ensuing parts of this chapter will examine and discuss the existing 
literatures on corporate governance issues in order to determine whether there is any 
knowledge gap that can give rise to the research question of this dissertation as well as 
the justification for this study. 
 
1.2.2 Knowledge Gap, Research Question and Justification for 
Study 
 
In the wake of the global financial crisis in 2008, the corporate world was truly rattled 
by the credit crunch which unmasked the Bernard Madoff (Madoff) scandal. Ironically, 
                                                            
6
 [1902] AC 83. 
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over the past 16 years, Madoff Investment Securities LLC had been examined multiple 
times by the Securities and Exchange Commission and other regulatory bodies in the 
United States. The fact that Madoff’s alleged $50 billion Ponzi scheme could be swept 
under the carpet and gone undetected under the radar for so long raises the questions of 
the effectiveness of regulatory mechanisms in the USA and other parts of the world. 
This begs the question - is the Madoff scandal a failure of existing legislation in the 
USA, or of a failure of the regulators to enforce the legislation? This begs further 
question – or is it a failure of implementation of corporate governance best practices 
within the corporation itself? The Madoff’s lesson has caused enormous losses to the 
investors and shareholders at large. The lesson learnt here is that the failure to 
implement an effective system of corporate governance would inevitably lead to such 
corporate scandals.  
 
Although the discussion on corporate governance is by no means a new phenomenon, 
the real impetus for international corporate law reform found its root from the Enron 
scandal itself and the myriad of corporate fiascos such as the spectacular collapses of 
WorldCom, Tyco and Global Crossing in USA, Parmalat S.p.A. in Italy, HIH Insurance 
in Australia, and Asia Pulp & Paper in Indonesia that came in its wake. The local scene 
was also captured by the notorious Transmile Group Berhad (Transmile) scandal. It is 
believed that no corporation wishes to be the next Enron or Transmile. This is because 
the slightest hint of corporate fraud scandal could send the price of a company's stock 
plummeting and bring chill to its corporate performance which will in turn put minority 
shareholders’ interest at stake. In relation to this, weak corporate governance has often 
been named as one of the contributory factors of the financial crisis (Mitton, 2002; Suto, 
2003). The aftermath of the Asian financial crisis in 1997 has sharpened the impetus for 
the adoption of a more concerted and holistic approach towards a comprehensive 
8 
 
corporate governance reform in Malaysia. It has since prodded the formation of a High 
Level Finance Committee on Corporate Governance to reform the legal and regulatory 
framework in order to create sound corporate governance standards as well as to 
develop a code of best practices in corporate governance.  
 
Until fairly recently, corporate governance was not an issue that attracted much public 
attention. It was only a topic reserved for discussion in boardrooms or in academic 
forums. Corporate governance “has now become a mainstream concern – a staple of 
discussion in corporate boardrooms, academic meetings, and policy circles around the 
globe” (Claessens, 2006). At present, there is a panoply of literatures on corporate 
governance that advocates the efficacy of different corporate governance structures and 
the superiority of various distinctive corporate governance models. However, dissident 
voices do exist. While there is surmounting evidence of failure of certain corporate 
governance structures and models to enhance corporate performance, the present 
empirical evidence is vastly diverse and only provides little coherent evidence for the 
formulation of corporate governance best practices. One possible explanation is that 
existing literatures have not been adequately comprehensive to discuss on all 
intertwined determinants of good corporate governance. Excessive attentions are drawn 
to discussions on what is the best corporate governance model without having in-depth 
analytical study on the “winning” factors of corporate performance and conformance. 
 
Hitherto, scholars have tried to reconcile the conflict between minority shareholders and 
majority shareholders but thus far this has not been done in the context of corporate 
governance, even though discussion of corporate governance issues has been thriving in 
Malaysia for more than a decade now. It is inevitably that board tussles between rival 
factions and companies will negatively impact the company’s performance in the 
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market when they take too long or become too legalistic to be resolved. Minority 
shareholders who are caught in the middle may regard this prolonged fight as an act 
driven by selfishness and a ‘couldn’t-care-less attitude’ where they are left with no 
remedies at the crossroad. As minority shareholders share a risk that is similar to the 
owners of a company, they deserve equal protection. Most researchers seem to make the 
assumption that inadequate protection of minority shareholders and failure of effective 
implementation of good corporate governance have given rise to expropriation of 
minority rights by majority shareholders. However, most of the studies was also carried 
out on a piecemeal basis based on specific components of corporate governance such as 
the accountability of the board of directors, board structure and size, corporate 
governance structure and performance (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006, Khatri, Leruth, & 
Piesse, 2002), separation of ownership and control (Fama & Jensen, 1983, Claessens, 
Djankov, & Lang, 2000) and so forth. It seems that there is limited research on 
protection of minority shareholders from the perspective of corporate governance.  
 
Many studies in various disciplines like finance, accounting, management and 
economics have been conducted as to whether corporate governance has any 
implication on the corporate performance. Much debate exists on the issue of whether 
the implementation of corporate governance could lead to the enhancement of corporate 
performance and value based on empirical and explanatory analyses. In this regard, 
Shabnam et al. (2009) conducted empirical survey on 10 Malaysian corporations that 
did not practice good corporate governance and vice versa. It was found that there was 
no difference in corporate performance between those corporations. Studies have also 
been carried out to determine the correlation of board structure, composition and size 
with corporate performance (Coles, McWilliams & Sen, 2001; Hermalin & Weisbach, 
2001; Bhagat & Black, 1999; Klein, 1998; Baysinger & Butler, 1985). Common 
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empirical studies delved into the relationship between different structure of corporate 
governance and managerial behaviour or corporate performance (Core, Holthausen & 
Larcker, 1999, Zahra & Pearce, 1989, Becht, et al., 2002). López-Iturriaga, López-de-
Foronda and Santamaría (2007) examined the relationship between ownership 
concentration and firm performance in terms of the mechanisms of corporate 
governance. This study also focused on the extent of control mechanism in resolving 
agency problem relating to conflicts of majority and minority shareholders. Demsetz 
and Lehn (1985) argued that high ownership concentration stimulates more managerial 
monitoring which would subsequently lead to higher corporate performance. 
Nevertheless, there is no conclusive outcome from studies associated with the 
relationship between board characteristics and corporate performance. Some studies 
found little evidence to support that board characteristics have a positive impact on 
corporate performance (Weir & Laing, 1999; Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand & Johnson, 1998) 
whilst other studies suggested otherwise (Bonn, 2004; Kiel & Nicholson, 2003). It 
would be fruitless to examine the board characteristics when the fiduciary duties of the 
board are essential to corporate performance (Abdullah, 2004). 
 
Be that as it may, it seems that there is agreement among the researchers and authors 
that corporate governance and its principles have a positive correlation with the level of 
corporate performance (Chiang, 2005). However, the lacking of research interest in the 
area of governance best practices proves to be difficult for directors or officers to 
effectively implement governance best practices that will eventually lead to the 
improvement of corporate performance. Similarly, Bhimani and Soonawalla (2005) 
rightly pointed out that corporate performance largely depends on the tools and methods 
of best practices which can be more easily tailored and implemented. While there is 
growing evidence of the failure of some governance structures to enhance corporate 
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performance, the empirical evidence to date is mixed and gives little solid indication for 
the shape of a most preferable governance structure. Thence, the research question of 
this dissertation is not framed with regard to the impact of good corporate governance 
on corporate performance since there is abundance of diverging views and research 
findings on the issue. Furthermore, corporate performance is measured in financial 
terms depending on other external factors apart from good governance. It is of utmost 
importance that the research direction should not be mainly driven towards the 
interrelationship between corporate governance and corporate performance since there 
is an ardent research need of formulating a set of corporate governance best practices in 
order to protect minority shareholders from illicit corporate activity or unscrupulous 
board behaviour.  
 
Thus far, the aforesaid literature review revealed that there is scant literature on the 
formulation of a set of corporate governance best practices for the protection of 
minority shareholders. Although most of the authors acknowledged that corporate 
governance is a subject worthy of academic consideration, it is hard to find that they 
touch on the practical insight into governance principles and the implementation of best 
practices within a corporation. For too long corporate governance has been scrutinised 
via a single analytical lens that offers partial insights, but cannot begin to examine the 
full dimensions of the continuing conflict amongst shareholders, or offer convincing 
vindications and explanations on the appropriate governance system or structure. The 
richness and complexity of the ever-changing phenomena involved in corporate 
governance requires the application of a range of theoretical critiques to understand 
more fully the dilemmas involved. Good business ethics dictates excellent compliance 
with good corporate governance code even if pure altruism does not induce sufficient 
motivation for the heightened interest in corporate governance code of best practices. 
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As such, this dissertation attempts to close the gap in the existing literatures by 
formulating a set of corporate governance best practices for the protection of minority 
shareholders in addition to the existing corporate governance code in Malaysia. 
 
To a certain extent, the gap in the research area has been addressed by regulatory 
guidelines and code on governance best practices in Malaysia. For instance, the Report 
on Corporate Governance by the Malaysian High Level Finance Committee (1999) 
which was codified into the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance 2000, the Bursa 
Malaysia’s Corporate Governance Guide (2009), and The Institute of Internal Auditors 
Malaysia’s Statement on Internal Control (2000). Nonetheless, the “cost” of such 
literature is that not much explanation and discussion has been offered on the practical 
application of such principles for the purpose of implementing best practices. Rather, 
they are more of a compilation of regulatory guidelines and codes which merely creates 
box-ticking approach by directors and auditors. Although the Malaysian Code on 
Corporate Governance 2000 was revised in 2007, the best practices provided under the 
revised Code are still largely the same with the old Code. The Code proves to be 
inadequate in terms of the best practices due to rapid evolvement of the corporate world. 
The Code should have contained more new provisions of best practices to enable 
directors and corporations to incorporate into their governance system. Hence, there 
remains a considerable gap of knowledge in this area of research which necessitates 
further analyses on the applicable governance best practices in the spirit of good 
corporate governance principles. The analysis of this dissertation does not end at the 
doorstep of explaining and examining the practical implementation of such best 
practices but it continues to formulate a set of governance best practices in addition to 
the existing Malaysian governance best practices code.  
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Having said that, Minority Shareholders Watchdog Group has also initiated the 
Malaysian Corporate Governance Index (MCG) 2010 which identified the need for 
improvement in the realm of independent directors, duality of CEO and Chairman, 
transparency of nomination process and remuneration policy, risk management and 
other related issues. In this regard, this dissertation sought to fill in the room of 
improvement for the identified area of issues with the aim to contribute to the corporate 
governance regime in Malaysia. Instead of the controversial research regarding the 
impact of corporate governance on corporate performance, the primary research 
question of this dissertation centres on what are the corporate governance best practices 
that could provide adequate protection for minority shareholders. 
 
As the recent financial turmoil takes centre stage, it raises a key research question of 
whether there should be an equivalent single model on corporate governance applicable 
to all corporations throughout the world. The OECD Corporate Governance Principles 
(2004) represents the initial attempt to reach a global consensus as to what constitutes 
good corporate governance principles. These recent efforts protrude the fundamental 
elements underlying the universal principles – fairness, transparency, responsibility and 
accountability as the vital factors that transcend both legal and national boundaries. The 
International Corporate Governance Network (ICGN) has adopted these OECD 
Corporate Governance Principles as the necessary bedrock of good corporate 
governance.  The ICGN urged corporations to amplify the principles to give them 
sufficient force for better governance and to implement them even in the absence of any 
mandatory legal requirements to implement. However, the ambitious approach of 
OECD has somehow overlooked the difficulties of attempting to implement general 
principles across countries from different levels of economic, cultural and legal 
development. It has been argued that this aspiration should not even be fathomed, for 
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corporations will be better off focusing on cleaning up their own backyards. 
Convergence may occur in specific areas such as financial reporting or in disclosure 
standards, but a global standard is simply not feasible (Stephan 1999) since even “any 
attempt to assess the governance of public firms around the world should depend 
critically on ownership structure” (Bebchuk & Hamdani 2009). Despite that, Ho Khai 
Leong (2005) added that “the OECD principles are by no means carved in stone” in that 
they provide a general framework for countries to shape the corporate governance 
principles according to their unique developmental experiences to build their own rules. 
 
It is fair to conclude that the prevalent corporate governance systems in the developed 
economies today is the Anglo-American model which is “market-based” – widely 
dispersed shareholders and a fairly vigorous corporate control via take-overs. The other 
system can be reflected by the “relationship-based” system in Japan and Germany 
which is based on a more concentrated ownership structure – large bank and inter-
corporate holdings with conspicuous absence of control through take-overs (Chew, 
1997). On the other hand, corporate governance structure in Southeast Asia countries is 
predominantly modelled upon “family-controlled” business system (Yeh, Lee & 
Woidtke, 2001). Prominently, public listed corporations are part of enterprises network 
supervised by family-owned holding corporations with minority shareholders as their 
public investors (Young, 2002). In practice, it is not uncommon to see that the 
ownership of a company is controlled by a few shareholders, who are called as 
“controlling shareholders” and the ownership structure is centralised. Despite such 
difference in governance structures, one obvious position predicted that global 
competition will force convergence in diverse corporate governance models. As markets 
globalise and corporations having very difficult governance systems are compelled to 
compete head-to-head, both in labour and capital markets, a Darwinian struggle 
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becomes inevitable, out of which the most efficient form should emerge dominant 
(Easterbrook & Fischel 1991). This position is, however, in contrary with the other view 
that convergence of corporate governance models is unlikely to happen since “different 
corporate governance systems are associated with peculiar managerial decision-making 
criteria, temporal orientations, and diachronic responses to the business cycle” 
(Goldstein, 2001). As a result of globalisation, Guillén (1999) noted an interesting legal 
argument against convergence in corporate governance models that “corporate law is 
intimately related not only to social custom but also to other legal areas, such as 
banking, labour, tax, and competition law, that would be exceedingly hard to change all 
at once because of the various interests created around them”. On this note, Soederberg 
(2003) has been strenuously insisted that the standardisation of corporate governance 
codes and practices is a new imposition of corporate disciplinary landscape upon the 
developing world by politically dominant international agencies. 
 
Generally speaking, there is no irrefutable indication that any single model of corporate 
governance leads to a more superior corporate performance. The Enron debacle has 
eroded confidence in the proposition that the Anglo-American corporate governance 
model is inherently superior” (Bicksler, 2003). In a similar spirit, Kala Anandarajah 
(2004) augured well that “there is no conclusive evidence that having appropriate 
corporate governance procedures and practices increases shareholder value” since it 
varies not only between corporations in a country but also over time for any individual 
corporation. In 1990, Merton H. Miller, a Nobel Laureate Economics recipient argued 
that “per se none of the corporate governance models dominates and none is 
intrinsically superior to the others”. Moreover, the western governance mechanisms 
may not be suitable for transitional economies like Malaysia (Haniffa & Cooke, 2002). 
Regardless of whether such convergence will materialise or not, all the above arguments 
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collectively point to the push for a set of corporate governance best practices that suits 
the best interest of minority shareholders. Be that as it may, the most notable challenge 
now is to shy away from the intense focus on a set of international corporate governance 
standards to dealing with the “hard” issues of practical application and the effective 
implementation of sound corporate governance practices in which each country must 
define for itself the best corporate governance framework. Cadbury (2004) advised that 
nations and corporations are best to embark from where they are and to build on their 
existing structures and systems. Perhaps, the Malaysian corporate governance standard 
may be benchmarked against the governance models in other countries in order to lift up 
the local standard to the international level. 
 
Notwithstanding the reality of this argument, it is strongly believed that a well-crafted 
corporate governance model which outlines the important characteristics of excellent 
corporate governance practices would inevitably provide an impenetrable framework 
for corporations to comply with. In this context, corporate boards and management can 
then opt to adopt the best corporate governance model as their own with the view of 
implementing a balanced corporate control mechanisms and effective oversight of the 
directors’ and officers’ accountability. These implementations can be carried out via the 
maximum involvement of minority shareholders and auditors. Essentially, the quest for 
a distinctive way to make a dent in global competition rather than to converge on a best 
model is preferable for corporations in local context since “globalization seems not to 
be about convergence to best practice, but rather about leveraging difference in an 
increasingly borderless world” (Guillén 2001). Hence, a more flexible and constructive 
corporate governance model which takes cognisance of the pace and level of economic 
development gap as well as the cultural differences is most instructive here. All things 
being equal, the simpler model is preferable to the more complex. Here, the simpler 
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model is that the parallel disciplines of superior corporate performance and strict 
corporate conformance should be merged to create a best practice model for corporate 
governance that keeps all stakeholders and regulators satisfied. Although this 
dissertation briefly discusses on the various corporate governance models regime, it will 
not delve too deeply into the different models of corporate governance. Such a 
discussion will be neither feasible nor desirable within the context of this dissertation 
which aims to formulate a set of corporate governance best practices that champion the 
interests of minority shareholders.  
 
The time has come for us to acknowledge the reality that there will never be one optimal 
governance structure or model since no two economies, two corporations, two legal 
spectre or two cultures are exactly of the same dimension, resulting in extremely 
complicated corporate governance issues. A more probable and fruitful finding of the 
existing literatures might be the increasing focus on minority shareholder interest and 
identification of governance best practices rather than seeking to search for some 
specific mechanisms which are universally applicable. Instead of exhausting efforts to 
nail down on universally applicable governance mechanisms, the remainder of this 
dissertation attempts to suggest a more practical and functional outcome of qualitative 
research which emphasises on minority shareholder interest and concerns.  
 
Bearing the research question in mind, the findings of this dissertation will contribute to 
the study of corporate governance to a large extent. The formulation of a set of 
governance best practices would serve as an all-inclusive guideline for the “preservation 
of shareholder value” that will put in place a stronger safety net for minority interest. At 
this juncture, it does not matter whether the best corporate governance model adopted 
would contribute to the uplifting of corporate performance in the long run. The more 
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favourable argument will be that the protection of minority shareholders does not fall 
squarely on the verge of superior corporate performance as the fate of minority 
shareholders does rely heavily on strict corporate conformance to corporate best 
practices. For while superior corporate performance is certainly important, it is only 
fully realisable if corporations also strive for good conformance to the governance best 
practices. In the end, the numbers and statistics of a good or bad corporate performance 
merely act as a stimulant or poison pill for public listed companies at the mercy of the 
capital market. Although the theoretical discussion on corporate governance is abundant 
in the realm of Malaysian corporate framework, the findings of this study, when set 
against its research objectives, will have significant implications on improving the 
overall implementation of corporate governance practices in Malaysia with the aim to 
protect minority shareholders. 
 
1.3 Objectives of Study 
 
The preliminary study reveals that good corporate governance is pivotal in protecting 
minority shareholders. Good corporate governance implies something more than 
shareholder democracy and the mere rights of shareholders to vote. These rights carry 
with it an obligation to participate, and in the case of shareholder activism, this 
obligation is to optimize shareholders’ interests and management interests for mutual 
benefits of both to contribute to shareholder value. Ultimately, the integrity, credibility 
and efficiency of the market place count for investor confidence as the cornerstone of 
shareholder activism and protection of minority shareholders interest. Hence, the main 
objectives of this study are to pursue good corporate governance and to protect minority 
shareholders. There is an ardent need in employing high standards of corporate 
governance to secure investors’ trust and confidence for a healthy functioning of 
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Malaysian capital market. This is because frank and transparent disclosure of 
procedures and policies must go beyond mere compliance on paper. The real test for 
good corporate governance is not just a matter of prescribing particular corporate 
structures for complying with the hard and fast rules. Real compliance is seen in 
corporate actions and practices that serve shareholders’ interests. 
 
The research objective in this dissertation is different from the existing literatures on 
corporate governance as its formulation of best practices is aimed at protecting minority 
shareholders, in particular. In essence, the objective of this study of corporate 
governance centres on the basis that minority shareholders most often seek to obtain 
from majority shareholders relate to the ability to:- 
 
a) select and elect members to the board of directors; 
b) participate in the decision-making process of a corporation; 
c) influence the outcome of certain corporate actions;   
d) secure representative seats on the board; and 
e) play more active screening role over the activities and decision of the 
board of directors; 
 
Currently, the Annual General Meetings (AGM) and Extraordinary General Meetings 
(EGM) are the only democratic forum for minority shareholders to voice their views or 
dissatisfactions. Some of them see themselves as in an odd role, while a significant 
number of them think that they contribute very little, in the form of sweat, toil, money, 
or even marginal interests, to the corporations in which they are investors. However, 
this democratic forum may not seem to be an effective governance measure for the 
protection of minority shareholders. The failure of implementation of corporate 
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governance best practices enables majority shareholders to acquire a domineering role 
in the implementation of the corporate decision process. As noted by Eisenberg (1969), 
the mala fide manoeuvre by a board over the apathy on the part of institutional 
shareholders has generated serious confusion for courts in defining a director’s 
responsibility to corporations and shareholders. The fact that institutional shareholders 
still remain passive was reflected in 2011 Green Paper on the European Union corporate 
governance framework (Birkmose, Neville & Sorensen, 2011). 
 
In a nutshell, this study seeks to formulate corporate governance best practices in order 
to protect minority shareholders. Considering the complexity of derivative actions and 
statutory minority remedies, all investors not in control of running the company, should 
see the need to be active and to set the right directions for their investments and bring 
effective reforms towards integrity and accountability in listed corporations. 
Corporations that perform effective checks on their internal controls actually outperform 
those with weak internal systems. Notably, an effective corporate governance and ethics 
are the best means to prevent a corporate scandal from occurring in the first place. 
Therefore, it is timely to highlight these concerns so that minority shareholders’ 
grievances and disappointments can be adequately and satisfactorily addressed. 
Minority shareholders should have the ‘teeth’ to bite whenever their patience is over-
tried or over-tested. 
 
1.4 Methodology of Study 
 
As the research objective of this dissertation is theoretical in nature, qualitative research 
methodology is adopted to review the existing literatures related with the corporate 
governance system and structure that promote best practices. Unlike most studies on 
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corporate governance issues in Malaysia and East Asian countries which are based on 
strong quantitative methodological focus and being scattered in numerous disciplines 
(Zahra & Pearce, 1989; McIntyre, Murphy & Mitchell, 2007), this study aims to provide 
a more in-depth legal insights and understanding of corporate governance practices, 
using qualitative and analytical study based approach. The qualitative methodology 
which is adopted in this dissertation is mainly premised on succinct discourse analyses 
and commentaries on the literatures available in order to identify sound governance 
mechanisms. This qualitative study will draw examination from a number of 
jurisdictions but focused on Malaysian public-listed corporations which involve the 
public shareholders at large. The methodology of this study aims at providing positive 
descriptive analysis of the corporate governance best practices for the purpose of 
minority shareholders’ protection.  
 
In essence, this study will adopt a two-tiered approach leading to the ends of this study. 
The first tier is a descriptive analysis which is aimed at exploring the current corporate 
governance structures and their effectiveness in protecting minority shareholders. As for 
the second tier, explanatory analyses will be applied to assess the extent to which 
various mechanisms and best practices are effective to create an all-inclusive golden 
parachute of corporate governance for minority shareholders against the poison pills of 
majority shareholders. It is hoped that the research methodology of this dissertation is 
able to shed some illuminating light upon a comprehensive set of corporate governance 
best practices in Malaysia. While there was some fine-tuning to the Malaysian corporate 
governance regime, the initial study reveals that the corporate governance reform was to 
a certain extent rather inadequate in light of the application of the corporate governance 
recommendations and regulations enforced in Malaysia. The fallacy of application lies 
in the fact that the existing “Anglo-American” model corporate governance code is 
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almost akin to the UK corporate governance code which comprises of differences in 
culture, environment and attitudes towards managing a corporation. Hence, a 
comparative analysis of the relevant regulations and codes of other regional 
jurisdictions will be conducted to formulate a set of corporate governance best practices 
that is tailor-made with the Malaysian corporate culture, environment and legal 
framework. 
 
By the same token, the Malaysian corporate governance reform had undoubtedly 
contributed to years of corporate success before the credit crisis, yet this reform came 
into question following the crisis. Therefore, there is an ardent need for further 
investigation to revisit the corporate governance reform in Malaysia and whether it can 
play a significant role in protecting minority shareholders – an issue that necessitates 
critical scrutiny later in this dissertation. Nonetheless, it was not the aim of this 
dissertation to provide a detailed review of governance reforms in Malaysia. Suffice it 
to say that this study employs the qualitative analyses to critically examine the existing 
governance framework in order to evaluate whether minority shareholders are 
adequately protected as a result.  
 
1.5 Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
 
This dissertation will only adopt qualitative analyses based on literature review and case 
studies given the nature of this study. Hence, it lacks the practicality of researched data 
collected from the primary source like surveys and field work observation. As a result, 
the implication of research findings made is limited since such corporate governance 
best practices are yet to be implemented and tested in the corporate world. Further 
analyses and discussions are required in order to test out the best practices of corporate 
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governance in the real corporate environment. Be that as it may, Kueppers (2010) 
believed that “companies must find the implementation solutions that are most 
appropriate for their investors, management, board and other stakeholders, given the 
company’s current circumstances”. Without effective implementation of such best 
practices, minority shareholders will remain weakly protected.   
 
On top of that, there are also other governance issues that require further research in 
order to provide a more detailed explanation for an effective implementation of best 
practices. For instance, one of the best practices mentioned in chapter 6 is that a board 
should allow shareholders to have more say in corporate strategic decisions and 
corporate governance related matters. However, future research may be helpful in 
providing further insights into the scope of such strategic decisions as well as the level 
of shareholder involvement in such governance matters so as to strike a balance 
between shareholder primacy and board primacy towards corporate primacy. It is also 
important for further studies to ensure that the best practices of shareholder activism do 
not unnecessarily encroach into the decision-making realm of the board and thus 
affecting the running of a corporation. 
 
1.6 Conclusion 
 
Based on the above analyses, the literature review in this chapter sums up the need for 
the best practices of corporate governance to step in and act as the golden scale to 
complement the imperfection of law in balancing the rights of majority and minority 
shareholders with the holistic view of enhancing shareholder values. As an alternative 
remedy, the protective measure of corporate governance may help to prevent or avoid 
the occurrence of corporate malpractices. This chapter also discussed that any attempt to 
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reach a global code on corporate governance rests on doubtful foundation since ‘one 
size does not fit all’. In fact, the converse speaks volume of the reality that ‘one model 
does fit one corporation’. A well-designed corporate governance model based on widely 
accepted corporate governance principles will be the best policy for a particular 
corporation according to its distinctive nature of organisational functions, legal 
responsibilities and economic considerations.  
 
Primarily, “corporate governance must no longer confine its analysis to the relationship 
between managers, boards and shareholders. The narrowness of this focus is a major 
contributing factor to the present round of corporate scandals of which Enron is the 
most emblematic” (Deakin 2003). Hence, a multidimensional approach to implement a 
set of governance best practices within a corporation is indispensable for recognising 
the many well-framed corporate governance principles that might reasonably enhance 
corporate functioning. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
OVERVIEW OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter will begin with the discussions on globalisation in a way that is useful to 
understanding the interplay between globalisation and the cross-national patterns of 
corporate governance in the age of turbulence. It will proceed to canvass on the various 
definitions and basic principles of corporate governance. It will review how corporate 
governance can and has been defined as well as its relevancy with corporate social 
responsibility. This chapter will also explore the reasons why corporate governance 
does matter and the justifications for having a sound corporate governance regime.  
 
2.2 Globalisation and Corporate Governance  
 
Corporate governance has over the years become a common parlance amongst the 
global corporate community. It is an art of term which witnessed its birth in the West, 
but has gradually gained increased significance in the East due to drastic evolvement of 
corporate governance systems led by corporate failures and systemic crises over the 
centuries. In the past few years, corporate scandals, environmental concerns and 
globalisation have all played their role in causing corporate stakeholders especially 
minority shareholders to query and consider how corporations should be governed.  
 
The emphasis on good corporate governance practices is escalating as globalisation is 
liberalising the global markets with efforts being made to attract foreign investments. 
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International financial integration, cross-border trade and investment activities have led 
to many cross-border issues in corporate governance (Williamson, 1996). This also 
increases the importance of good corporate governance, but also makes it more complex, 
resulting in the clash of corporate governance practices and cultures that are at times 
uneasy. In relation to this, the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis is often cited as a catalyst for 
bringing corporate governance to the foreground since most corporations and regulators 
learn their lessons not from theories but from the historical age of turbulence. Since the 
beginning of new millennium, a rethinking of the existing corporate governance 
standards has been called for to establish the legitimacy and sustainability of 
globalisation.  
 
The announcement on the liberalisation of many services sub-sectors by Prime Minister 
of Malaysia, Datuk Seri Najib Razak (New Straits Times, April 2009) will certainly 
become the driving force of globalisation for corporations to compete in a more liberal 
competitive market-economy. This bold revamp will also help to embrace corporate 
governance principles and best practices into an “evolving corporate behaviour and 
rationality” in the future. Most of us mistakenly share the view that globalisation means 
elimination of all barriers and differences – the promotion of homogeneity across the 
face of earth. Globalisation, however, is not a “bulldozer”; it is rather a global 
informational revolution which will not automatically wipe out all disparities and 
barricades between countries and communities. Thus, it is the thesis of this dissertation 
to propose a comprehensive set of corporate governance best practices which belongs to 
the unique identity of Malaysia’s own economic, cultural and legal landscape.  
 
That said, it is not the focus of this chapter to discuss too much on the interplay between 
the world of globalisation and corporate governance. Suffice to say that while the past 
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decade has been spent to lay down the necessary foundation for corporate governance, 
the years ahead will see a pragmatic shift in the corporate agenda – an upward trend 
from mere corporate performance to strict corporate conformance with good corporate 
governance practices. This laudable process of globalised trend is thus labelled as 
“corporalisation” in the corporate world. Just as globalisation impacts the way financial 
markets are perceived all around the world, so too will it change the way in which we 
need to revisit some of the pertinent issues in corporate governance. 
 
2.3 What is Corporate Governance? 
 
To formulate a set of corporate governance best practices, it should first be explained 
what exactly is meant by the concept of corporate governance. Though extensively used 
in theory and practice, the buzzword “corporate governance” defies easy definition. It is 
noted that there is no single definition for corporate governance. In its simplicity, 
Tricker (1984) described that “the origins of the word governance can be found in the 
Latin ‘gubernare’ meaning to rule or to steer”. He added that “the idea of steersman - 
the person at the helm - is a particularly helpful insight into the reality of governance”. 
In fact, the concept of corporate governance resists easy definition. It is not a static 
concept but continually evolving process of controlling management. However, 
corporate governance should be distinguished from the term “management” since it 
refers to the rules, regulations and best practices which ensure accountability, 
transparency and responsibility and not the day-to-day operation of business affairs 
(Darman, 2004). 
 
According to the Report on Corporate Governance by the Malaysian High Level 
Finance Committee in 1999, corporate governance is defined as “the process and 
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structure used to direct and manage the business and affairs of the company towards 
enhancing business prosperity and corporate accountability with the ultimate objective 
of realising long term shareholder value, whilst taking into account the interests of other 
stakeholders”. A final analysis on the above definition reveals that the process and 
structure of corporate governance appear to be designed mainly to police corporate 
behaviour by various stakeholders. It is this external mechanism that is more likely to 
act as a “surveillance video” over corporate actions and decisions as opposed to those 
positive inspirational definitions that merely capture the enthusiasm of board and 
management.  
 
Furthermore, the link between corporate governance and monitoring performance is 
clearly expressed in the definition stipulated by the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) in 2004 which practically defines corporate 
governance as: 
 
. . . the system by which business corporations are directed and controlled. The 
corporate governance structure specifies the distribution of rights and 
responsibilities among different participants in the corporation, such as the board, 
managers, shareholders and other stakeholders, and spells out the rules and 
procedures for making decisions on corporate affairs. By doing this, it also 
provides the structure through which the company objectives are set, and the 
means of attaining those objectives and monitoring performance are determined. 
 
The aforesaid authoritative functional definition expounded by OECD succinctly 
reflects the process and structure of corporate governance referred to in the Report on 
Corporate Governance by the High Level Finance Committee above.  Both definitions 
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explain the division of power and accountability among shareholders, board and 
management, and its impact on other stakeholders such as employees, creditors 
including customers and suppliers, and community at large. It is widely acknowledged 
that there should be a set of rules and mechanisms to govern the process and structure of 
directing and managing the business and affairs of a corporation. Similarly, this 
explanation also shares the same spectaculars of key shareholder activists, Monks and 
Minow (2001) who defined corporate governance in its narrowest sense by limiting the 
primary participants in determining the direction of a corporation to shareholders, 
management, and board. Hence, corporate governance can also be viewed as a set of 
internal corporate arrangements which design the relationship between the owners and 
managers of a corporation. On the other hand, Sir Adrian Cadbury (2000) defined 
corporate governance, in its broadest sense, as “holding the balance between economic 
and social goals and between individual and communal goals”. He argued that “the 
governance framework is there to encourage the efficient use of resources and equally 
to require accountability for the stewardship of those resources”. Regardless of the 
broadness or narrowness of these definitions, they share a common point that corporate 
governance is all about board responsibility and accountability in managing the 
relationship amongst the various stakeholders of the corporation.  
 
Further, corporate governance can also be defined from two other perspectives – the 
corporation’s perspective and the public policy perspectives. From the standpoint of a 
corporation, corporate governance is given major significance in relation to value 
maximisation subject to complying with the corporation’s legal, financial, contractual, 
and other obligations. In view of attaining durable sustained value for a corporation, this 
perspective emphasises the ability of a board to balance the interests of shareholders 
with those of other stakeholders – employees, customers, suppliers, investors and 
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communities. With respect to the public policy perspective, “corporate governance is 
about nurturing enterprises while ensuring accountability in the exercise of power and 
patronage by firms” (Iskander & Chamlou, 2000). Hence, it can be understood from 
these two perspectives that there are two distinct forces that co-exist in a structure of 
corporate governance vis-à-vis the internal forces which define the inter-correlation 
among the corporate key players and the external forces which include policy, legal, 
regulatory and market that oversee the corporate behaviour and performance.  
 
Even though it is hardly possible to define its exact scope, corporate governance is a 
multidimensional concept due to its involvement of various stakeholders’ interests. This 
dissertation thus defines corporate governance in terms of the pillars of corporate 
governance code of best practices which cover the generic concepts of “external” and 
“internal” corporate governance. It strives to ensure that corporations exercise their 
responsibilities towards shareholders effectively and satisfactorily. The “external 
corporate governance” may be defined as governance based on the presence and roles of 
the key stakeholders – auditors, minority shareholders, institutional shareholders, 
independent directors and corporate players as well as related corporate monitoring 
mechanisms and risk management. The “internal corporate governance” seems to 
suggest that corporate governance may be built around corporate values, corporate 
culture, ethics and management strategy with the enforced grips of laws and regulations 
upon board functions and establishment of committees. 
 
The foregoing discussions entail the many different definitions of corporate governance. 
Although the term “corporate governance” is oft used, yet it lacks a precise definition 
since it involves transparency and accountability which render it thorny, if not 
unfeasible to capture the process and structure of corporate governance. Legally 
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speaking, corporate governance defines the respective roles and responsibilities of 
corporate key players and their influence in steering the course of a corporation towards 
the zenith of quality modern corporate life. In term of the protection of minority 
shareholders, one thing is certain – all of these definitions invariably address the 
following central theme in this dissertation which illustrates corporate governance as: 
the fortified legal and regulatory backbone of a corporation which supports its core 
skeleton of enhanced interactions, accountable relationships and systemic monitored 
functionality between its well-built body that governs (the board and top management), 
its constant bloodstream that keeps it alive (contributors of capital), its running feet that 
administer (seniors managers and corporate counsel), its employed hands that toil 
(employees or workers), its vital eyes that monitor (Chief Governance Officer and 
independent auditors) and autonomous brain that decides (all key stakeholders that have 
vested interest and other parties that take part to varying degrees in the decision making 
process).  In the final analysis, the entire physiology of this corporate anatomy will 
eventually spiritualise its soul (business prosperity and corporate accountability) that 
vitalise its heartbeat (long term shareholder value) in the long run.  
 
2.3.1 Is a Definition Still Useful? 
 
Have we ever paused to ponder upon the words “corporate governance”? We may want 
to question the ordinary layman on the street who may sometimes dabble on stocks 
investment and it is most likely that the response will be a blurred stare or a cynical look. 
The aftermath of corporate scandals has not enlightened the ordinary investors about 
what corporate governance really stands for in reality nor the implication of corporate 
governance in the corporate world. It seems to them that the words “corporate 
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governance” serve no significance to their stocks investment since the share prices and 
the rate of return on their investments are their only concerns. 
 
By the same token, the question whether the definitions of corporate governance are 
comprehensive, all-embracing or precise in every sense does not bring to us the 
significance of these definitions when it comes to the protection of minority 
shareholders. Corporate governance is all about effectiveness of mechanisms that 
minimise agency conflicts involving managers, with particular emphasis on the legal 
mechanisms that prevent managers from expropriating minority shareholders (Shleifer 
& Vishny, 1997). The most imperative concern here is how best corporate governance 
principles are derived from these compatible definitions in order to be effectively 
implemented upon a corporations.  
 
In other words, implementing good corporate governance practices spell out that 
corporations have to practise transparency, accountability and integrity. Therefore, the 
formulation and implementation of corporate governance principles warrant a careful 
consideration by those championing the rights of minority shareholders in culling out 
the ultimate objectives behind all these definitions for a deep understanding of corporate 
governance principles based on these definitions would certainly be useful to formulate 
the gist of the chapters which follow. 
 
2.3.2 Why Does Corporate Governance Matter? 
 
The collapse of high-profile corporate giants such as Enron, WorldCom and the recent 
case of Satyam rammed home like never before the importance of strong and ethical 
corporate governance. What used to occur silently behind closed boardroom doors is 
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now a matter of considerable public interest in light of the recent credit crisis which has 
highlighted some of the dilemmas of corporate governance. These scandals, however, 
are just manifestations of some structural reasons why corporate governance has 
become more crucial for economic development and well-being (Becht et al., 2003). 
 
Basically, the very question that springs into our minds – is good corporate governance, 
as a standalone principle, sufficient to placate stakeholders with a vested interest in a 
corporation or minority shareholders whose backs have been pushed against the 
scandalous wall at the spectre of fraud, mismanagement and unaccountability in the 
boardroom? Be that as it may, good corporate governance practices encourage a 
corporation to deliver the message of reliability, trustworthiness, efficiency and stability 
to all its stakeholders. Evidently, corporate governance does matter predominantly to 
the preservation of shareholder value when it has been proven that both before (Joh, 
2003) and after (Mitton, 2002) the Asian financial crisis in 1997, Asian corporations 
that focused on sound corporate governance practices provided greater protection to 
shareholders, especially minority shareholders.  
 
Mensah et al. (2003) view that corporate governance is one of the most effective means 
to reduce the occurrence of corporate corruption as well as creating “safeguards against 
corruption and mismanagement, while promoting fundamental values of a market 
economy in a democratic society”. Corruption is deemed to be the most-feared term in a 
corporation since it may trigger havoc to the stability of a corporation which would in 
turn cause catastrophic effect upon minority shareholders’ interest. It also drains 
corporations’ resources and erodes competitiveness driving away investors. In this 
regard, the world has witnessed many notorious corporate collapses due to fraud or 
corrupt practices by board and management. To make matter worse, the unethical act of 
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unscrupulous auditors who assist the deceitful board to bury their corrupt practices 
under the boardroom carpet has added salt to the corporate wound. These corporate 
malpractices can be evidenced from the classic examples of Enron and Transmile. 
 
Better structures and processes of corporate governance improve the internal corporate 
decision-making for the purpose of long-term prosperity.  In addition, it also enhances a 
corporation’s access to domestic and international source of finance from public and 
private entities since higher market valuations are also accorded to well-governed 
companies when compared with those poorly governed corporations. For instance, 
corporations must improve governance in order to meet more stringent listing 
requirements set at international equity markets. Moreover, sound corporate governance 
is a source of competitive advantage and critical to economic and social progress 
(Iskander & Chamlou, 2000). The wider economic significance of corporate governance 
became apparent as can be seen from the statements of World Bank (2000) “good 
corporate governance is not only about its increasing importance to international 
investors but also its protection of domestic investors”. Yet the better reason for 
heightened interest in corporate governance owes it to the present general sense that 
corporations must be well-governed if they are to do good to the larger picture of the 
economy and society. As James Wolfensohn, the former President of the World Bank 
put it, “the proper governance of companies will become as crucial to the world 
economy as the proper governing countries” (CACG Guidelines, 1999). 
 
On the flip side of the same coin, the investors’ confidence towards the fundamentals of 
the corporations may be strengthened through the close adherence of corporate best 
practices. The bottom line is that investors seek out corporations that have sound 
corporate governance structures. Indeed, McKinsey & Company (2002) conducted 
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“Global Investor Opinion Survey on Corporate Governance” which indicated that 
significant majority of investors are willing to pay a premium for the securities of a 
corporation which has good corporate governance practices and most of them prefer 
well-governed corporations as opposed to poorly-governed ones where these 
corporations have comparable financial performance. This survey provides an 
imperative insight into the relative importance of corporate governance best practices. 
They are inversely co-related with the perception that reflects the increased confidence 
of minority shareholders regarding the value of investment in a corporation which 
adopts the governance best practices. Therefore, regulators and corporations should take 
cue from these findings to improve their awareness and conceptual understanding of 
corporate governance, and perhaps more importantly, to implement such pragmatic 
corporate governance principles as are required to upgrade the standards thereof. 
Recognising the importance of good corporate governance, the ensuing section 
highlights the basic principles of corporate governance for the purpose of formulating 
corporate governance best practices in chapters 5 and 6. 
 
2.3.3 Basic Principles of Good Corporate Governance 
 
Although the concept of corporate governance has been recognised in the past, the need 
for greater transparency and the idea of stricter accountability towards minority 
shareholders are seen to be mowed from the backbone of the trust that investors have in 
a corporation. The question remains – what exactly are good corporate governance 
principles? A simple definition would classify it as an environment where individuals in 
control of a corporation provide quality management to advance the corporate values in 
the interests of all shareholders, regardless of whether they are minority or majority 
shareholders. This dissertation recognises that it is the interests, and not the rights, of 
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minority shareholders that need to be given emphatic considerations as the rights 
conferred by law are rarely comprehensive enough to avoid the undermining of minority 
shareholders’ legitimate interests. As for such legitimate interests, they are in fact 
consistent with the long-term interest of a corporation. Both shareholders and 
corporations are well-served when management achieves the corporate goals and 
preserves the value of their shareholdings through good corporate governance. 
 
Good corporate governance strikes the same chord with the core principles of 
transparency, board accountability and shareholder rights which have long been seen as 
the “holy trinity” of sound corporate governance. It encompasses shareholders’ rights, 
board independence, internal control, risk management and other guiding principles 
which will be consistently reflected throughout the discussions in this dissertation. 
Bearing in mind these principles, it will facilitate the formulation of corporate 
governance best practices. It is worth to note that the principles of good corporate 
governance are also intertwined with the concept of corporate social responsibility 
which has gradually gained its prominence nowadays. 
 
2.3.4 Corporate Governance and Corporate Social Responsibility 
 
In the 1930s, the early proponents on the idea of corporate social responsibility – Berle 
and Means (1932) opined that a modern corporation should be a “social institution” 
involving an interrelation of a wide diversity of economic interests. This idea requires 
corporate restructure in order to include social policies within the financial structure of 
the corporate activities (Sheikh, 1996). Bursa Malaysia clearly defined corporate social 
responsibility as “open and transparent business practices that are based on ethical 
37 
 
values and respect for the community, employees, the environment, shareholders and 
other stakeholders. It is designed to deliver sustainable value to society at large”7. 
 
The broadness of corporate social responsibility, though sometimes at its advantage, has 
also been seen as its major drawback, as the often-cited criticism by Votaw (1973) 
illustrated that “to some it conveys the idea of legal responsibility or liability; to others 
it means socially responsible behaviour in an ethical sense; to still others, the meaning 
transmitted is that of ‘responsible for’, in a causal mode; many simply equate it with a 
charitable contribution.” Hence, it means differently to different people due to its wide 
range of responsibility involving the society at large. Perhaps, it is hard to ignore the 
definition explained by Schreck (2009) that “definitions of corporate social 
responsibility lies the idea that actions and decisions by a company do not only concern 
its own interests but also those of society as a whole, or in economic terms: companies 
should internalise negative external effects”. In other words, corporate social 
responsibility requires directors to adhere to best practices that promote the interest of 
the public at large apart from shareholders and investors. 
 
In a similar vein, corporate social responsibility should not be perceived as a mere 
corporate philanthropy which touches on poverty and woes of mankind. It has been 
irretrievably linked with good corporate governance practices that add value to a 
corporation. As correctly pointed out by Cheah (2008) – “are not these two good 
‘fellows’ sharing the same bed of ethical practices leading to a high valued corporation”? 
It is viewed that corporate governance and corporate social responsibility do converge 
in the same bed of business ethics and good financial reporting system. For instance, 
corporate social responsibility manifested the reporting initiative of “triple bottom line” 
                                                            
7
 Bursa Malaysia. Corporate social responsibility (CSR) framework for Malaysian public listed companies. Retrieved March 2, 
2009, from http://www.klse.com.my  
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reporting which is designed to highlight the view that the financial bottom line is 
inadequate in measuring corporate success (Dechow & Skinner 2000). It is argued that 
equal consideration should be given to the social impacts and the environmental impacts 
arising from the corporate engagement with its daily affairs. This “triple bottom line” 
reporting constitutes an alternative means of avoiding reporting irregularities since 
financial success relies on the economic, social as well as environmental sustainability.  
 
In the past, good corporate governance and corporate social responsibility had little to 
do with each other. The growing activism of minority shareholders, however, has 
recognised that corporate governance must be encouraged as it is one of the drivers 
behind the prevalent enthusiasm amongst corporations to assume greater corporate 
social responsibility. Nonetheless, a clear demarcation line should be drawn between the 
notion of corporate social responsibility and that of corporate governance obligation. 
The former has been described in the sense that corporate stakeholders should be 
advocating corporations to incorporate social responsibility into their corporate 
governance structure. It moves beyond the realm of corporate governance principles to 
include corporate commitments to publicise their responsibilities and explain to 
stakeholders how they are allaying concerns. Focusing on the legal aspect, this means 
that “social responsibility begins where the law ends. A firm is not being socially 
responsible if it merely complies with the minimum requirements of the law, because 
this is what any good citizen would do” (Davis, 1973). Broadly speaking, corporate 
social responsibility is viewed as transcending beyond fulfilling corporate governance 
obligations. On the contrary, the latter merely requires corporations to be law-abiding 
corporate citizens with regard to law and regulatory compliance. Due to the main 
objectives of this dissertation, the discussion of corporate social responsibility is not 
part of further analysis. 
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2.4 Conclusion 
 
Last but not least, this chapter makes a final note that corporate governance does matter 
in protecting minority shareholders. Good corporate governance principle goes in 
tandem with the rights and powers of shareholders which will be eventually translated 
into corporate governance best practices. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
MALAYSIAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORM 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter will review the reforms and measures introduced thus far to enhance the 
level of corporate governance in Malaysia. In essence, this chapter will highlight the 
roles and functions of various corporate governance regulatory regimes and 
stakeholders. Reviews are made on such corporate governance reform to identify the 
regulatory defects. The aim is to evaluate the extent of which these regulatory reforms 
have been effective in safeguarding the interest of minority shareholders. The 
shortcomings or defects, if any, will be underscored so that improvements can be made 
to the existing corporate governance regime.  
 
It is also necessary to briefly examine the existing literatures addressing development of 
corporate governance best practices in other jurisdictions in order to assist in 
formulating the corporate governance best practices for the protection of minority 
shareholders. Last but not least, this chapter concludes the discussion by reaffirming the 
need to have a new set of corporate governance best practices that will be formulated in 
chapter 5 and 6 of this dissertation. 
 
3.2 A Review of the Corporate Governance Reform in Malaysia 
 
The catalyst for corporate governance reform in Malaysia was the Asian financial crisis 
in 1997/1998 (Ho & Wong, 2001). As a result, various regulatory reforms were 
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undertaken in the corporate governance regime. The push for corporate governance 
reform also calls for institutional and minority shareholders to participate more actively 
in the process of decision making and governing the corporations with higher 
transparency as well as wider accountability. Hence, the ensuing sub-sections will 
examine the corporate governance reform in Malaysia since 1997 in order to highlight 
the loopholes in the governance framework. Such identified defects are pivotal in 
setting the path towards the formulation of governance best practices in chapter 5 and 6 
of this dissertation. 
 
3.2.1 Regulatory Effort in the Corporate Governance Development 
 
When Malaysian regulators started to acknowledge the fact that poor corporate 
governance is one of the major factors leading to economy meltdown in 1997/1998, the 
High Level Finance Committee (“the Committee”) in its Report on Corporate 
Governance (“the Report”), has among others, introduced the Malaysian Code of 
Corporate Governance (Finance Committee on Corporate Governance, 2000) and 70 
recommendations in March 2000 to deal with the corporate governance issues. The 
Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance introduced by the High Level Finance 
Committee was subsequently revised on 1 October 2007 (“the Code”). The Code has 
brought significant amendments that focused on the duties and responsibilities of 
nominating committee and board of directors, the composition of audit committees for 
the enhancement of corporate governance framework in Malaysia.  
 
In essence, the Revised Code spells out the important principles and best practices on 
corporate governance structures and systems that corporations may adopt in their 
governance framework. It has also created some corporate governance principles and 
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best practices which are explained in the Revised Code’s explanatory notes with the aim 
to attain the finest corporate governance framework. The Revised Code also reflects, 
amongst others, the importance of independence of nominating and audit committee as 
the former plays a vital role for board of director's appointment and reappointment 
whilst the latter acts as an effective check and balance on corporate financial status. For 
instance, it is required that corporation shall maintain a minimum one-third of 
independent non-executive directors in its composition of board of directors. Moreover, 
the Revised Code also stresses on the internal audit mechanisms within a corporation 
which have emerged as an important means to filter and report any corporate 
malpractices at an early stage.  
 
Apart from the Revised Code, the Report has also brought to the establishment of the 
Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group (“MSWG”) in August 2000. It is a non-profit 
company limited by guarantee which comprises of government-linked institutional 
investment funds as its founding members. One of its corporate objectives is to advise 
its members on issues of corporate governance, particularly those pertaining to the 
rights of minority shareholders. To improve corporate governance performance, Bursa 
Malaysia has also launched a Corporate Governance Guide together with the MSWG’s 
implementation of a Malaysian Corporate Governance Index and Awards on 10 June 
2009. The Corporate Governance Guide is intended to provide guidelines to corporate 
boards and managements on how to practise good corporate governance instead of the 
normal box-ticking approach. On the other hand, the Malaysian Corporate Governance 
Index and Awards are designed to enhance corporate governance best practices and to 
recognise good corporate governance practices amongst the public listed corporations in 
Malaysia. It “will provide a reliable gauge for investors to rate local public listed firms 
based on their level of adhering to globally accepted corporate governance standards” 
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(The Business Times Malaysia, 10 June 2009). The top 100 corporations would be 
measured in-depth and will be ranked based on corporate governance conformance, 
financial performance and corporate engagement.  
 
This new initiative made by MSWG marked a new era of rating corporate standard in 
Malaysia.  This new measure will in turn help to track corporations that do not comply 
with the mandatory disclosure requirements at an early phase in terms of corporate 
governance standards. The Chief Executive Officer of Bursa Malaysia, Datuk Yusli 
Mohamed Yusoff supported the MSWG’s extended efforts to gauge the corporate 
governance performance of corporations beyond the mere box-ticking approach as 
shown in their annual reports. He remarked that there will be a shift from form to 
substance if the corporate governance issues pertaining to shareholders’ rights and 
board accountability are adequately addressed in the daily operation of a corporation 
(New Straits Times, June 10, 2009). Besides that, MSWG also played its active role in 
participating in the general meetings of corporations they invested. For instance, MMC 
Corp Bhd has proposed to buy the unprofitable Senai Airport Terminal Services Sdn 
Bhd for RM1.7billion in 2009. The transaction came to limelight since it involved 
related-party transaction in which both the corporations are controlled by Tan Sri Syed 
Mokhtar Al-Bukhary. Representing the voice of minority shareholders, the MSWG has 
played a useful role in intervening in the transaction concerned by demanding a second 
valuation from MMC Corp Bhd. The second valuation was necessary to determine 
whether the offer price was fair enough to minority shareholders or not. 
 
In March 1998, the High Level Finance Committee on Corporate Governance also set 
up the Malaysian Institute of Corporate Governance (MICG). It is a non-profit public 
company limited by guarantee, with founding members consisting of the Federation of 
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Public Listed Companies (FPLC), Malaysian Institute of Accountants (MIA), Malaysian 
Association of Certified Public Accountants (MICPA), Malaysian Institute of Chartered 
Secretaries and Administrators (MAICSA) and Malaysian Institute of Directors (MID). 
The MICG was established, amongst others, to assist the development of corporate 
governance in Malaysia and to tailor the governance practices to suit the needs of the 
local corporate arena (Dato’ Shahran Laili Abdul Munid, 2006). In view of the 
importance of high quality accounting standard and reporting in corporate governance, 
the Malaysian Accounting Standards Board (MASB) was also established in March 
1997 via the Financial Reporting Act 1997 as the sole authority to set accounting 
standards for Malaysia. It reviews and develops accounting and reporting standards 
based on the international best accounting practices and standards.  
 
On 1 August 2009, the Companies Commission of Malaysia also teamed up with the 
Malaysian Institute of Integrity to promote both common interests in “increasing 
cooperation and collaboration on areas relating to corporate integrity, business ethics, 
corporate governance and corporate social responsibility” (New Straits Times, 1 August 
2009). It is understood that the Training Academy under the Companies Commission of 
Malaysia will also organise “joint education and training programmes such as 
curriculum development, module design and learning interventions”. This initiative can 
be seen as part of the regulator’s effort to cultivate awareness on the importance of good 
corporate governance practices amongst corporations through enhancing the corporate 
learning curve. 
 
With regard to mandatory regulatory framework on corporate governance, it is worth to 
take into account the Companies Act 1965 which was amended on 23rd May 2007 via 
the Companies (Amendment) Act 2007 with the aim of uplifting the corporate 
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governance standards in Malaysia. The amendments, amongst others, include the 
insertion of new Section 131A into the Companies Act 1965 which prohibits a director 
of a public company or subsidiary company of a public company who has an interest in 
a contract entered into or proposed to be entered into by the company from voting on, or 
participating in the discussion on, the contract or proposed contract while the contract or 
proposed contract is being discussed in the meeting of board of directors. The 
amendments made to Section 132 of Companies Act 1965 have also further amplified 
the duties and responsibilities of corporate directors.  
 
On the other hand, Section 132E of the Companies Act 1965 was amended to prohibit a 
company from carrying into effect any arrangement or transaction where a director or 
substantial shareholder of the company or its holding company or person connected 
with such director or substantial shareholder acquires from or dispose to the company 
shares or non-cash assets of a requisite value. Moreover, the amended Section 134 of 
the Companies Act 1965 also obliges directors to disclose the interests of their spouses 
or children which include adopted children and stepchildren as part of their disclosure 
of interest in the corporation. The preceding amendments are intended to enhance the 
governing laws on related-party transactions and corporate disclosure requirements. 
 
As for the holdings of corporate meetings, Section 145 of the Companies Act 1965 was 
amended to the effect that public company shall issue the notice to call for its annual 
general meeting to its members not less than 21 days prior to the scheduled meeting. It 
is believed that this will provide reasonable opportunities to all shareholders to prepare 
for the meeting. This provision is further enhanced by the introduction of new Section 
145A of the Companies Act 1965 which allows a corporation to hold shareholders’ 
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meeting at various venues through the utilisation of modern information communication 
technology. 
 
Another important amendment of the Companies Act 1965 covers the provisions on 
whistleblowers which impose mandatory obligation upon an auditor of public 
corporation to report to the Companies Commissioner of Malaysia any serious offence 
involving fraud or dishonesty that he or she has a reason to believe has been committed 
by any officer or employee of a corporation.  In this regard, the auditors who have 
unravelled and reported the fraudulent offence in the performance of their legal duties 
and in good faith are fully protected by Section 174A of Companies Act 1965 against 
any court or disciplinary proceedings. This amendment seeks to shield the bona fide 
auditors from being persecuted for whistle blowing the corporations which they are 
engaged to audit. 
 
As part of the latest regulatory effort, the Capital Market Services Act 2007 was 
amended in 2010 to enhance the enforcement powers of the Securities Commission 
against a director or officer who has committed corporate crime or securities offences 
which in turn caused a wrongful loss to a public listed corporation or its subsidiary to 
the detriment of shareholders of the public listed corporation. Through the new 
amendments, a new offence was created to forbid any person from influencing, coercing 
or misleading any person engaged in the preparation or audit of financial statements of a 
public listed corporation. Besides that, an independent Auditor Oversight Board was 
also established via the amendments to the Securities Commission Act 1993. These 
amendments are commendable since it goes in line with the “Malaysia’s regulatory 
objectives of fair and orderly markets, transparency, financial soundness and investor 
protection” (The Business Times Malaysia, 30 June 2009).  
47 
 
 
As the Malaysian economy continues to resist the global financial crisis in the 21st 
century, the belligerence of regulators’ efforts towards development of better corporate 
governance reflects that a higher level of corporate governance conformance and 
performance is required. Such legal moves necessitate the right attitude and behaviour 
among the corporate industry to reach the next level of corporate governance standards 
in Malaysia. It follows that the impacts of such reform on the local corporate 
performance should be accessed in order to point out any regulatory gap that hinders the 
effective implementation of corporate governance best practices. 
 
3.2.2 Corporate Governance Performance and its Regulatory Gaps 
in Comparison with Other Countries 
 
With the proliferation of regulatory efforts in improving the corporate governance 
standard, it is then important to shed light on the impact of corporate governance reform 
on the corporate governance performance in Malaysia. Sang-Woo Nam and Il Chong 
Nam (2004) found in their questionnaire surveys that “the gap between the regulatory 
framework and formal corporate governance practices is probably not particularly large, 
but that a substantial gap exists between the regulatory framework and practices in 
substance or spirit”. Hence, in accessing the corporate governance performance from 
the Malaysia’s experience, it is necessary to discuss whether the substantial gap 
between the regulatory framework and corporate governance practices in Malaysia has 
been bridged by the regulatory reforms made by the local regulators and relevant 
agencies. 
 
48 
 
According to the CG Watch 2007 report issued by the investment firm, CLSA Asia-
Pacific Markets in collaboration with the Hong Kong-based Asian Corporate 
Governance Association (ACGA) 8, Malaysia was ranked in the sixth position among 11 
Asian countries for its corporate governance ranking based on issues such as rules and 
practices, enforcement, accounting, governance culture and political and regulatory 
environment. Notably, the report observed that the corporate governance landscape in 
Asia has “generally been on an improving trend” despite the fact that many Asian 
governments, regulators and market participants were growing complacent about the 
need for further corporate governance reforms.  
 
However, ACGA’s secretary-general, Jamie Allen criticised the slower pace of 
corporate governance reform around the region where some regulators have even “taken 
their eye off the governance ball”. Specific attention was also drawn to the local 
corporate scandal of Transmile’s accounting fraud which stood as a chapter itself in the 
report – “Malaysia – Transmile testing the market”. The report further stated that “we 
have not noticed a significant step-change and the market hit some serious potholes 
when Transmile’s accounting irregularities came to the fore” in 2007. This report 
indicated that Malaysia has not fared well in the recent corporate governance 
performance as can be seen from its poor ranking compared with its counterparts in the 
Asia region. It was explained in the report that the poor ranking was partly due to the 
tightened scoring process and more focus was given to corporate compliance with 
corporate governance rules and best practices. 
 
In April 2009, Chief Executive Officer of Securities Industry Development Corp 
(SIDC), John Zinkin has scathing criticisms against the Malaysia’s legal framework for 
                                                            
8
 CG Watch. (2007). Corporate governance in Asia, CLSA Asia Pacific markets in collaboration with the Asian Corporate 
Governance Association. Regional Special Report. 
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corporate governance which has slithered behind most developed countries and even 
some emerging markets in the last four years. It was said that the fall began in 2005 
“when directors of listed companies were no longer mandated to attend continuous 
training on a regular basis”. This phenomenon occurred when Bursa Malaysia removed 
the mandatory requirements of accreditation programme (MAP) and continuing 
education programme (CEP) for corporate directors of listed corporations in January 
2005 as a result of the demands for its removal from the corporate sector. The board of 
directors of public listed corporations were then given the sole discretion to decide on 
the needs of continuous specific training for their directors. Consequently, it will put a 
stop on the “momentum for corporate governance excellence” which in turn has caused 
other nations outshined Malaysia in terms of the best corporate governance system (The 
New Straits Times, 27 April 2009). This faded focus on corporate governance was 
supported when PricewaterhouseCoopers Executive Chairman, Datuk Johan Raslan said 
that: “I noticed that when the Code of Corporate Governance came out in 2000, there 
was a heightened understanding of all the CG concepts. I think it has gone down” (The 
Star Online, Saturday April 25, 2009). As such, it can be seen that the focus on 
corporate governance has been waning in terms of compliance with the governance best 
practices. 
 
Similarly, the USA also introduced the Sarbanes Oxley Act 2002 in the wake of the 
infamous Enron and WorldCom scandals. Due to the extensive discussions on the 
regulatory reform in the crisis-hit Asian countries (ADB 2000, 2001), it is best to 
comprehend the level of corporate governance conformance and performance in 
Malaysia by examining how corporate governance systems in other jurisdictions 
address the same issues. It aims to address these issues via brief comparative studies on 
the corporate governance systems and structures in other jurisdictions since corporate 
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governance developments in these jurisdictions like USA and UK often serve as a 
useful guide to local corporate governance reform. Despite the abundance of descriptive 
explanation contained in the existing literatures by scholars around the globe, the test 
for corporate governance issues lies in finding the defining line to explain the diverse 
corporate governance structures and systems. This defining line is in tandem with the 
importance of ownership concentration as one of the key ingredients of corporate 
governance (Schleifer & Vishny, 1997). 
 
Generally, there are two ownership patterns: ownership type (who owns corporations: 
families, State or government, financial institutions, individuals, institutional investors, 
etc.) and how much they own (majority or dispersed ownership). The ownership 
structure of Malaysian corporations tends to be highly concentrated in the hands of a 
relatively small number of individuals, families and State enterprises (Shim, 2006). 
Comparatively, the corporate governance system in Malaysia is premised on the market-
based governance model or Anglo-American system to a large extent (Liew, 2007). The 
Anglo-American system is classified as “dispersed ownership expecting short term 
returns, strong shareholder rights, arm's length creditors financing through equity, active 
markets for corporate control, and flexible labour markets” (Aguilera et al., 2004). 
Sang-Woo Nam and Il Chong Nam (2004) argued that “in companies controlled by 
family owners, these owners could pursue their private interests relatively easily and 
often at the expense of minority shareholders and firms’ profits”. It is noted that the 
high concentration of shareholding can lead to poor corporate governance as a small 
group can exercise control over a corporation and pursue the objectives of the insiders at 
the cost of the outsiders or minority shareholders (Claessens, Djankov, Fan & Lang, 
1999).  
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In contrast, the corporate governance system in Continental Europe as demonstrated by 
Germany and Japan focuses on “long-term debt finance, ownership by large 
blockholders, weak markets for corporate control, and rigid labour markets” (Aguilera, 
2005). Large shareholders ,often, referred as block shareholders can benefit minority 
shareholders because of their power and incentive to prevent expropriation (Mitton, 
2002). Due to the ample literatures and discussions on the corporate ownership 
structures (Bebchuk et al., 1999; Ayoib et al., 2003; Chen & Ho, 2000; Fan & Wong, 
2002; Lemmon & Lins, 2001), suffice it to say here that the differences in these areas 
like the ownership structures, institutional and socio-cultural norms have thus accounted 
for some of the notable differences in the corporate governance models and regulatory 
framework found on either side of the Atlantic.  
 
Basically, the regulatory framework for corporate governance in Malaysia has adopted 
the hybrid approach where there are mandatory regulations like securities laws, 
Companies Act 1965 and Bursa Securities Listing Requirements which comes into force 
in June 2001 as well as voluntary self-regulation like the Revised Code. However, this 
dissertation does not wish to delve deeply into the distinctive features and structures of 
the corporate governance models and regulatory framework in these jurisdictions. What 
is of major concern here is the discussion on the “comply or explain” principle present 
in the UK’s Combined Code on Corporate Governance and Malaysia’s Revised Code. 
 
Strictly speaking, the Revised Code requires corporations to comply with the provisions 
of the Code taking appropriate action whenever possible to secure compliance or 
explain why they have not complied. Paragraph 15.26 of the Bursa Malaysia Listing 
Requirements also mandates that a public listed corporation must include the 
“Corporate Governance Statement” in its annual report stating its compliance with the 
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Code. This includes “a narrative statement of how the listed issuer has applied the 
principles set out in Part 1 of the Code” and “a statement on the extent of compliance 
with the Best Practices in Corporate Governance set out of the Code in Part 2 of the 
Code which statement shall specifically identify and give reasons for any areas of non 
compliance with Part 2 and the alternatives to the Best Practices adopted by the listed 
issuer, if any” (Practice Note No 9/2001, Bursa Malaysia Securities Bhd)9. The Revised 
Code thus emulates the UK tradition of ‘‘voluntary’’ compliance rather than legal 
enforcement.  
 
Although Abdul Hadi et al. (2005) viewed that the aforesaid requirements would 
encourage corporations to be more transparent and accountable in their actions, the 
insufficiency of regulatory enforcement and monitoring of “comply or explain” 
principle has induced bad corporate practices, namely misleading financial statements, 
fraudulent share manipulation, non-transparent corporate policy, blatant disregard of 
minority shareholders’ interests in decision making process, non-conformity with the 
“comply or explain” principle and boilerplate disclosures. This boilerplate or “cut and 
paste” approach refers to the common use of standard template to disclose the corporate 
governance practices in their “Corporate Governance Statement” (Salleh Hassan & Bala 
Ramasamy, 2005). 
 
Notably, some corporations have even tried to circumvent the “comply or explain” 
principle by merely complying with selective best practices that are favourable to them 
whilst leaving aside the rest without valid explanation or reason. This is partly due to 
the fact that most of the corporations in Malaysia still confine the notion of “comply or 
explain” to a mere compliance component in corporate governance regime. They do not 
                                                            
9
 Bursas Malaysia Securities Bhd. Disclosure in relation to the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance and the state of internal 
control. Practice Note No 9/2001.  
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perceive the notion beyond the realm of mechanical compliance in which the primary 
objectives of corporate governance are to enhance corporate performance and to 
preserve shareholder value, in particular, to safeguard minority shareholders’ interests. 
Hence, the principle of “comply or explain” is merely a basis of regulatory action at 
corporate level. In practice, unless and until this principle is subject to some form of 
enforcement, it might remain a buzz phrase – an inchoate concept. In the absence of 
legal obligations and sanctions, it is highly likely that most corporations would not 
comply with the best corporate governance practices whilst opting not to explain such 
non-compliance at the same time. This is because it is hard to ensure that corporations 
would subscribe whole-heartedly to the principles of corporate governance when there 
is no proper enforcement or monitoring mechanism being put in place. 
 
By the same token, one may reach the converse finding and argue that corporations in 
Malaysia would be over-regulated if more legal implications are attached with the 
corporate governance rules and practices. This view will lead to the conclusion that the 
restricted “comply or explain” self-regulation found in the United Kingdom’s corporate 
governance system is nearer to optimal since it provides rooms for corporations to 
manoeuvre their business activities. Be that as it may, this conclusion does not truly 
reflect the ‘public interest’ hypothesis. The issue of over-regulation of corporate 
perpetrators would not arise at all when it comes to the larger picture of public 
shareholders – largely comprise of institutional and minority shareholders. It could be 
reasonably justified under the notion that public interest shall prevail over individual 
corporate interest to the extent that it would enhance corporate governance by protecting 
the rights of minority shareholders. 
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Apart from the “comply or explain” principle, this sub-section wishes to point out the 
defects in the Revised Code since its provisions are silent on certain important 
principles relating to good corporate governance. For instance, the Revised Code does 
not touch on the dividends paid out to the corporate directors – executive remuneration 
that intertwined closely with the other significant areas of corporate governance regime. 
It only provides a short explanation on the level and composition of remuneration, 
procedure and disclosure. In contrast, serious attention is given to the executive 
compensation within corporate governance framework in other jurisdictions such as in 
the United States of America (“USA”) and United Kingdom (“UK”). Unlike the 
Revised Code in Malaysia, the Securities and Exchange Commission of USA details out 
comprehensive guidelines on remuneration under their Compensation and Related Party 
Disclosure report. Hence, it should be borne in mind that the latest corporate 
governance developments could be superficial when the implications of the 
amendments to the Revised Code are yet to be seen in view of the recent economic 
turmoil. This dissertation suggests that the Revised Code should be given a fresh facelift 
rather than simply revamped in a piecemeal fashion. Such fresh facelift meant is 
addressed in the formulation of the best practices in chapters 5 and 6. 
 
In this regard, the significance of corporate governance is widely acknowledged in 
Malaysia but the extent to which it has infiltrated the nation’s corporate culture remains 
limited and clouded. The beginning of 21st century has also witnessed a vigorous start 
on revamping corporate governance while losing its force of implementation over the 
past few years. Even if Malaysia’s corporate governance performance is showing some 
improving signs, regulators should neither be positively complacent about their 
achievements in the past few years nor be proudly contended with the rising corporate 
governance standards. Moreover, regulators should not be contended with the existing 
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corporate governance performance by declaring their reformatory efforts a success in 
the corporate governance landscape. 
 
It is granted that there will never be a flawless regulatory regime for corporate 
governance in this world. It is simply because corporate governance reform requires 
continuing improvement to corporate governance practices. Corporate initiatives to 
improve corporate governance performance should not be made for the sake of 
corporate compliance per se. Rather, regulators should endeavour to further refine the 
existing corporate governance rules and practices in order to enhance the effective 
implementation of corporate governance best practices within the corporations. For this, 
Malaysia, as a developing country, will have to tail closely behind the corporate 
governance reform and recent developments in those developed countries.  
 
3.3 Protection of Minority Shareholders under the Malaysian Corporate 
Governance Regime 
 
To further evaluate the corporate governance performance in Malaysia, it is imperative 
to examine the level of protection accorded to minority shareholders under the existing 
corporate governance regime since the protection of minority shareholders was one of 
the major issues addressed in the revised principles of corporate governance by OECD 
in 2004. This move reflects the importance of taking into consideration the level of 
protection granted to minority shareholders when the regulators are drafting the laws 
and regulations on corporate governance principles. It is also the main objective of this 
dissertation to address the protection of minority shareholders via the corporate 
governance best practices. The focus on shareholder rights and remedies is mainly 
formed by the prevalent sentiment of sympathy for vulnerable minority shareholders 
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whose interests had been compromised by those who control and manage corporations. 
The oppression by majority is often seen in various forms, including asset injections and 
disposals based on questionable valuations, inopportune share buybacks, and offer of 
corporate takeovers that minorities are forced to accept as well as excessive executive 
remuneration and share options for directors. 
 
Recently, Malaysia was ranked in the fourth position overall for protecting investors by 
the World Bank (2009) in its report on Doing Business 200910 which measured the 
strength of investor protection index in Malaysia based on its extent of disclosure index, 
director liability and the ease of shareholder suits. It is observed that the adequacy of 
minority protection in Malaysia – which is equivalent to the World Bank’s investor 
protection terms, are scrutinised in the context of the rights accorded to shareholders as 
a whole, the transparency level of the disclosure requirements as well as the 
effectiveness of legal enforcement against share manipulation and oppression upon 
minority shareholders. Although the above finding has indicated that the legal 
protection of minority shareholder rights and the regulatory framework in Malaysia 
appeared comprehensive and were relatively adequate compared with other countries in 
their study, the main corporate governance issue here is whether the interests of 
minority shareholders are sufficiently shielded in practice since majority of public listed 
corporations in Malaysia have controlling shareholders who dominate the management 
and the boardroom. Besides that, the ascending of shareholder activism from corporate 
scandals like that of Enron and Transmile has also given rise to the need for stricter 
enforcement of laws and regulations relating to shareholders’ protection. For 
instance, Asian countries supported these activisms by introducing new laws and 
regulation that calls for better corporate governance such as, Singapore Rules 1998, 
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 World Bank. (2009). Doing business 2009 report on country profile Malaysia. Washington: The World Bank. 
57 
 
Japan Code 1998, Thailand SET Guidelines 2001, Indonesia Code 1999, and Hong 
Kong Code 1993. Nonetheless, the issue arises as to whether the existing regulatory 
framework in Malaysia, including the Revised Code provides a solid platform to protect 
shareholders rights, in particular the rights of minority shareholders. 
 
Furthermore, it is also crystal clear that corporate management and the majority 
shareholders are inclined to expropriate the rights of minority shareholders to safeguard 
their own interests. This is also consistent with the finding of La Porta, et al. (2000) that 
the protection of minority shareholders is weak in East Asian countries. Zuaini Ishak 
and Napier (2006) argued that the expropriation of minority interests might be 
intensified by high control rights of controlling owner through corporate diversification 
strategies. In this regard, it is pertinent to briefly examine how well minority 
shareholders' rights are protected by the existing laws in Malaysia in order to determine 
whether it is adequate to enhance such protection against fraud on minority in terms of 
corporate governance standards. In other words, the formulation of policy reform in 
Malaysian corporate governance regime should be extended to the cost-benefit 
consideration of minority rights and corporate interest, the harmonisation of corporate 
environment and the experiences from other jurisdictions as well. 
 
3.3.1 Adequacy of Shareholder Rights and Remedies under the 
Regulatory Framework 
 
With regard to the adequacy of shareholders’ rights, the Malaysian laws generally 
provide shareholders with right to vote in the annual general meetings of a corporation. 
These rights cover major corporate actions such as the dealings or related-party 
transactions affecting substantial portion of the corporate assets, key alterations made to 
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corporate constitution as well as the appointment or re-appointment of corporate 
directors. Indeed, Thillainathan (1998) propounded that the voting rights attached to the 
shares as well as the rights that support the voting mechanism have to be examined 
against the interference by the corporate insiders in order to evaluate how well Malaysia 
fares as regards the principal right of shareholders.  
 
Pursuant to Section 128 of the Companies Act 1965, shareholders have the right to vote 
on the removal of corporate directors from their office by a resolution of a simple 
majority. Notwithstanding this shareholder right, CEOs or corporate management get to 
choose their own slate of directors whom they favour and nominate their names for 
election or re-election in the annual general meeting. Most often than not, this practice 
brings us to the reality that shareholders would rubber-stamp the appointment of 
directors themselves or through a proxy vote. Hence, one cannot find adequate check 
and balance on the eligibility and suitability of the corporate directors when 
shareholders’ rights to vote are restrictive in nature. This is the reason why corporate 
governance performance in Malaysia has not attained the optimum level when 
compared with neighbouring countries in this region like Singapore and Hong Kong in 
the recent corporate governance performance assessment by the World Bank. 
Conversely, shareholders, particularly minority shareholders should have more than just 
rubber-stamped rights to vote for their choice of corporate directors in order to ensure 
that there is check and balance mechanism in the corporate governance performance of 
corporations.  
 
Be that as it may, shareholders’ rights to vote and elect their directors would at most 
serve limited purposes in the spirit of corporate governance since the inherent powers to 
manage and supervise the daily business affairs of the corporations reside in the hands 
59 
 
of directors pursuant to the new Section 131B of Companies Act 1965. Notwithstanding 
the legal requirements that directors have to exercise “best judgment rule” in managing 
and deciding their corporate actions, most often than not, board will normally pass a 
board resolution or circular to ratify the actions taken by directors.  This phenomenon 
has given rise to conceptual anomalies pertaining to the effectiveness of shareholders 
rights as prescribed under the laws. In other words, shareholders may have the 
hypothetical right to vote for the appointment of directors whom they favour, but 
neither are they given the complete oversight of the corporate actions taken by directors 
in the daily affairs of the corporations nor the power to direct the corporate management 
entrusted to the board of directors. To make matter worse, it seems that the corporate 
environment in Malaysia does not encourage minority shareholders to call for 
extraordinary shareholders’ meetings or allow them to table their issues on the corporate 
agenda of a shareholders’ meeting. Even if minority shareholders have the right to 
attend general meetings and other shareholders’ meetings, it does not necessarily imply 
that minority shareholders have sufficient voting powers to override or pass through a 
resolution due to the limited rights to vote as compared to majority shareholders who 
have more counts of votes in practical sense. 
 
Nonetheless, the significance of the rights given to minority shareholders seems to be 
more visible in situations where shareholders have the power to remove directors before 
the expiration of their period of office by ordinary resolution and the power to amend 
corporate constitution by special resolution during corporate meetings under Sections 
128 and 21 of Companies Act 1965 respectively. However, these shareholders’ rights 
are deemed to be of little impact on the corporate governance standards and practices in 
corporations. Firstly, it may be impractical for shareholders to exercise their rights to 
remove directors when the damages have been effected by the unfavourable transactions 
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since normally these transactions are discovered at a later stage. Secondly, the power to 
amend corporate constitution is limited to the extent of the compositions of voting rights 
minority shareholders have. Hence, they may not have sufficient power to thwart the 
decision made by board due to the aforesaid reasons. 
 
Even though it seems that the establishment of the MSWG and its efforts may assist to 
change the fate of minority shareholders in Malaysia in the long run, it can be argued 
that MSWG, as a market institution which is supposed to promote shareholder activism 
may, at one point, find it difficult to strike a fine balance between the protection of 
minority interest as a whole and MSWG’s shareholder interests in public-listed 
corporations. It is indisputable that MSWG was established to promote good corporate 
governance, but one may not rule out the possibility that they may contravene the 
corporate governance principles or best practices since they are no different from other 
shareholding investment corporate vehicles. This would eventually turn them into “the 
foxes that are guarding the henhouse” in view of the possible call for corporate 
governance reform within their own body. As such, it remains hard to have an 
independent non-corporate linked body to champion minority shareholders’ interests. 
 
In furtherance to the role of MSWG in upholding shareholder activism, the Employees 
Provident Fund (EPF), as a huge institutional investor in the Malaysian capital market, 
also acts as a key player in shaping the local corporate landscape. EPF has often taken 
the initiatives to pay corporate visit to corporations which it has substantial vested 
interest. Unlike MSWG, EPF is more driven by both institutional shareholder activism 
and corporate interest. This is due to its active participation in Annual General Meetings 
of these corporations in order to promote institutional shareholder activism which in 
turn helps to protect its corporate interest. One must not lose sight of the fact that EPF is 
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morally obliged to declare dividends to its members across the nation annually. Hence, 
it is still difficult to ascertain how much corporate governance performance that would 
be and has been improved by these market institutions. 
 
As for the adequacy of remedies, it has become more and more manifest ever since the 
landmark case of Foss v Harbottle, that minority shareholders “hunger” for a sufficient 
degree of protection from the expropriation or oppression of majority shareholders who 
are often directors. Previously, Section 218 (1) of the Companies Act 1965 provides the 
only drastic remedy to petition for winding up of a corporation on “just and equitable” 
ground. However, winding up of a corporation is draconian in nature since it involves 
the dissolution of the whole corporate organisation and cease of business activities. 
Walter CM Woon’s Company Law at p 499 (as quoted in Tien Ik Enterprises Sdn Bhd 
& Ors v. Woodsville Sdn Bhd [1995]11) stated that: 
 
When it is sought to invoke the court’s discretion to wind the company up, the 
fact that the petitioner has an alternative remedy is relevant. Thus if the 
petitioner is able to sell his shares at a reasonable price it would be more 
difficult to justify a winding up since he would not need the aid of the court to 
extricate his investment. Similarly, if the petitioner’s grievances can be 
redressed under s 216 (s 181 Malaysian Companies Act) a court should be 
reluctant to grant the rather draconian remedy of winding up.  
 
This measure may not necessarily be the viable solution intended to be sought by 
minority shareholders, especially if a corporation is a profitable and fundamentally 
strong entity. Hence, it will normally be used as a last resort by minority shareholders 
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and the court when all other remedies have been exhausted. For this reason, it can be 
said that the remedy under Section 218 of the Companies Act 1965 may not be an 
effective and adequate remedy to address the grievance of minority shareholders. 
 
In the final analysis, it can be said that minority shareholders’ rights were often 
neglected in practice because of the excessive power enjoyed by controlling 
shareholders in the Malaysian corporate structure. This in turn implies that corporate 
governance reforms in Malaysia could contribute to enhanced legal protection for 
minority shareholders in the commonly family-dominated Malaysian corporations. In 
determining the adequacy of remedy, it is also vital to examine the statutory derivative 
right of minority shareholders in the event of expropriation by majority shareholders. 
 
3.3.2 Statutory Derivative Action in Relation to the Protection of 
Minority Shareholders 
 
In Wallersteiner v Moir (No.2)12, Lord Denning explicitly described derivative action as 
an action brought by an individual shareholder on behalf of himself and other members 
except the wrongdoers to remedy a wrong done to a corporation and which cannot 
otherwise be corrected because of the reluctance or refusal of the majority wrongdoers 
to rectify the wrong. It is clear that this remedy falls broadly within the fraud on 
minority or established exception under the rule in Foss v Harbottle which stated that in 
respect of wrongs done to a corporation, “the corporation should sue in its own name 
and in its corporate character, or in the name of someone whom the law has appointed 
to be its representative”. Under this exception, minority shareholders often met with 
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bumpy path towards lawsuit against majority shareholders or directors simply because 
there are a few practical hitches hindering the process of minority’s legal actions.   
 
Firstly, minority shareholders are heavily burdened with the costs of initiating the 
proceeding in the name of corporation. Secondly, the courts have always give due 
consideration to the fact that the breach in issue has been ratified by board or in general 
meeting. Thirdly, they have no individual right to the prospective damages or monetary 
compensations that may be granted by the court since all these will be received by 
corporation as the complainant in the proceeding. Lastly, the powerlessness of minority 
shareholders to gain sufficient corporation information since the access to its flow is 
usually restricted by directors and management. On the other hand, majority 
shareholders who are largely comprise of the board in Malaysian public listed 
corporations tend to pursue their own corporate interest to the extent of jeopardising 
minority shareholders’ values, particularly in situations of management buyout, 
delisting and mergers and acquisitions.  
 
Taking cognisance of the aforesaid substantial difficulties faced by minority 
shareholders, the new Sections 181A and 181B of Companies Act 1965 have codified 
the right of shareholder’s derivative action in common law into statutory right. The 
provisions stipulate that leave of the Court may be obtained by a member or any 
director to initiate proceedings or to intervene in proceedings on behalf of a company. 
Even if directors attempt to circumvent shareholders’ action through the process of 
board ratification, the new Section 181D of Companies Act 1965 was inserted to allow 
the person who has the locus standi to bring an action under Section 181A of 
Companies Act 1965 notwithstanding that the ratification may be considered by the 
Court in reaching its judgment or granting orders. 
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It appears that the introduction of Section 181A of Companies Act 1965 has on the 
surface, eradicated the difficulties faced by minority shareholders to bring a suit against 
directors under the previous common law position set forth in the infamous case of Foss 
v Harbottle.  Nonetheless, it remains unclear as to the factors taken into consideration 
by the Court in deciding whether or not to grant leave of application to sue pursuant to 
Section 181B of Companies Act 1965. The provision lays down the requirement that the 
complainant is acting in good faith and it appears prima facie to be in the best interest of 
a corporation that the application for leave be granted. This new introduction of 
statutory derivative action will allow courts to take into account essential factors such as 
the good faith of shareholders and the best interest of corporation, rather than whether a 
shareholder should be allowed to sue in the name of a corporation.  
 
As for the requirement of good faith, the Singapore court in Pang Yong Hock and 
another v. PKS Contracts Services Pte Ltd [2004] 13  held that “the best way of 
demonstrating good faith is to show a legitimate claim which directors are unreasonably 
reluctant to pursue with the appropriate vigour or at all.” The fulfilment of the first 
requirement of good faith seems to reflect the second requirement of prima facie to be 
in the best interest of the company (Ng Hoy Keong v. Chua Choon Yang [2010]14).  As 
can be seen in the case of Mohd Shuaib Ishak v. Celcom (Malaysia) Bhd [2008]15, the 
High Court ruled that “the complainant had to demonstrate that there was a reasonable 
basis for the complaint and that the proposed action was legitimate and arguable, in that 
it had a reasonable semblance of merit”. In that case, there was prima facie evidence 
that the proposed action by shareholders was in the best interest of the company as the 
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breaches of directors’ duties involved “self-serving behaviour which is culpable and at 
the expense of the corporate interest of the company as well as shareholders”. However, 
the Mohd Shuaib Ishak case was overturned by the Court of Appeal which adopted a 
stricter interpretation of Section 181A. The Court of Appeal was of the view that the 
application of Section 181A must not run foul of the company’s interest. In this regard, 
the pertinent issue remains that what constitute good faith of shareholders and best 
interest of a corporation are very much a subjective exercise of discretion by the Court 
as well as a mere conjecture by minority shareholders in such a derivative action suit.  
 
Similarly, Choong and Sujata Balan (2008) agreed that “what remains to be done is for 
the courts to interpret these statutory provisions in a broad and liberal manner so as not 
to stifle actions by minority shareholders against the company’s wrongdoers”. 
Furthermore, Section 181A(4)(d) provides the Registrar the power to initiate a 
derivative action in the case of a declared company under Part IX of the Companies Act 
1965. Although this new Section has opened up an alternative route to the enforcement 
path of the corporate regulators, it is clear that “the scope of powers conferred on the 
Registrar is quite limited” due to the reason that “securities market regulators in the US, 
the UK, Australia and Malaysia have been conferred with the authority to use civil 
proceedings to enforce any contravention of the securities laws” (Malaysia Corporate 
Reform Committee, December 2007). Despite such right to derivative action, it is also 
pertinent to point out that the legal protection afforded under Section 181 depends on 
how minority shareholders can satisfy the court that there is a total disregard to their 
interests or unfair discrimination against them. Minority shareholders would have to go 
through all the hassles to bring the court’s attention to these “equitable considerations” 
when they feel that they have been sidelined, discriminated or treated unjustly. The 
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situation is made worse when minority shareholders do not even know each other or 
when they are disunited or totally disorganized among themselves. 
 
In the upshot, the statutory derivative action often only acts as the remedial measures 
for minority shareholders during the aftermath of corporate scandal. Although it may 
save an individual minority shareholder from the onerous costs of proceedings, the new 
inclusion of statutory derivative right has not promised enhanced transparency and 
accountability of corporate directors in relation to higher corporate governance standard. 
Therefore, it is for the foregoing reasons that the positive effect of this new statutory 
derivative action is yet to be clearly visualised by minority shareholders in terms of the 
local corporate governance practice. Ultimately, the question of adequacy of minority 
protection is best answered in terms of preserving and enhancing shareholder values via 
the implementation of corporate governance best practices. 
 
3.3.3 Preserving and Enhancing Shareholder Values 
 
In investment’s term, shareholder value can be defined as the value that a shareholder is 
able to obtain from his/her investment in a corporation. This value is made up of capital 
gains, dividend payments, proceeds from shares buy back schemes and any other payout 
that a corporation might make to a shareholder. Shareholder value “can also be 
influenced by maximising economic value, either by undertaking positive present-value 
decisions or by running the business in such a way as to create a surplus above the 
market costs of funding” (Dictionary of Business and Management, 2006). The 
corporate governance reform analysis in this dissertation largely owes itself to a stream 
of high profile corporate collapses which have left shareholders with nothing but huge 
losses. Serious attention has to be drawn to how shareholder values are greatly 
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expropriated by the corporate management to attain individual ends, and thence to the 
question of how shareholder values can be enhanced in pursuance to the rights 
conferred by corporate law on shareholders. To do so, it requires a redefinition of the 
shareholder value. In the UK, the recent review of company law proposed that corporate 
boards should seek to achieve ‘enlightened shareholder value’ (Company Law Review 
Steering Committee, 2001)16 which means that the interests of the different stakeholders 
should be balanced in such a way as to create closer collaboration amongst them in 
enhancing the long-term interests of shareholders.  
 
In the context of enlightening minority shareholder values, it is interrelated with the 
notion of “shareholder activism”. Low (2004) defined “shareholder activism” as the 
exercise and enforcement of rights by minority shareholders with the objective of 
enhancing shareholder value over the long term. The Star Online (2009) reported in its 
business section that “shareholder activism is on the rise in Malaysia and could, in the 
longer term, positively affect companies to enhance shareholder value”. This was 
further supported by Rita Benoy Bushon, MSWG’s Chief Executive Officer that more 
retail shareholders are attending annual general meetings of corporations and posing 
relevant questions to the respective boards of directors (The Star Online, July 8, 2009). 
Selvarany Rasiah, Bursa Malaysia Bhd’s Chief Regulatory Officer also mentioned that 
“emphasis should also be placed on non-technical aspects of the profession such as 
improving negotiation as well as conflict mediator skills as such traits would certainly 
enhance their worth in the eyes of the board”. Hence, it is not wrong to say that the 
rising of shareholder activism may affect the corporation’s operating behaviour such as 
“alleviating boardroom complacency and bring about more positive changes towards 
enhancing shareholders’ value in a more timely manner” (The Star Online, July 8, 2009). 
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However, it is interesting to note that corporations often undermine the need to enhance 
the shareholder value especially for minority shareholders when there is a conflict 
between shareholder value and corporate business objectives. The total investment 
holdings of minority shareholders are principally insignificant to the entire financial 
status of a corporation due to the relatively small quantum of shares held by minority 
shareholders in the corporation. As a result, it would create a wrongful perception 
amongst the corporate management that it is not important to preserve or enlighten 
minority shareholders’ values. This is very much different from the case of employees 
and the benefits accrued to the majority shareholders. In the case of the employees, 
“they get paid almost immediately for their efforts, and are generally in a much better 
position to hold up the firm by threatening to quit than shareholders are” (Schleifer & 
Vishny, 1997). Hence, corporate governance best practices shall be formulated and 
implemented in such a way that directors will consider the best interest of a corporation 
to include minority shareholders. To fix this thorny issue, it is suggested that the 
corporate governance regime should be designed mainly to preserve the values of 
shareholders 
 
3.4 Short Case Studies on the Corporate Scandals 
 
The lack of good corporate governance can lead to the aggravation of conflicting 
interests. Each of the substantial corporate stakeholders has the tendency of making 
decisions they believe will be favourable to them, even though, it does not seem to be 
equivalent to the best interest of other stakeholders. This means that different corporate 
members can assert their own views and perspectives. As such, a corporation will no 
longer function as one instead selfishly directed when the stench of fraud and 
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dishonesty reeks from corporations with poor corporate governance. These inferior 
qualities of corporate governance would eventually lead to corporations paying a 
higher price than they imagined.  
 
Evidently, the collapse of many corporations was being attributed to poor corporate 
governance such as fraudulent financial statement, shares manipulation, corporate 
mismanagement and other illegal practices. These corporate scandals have brought 
negative repercussions to the corporations and stakeholders at large. For instance, 
the case studies below will uncover that the inflow of capital stopped and as such, 
the corporations crumbled when the investors became wary of the corporate illicit 
practices. The ensuing sub-sections discuss on the case studies of the Enron and 
Transmile scandals in order to find out the lessons that may be garnered in 
improving the corporate governance framework. 
 
3.4.1 Enron 
 
As a global giant energy corporation in 2001, Enron unexpectedly shattered into pieces 
with the sharp decline in its share prices and filing of bankruptcy under Chapter 11 of 
the United States Bankruptcy Code. Wearing (2005) has analysed that the collapse of 
the Enron was very much attributed to the devious utilisation of the special purpose 
vehicles in creating misleading financial position, excessive executive remuneration in 
relation to its annual net income (Useem, 2003), ineffective board of directors and 
dependent audit committee. To make matter worse, the external auditors of Enron, 
Arthur Andersen had also illegally performed their auditing duties by shredding and 
erasing documents from the financial records for the mala fide purpose of financial 
misstatement (Squires et al., 2003). This unlawful act has eventually caused great 
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impact on the reliability and trustworthiness of Arthur Andersen which has then 
vanished from the auditing world.  
 
Bob Garratt (2003) quoted an anonymous email which was circulated in 2002 on the 
Enron debacle as follows: 
 
“Normal capitalism: you have two cows and buy a bull. Your herd multiplies 
and the economy grows. You sell the bull and retire.  
 
Enron capitalism: you have two cows. You sell three of them to your publicly 
listed corporation, using letters of credit opened by your brother-in-law at the 
bank. You then execute a debt/equity swap with an associated general offer so 
that you get all four cows back, with tax exemption for five cows. The milk 
rights of the six cows are transferred via an intermediary to a Cayman Islands 
company, secretly owned by your chief financial officer, who then sells the 
rights for all seven cows back to your listed corporation. Your annual report 
states that your corporation owns eight cows, with an option on six more”. 
 
The aforesaid comparison of normal and Enron capitalisms has clearly illustrated the 
complex modus operandi of the fraud and dishonesty experienced in the Enron scandal. 
It shows that Enron was once managed by a bunch of crooked and unscrupulous 
directors and managers who selfishly swindled the capital and wealth of a corporation 
through various deceitful conduit pipes and fraudulent financial report. The corporate 
malfeasance involved here was so different from the normal capitalism process where 
the assets or resources of a corporation are efficiently managed and utilised to generate 
income and capital flow for the purpose of business expansion. Unfortunately, the 
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relaxed corporate governance regulatory framework prior to 2002 has failed to prevent 
such disease from spreading into the corporate world of the USA. Only after this Enron 
scandal emerged that the USA’s regulators realised the importance of strict regulation 
on corporate governance by enacting the new Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002. 
 
With regards to the Enron debacle, Deakin and Konzelmann (2003) viewed that “while 
board members may have been mistaken, with the benefit of hindsight, in waving 
through these deals, it does not necessarily follow that individual directors breached the 
duty of care they owed to the company; the protective ‘business judgment rule’ will 
protect them from liability for decisions taken in good faith”. As such, the Enron 
scandal has also prompted the revisit of the business judgment rule which is further 
discussed in the ensuing chapters. 
 
3.4.2 Transmile 
 
On 14 November 2007, the Securities Commission Malaysia has filed charges against 
two former directors of Transmile for intentionally authorising the submission of 
misleading financial statement to Bursa Malaysia Securities Berhad in relation to its 
“Quarterly Report on Unaudited Consolidated Results for the Financial Year Ended 31 
Disember 2006”. Both of the accused persons were former Independent Non-Executive 
Directors of Transmile.  
 
The Securities Commission Malaysia claimed that they had the knowledge of the false 
statement when they authorised the statement for furnishing to Bursa Malaysia 
Securities Berhad. Notification was initially sent by Transmile to Bursa Malaysia 
informing that its auditors found it difficult to verify Transmile’s financial accounts for 
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the year ended 31 December 2006 due to the absence of some documents. Moores 
Rowland Risk Management then conducted a special audit on Transmile’s accounts and 
discovered that the revenue and assets of the company as reported in its financial 
statement had been blatantly inflated by way of deceitful invoicing.  
 
Subsequently, much criticism had been thrown against Deloitte & Touche who was the 
external auditor of Transmile for not discharging their duties to audit effectively. The 
criticism was refuted by Deloitte & Touche that as an external auditor, it is almost 
unfeasible for auditors to check on every single transaction in the auditing process. 
Hence, external auditors would have to put heavy reliance on the internal management 
of a corporation to perform the task of corporate governance and to ensure that proper 
internal control systems are in place to detect accounting fraud. 
 
3.4.3 Have We Not Learnt Our Lessons? 
 
From the preceding corporate scandals, those who have been championing for better 
corporate governance principles have been slapped with great impasse of corporate 
governance failures. These failures indicate that although good governance principles 
have been deeply embedded in the Western corporate culture, there is still a distant road 
ahead and ample room for improvement to produce exemplary benchmark of corporate 
governance practices in Malaysia. It is believed that no single party will stand out and 
bravely admit to bear all responsibilities when the outcries of corporate scandals start to 
point fingers at certain corporate culprits. For instance, Deloitte & Touche as the 
external auditor of Transmile has refuted the claims that they should be blamed for the 
accounting fraud in Transmile. Its Chief Executive Officer for Asia-Pacific, Chaly Mah 
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Chee Kheong argued that it was their “stringent audit process” that enabled them to 
unravel the accounting fraud in the corporation (The Malaysian Bar, 21 July 2007).  
 
However, the accounting firm giant could have detected the slightest hint of corporate 
malpractice underlying the Transmile’s boardroom carpet at an early stage if they have 
practised stringent audit processes in the entire corporate governance system and 
adhered to the high standard of accounting standard. Although credits may be given to 
Deloitte & Touche for unravelling the accounting fraud, but it is their sacred duties to 
be alert with the abnormal accounting practices and financial performance of Transmile 
throughout their annual auditing process. In the event that they are suspicious of any 
fraudulent transaction shown by their auditing results, steps must be taken to report the 
case to the relevant authorities and regulators like Bursa Malaysia and the Securities 
Commission Malaysia. This prompt action is necessary for the purpose of giving an 
early opportunity to the relevant authorities to implement their monitoring mechanism 
on the financial operation of a corporation.  
 
In this context, it would be a fallacy to argue that the external auditors could rely on the 
corporate management and board of directors in an audit process. As professional 
external auditors, they shoulder the responsibilities to audit which could not possibly be 
transferred to corporations in any given circumstance. After all, the function of an 
external auditor is to verify the financial accounts of a corporation for the purpose of 
check and balance. The independent function of the external auditors should not be 
confused with the internal auditing process which may be interfered by the corporate 
management. In the Economist, September 2002 (as cited in Deakin, 2003), it was 
learned that “companies need stronger non-executive directors, paid enough to devote 
proper attention to job; genuinely independent audit and remuneration committees; 
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more powerful internal auditors”. With respect to this particular lesson, Chapter 5 of 
this dissertation proposes various governance best practices that may strengthen the 
internal control system of a corporation through risk management and better auditing 
process. 
 
The foregoing series of corporate scandals that shattered the confidence of investors and 
minority shareholders raise the question whether the regulators are ready to take extra 
miles to revive the lost investors’ confidence in the corporate world and market. Have 
we not leant from our past bitter corporate experiences like the Transmile scandal that 
has become somewhat emblematic of the existing issue of corporate governance in 
Malaysia? In the event that we could not learn much from the local corporate scandal, 
perhaps the experiences in foreign corporate scandal may shed some invaluable light on 
the corporate lesson that we may learn from. 
 
All in all, the corporate scandals have taught us that conspiracies by their nature do not 
reveal themselves to minority shareholders who will be left bearing the consequential 
losses. Perhaps the good lesson that has arisen out of these bad corporate experiences is 
the rising appreciation of the importance of good corporate governance practices 
amongst the larger community. The lessons learnt have also pressed for the need to 
comprehend and implement established and well-thought-out corporate governance 
principles and practices.  
 
3.5 How to Fix Corporate Governance for Minority Interest? 
 
Corporate shenanigans are as antique as the existence of corporation itself. From 
corporate malfeasance to oppression against minority shareholders, corporate world has 
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long been tainted with unscrupulous corporate players who crave to reap immense 
wealth from business activities by not abiding by the laws and rules. As corporate 
governance marches steadily, such unhealthy corporate malpractices have gradually 
been weeded out by the regulators. Nevertheless, as the saying goes, ‘Old habit dies 
hard’. Corporate fraud and scam still find their ways to penetrate the regulator’s 
enforcement wall irrespective of the fact that the modern investors and minority 
shareholders are becoming more watchful of their own interests.  
 
These corporate scandals, some of which are still unfolding, involving oppressive 
activities of directors and majority shareholders expropriating the corporate capitals at 
the ultimate expense of minority shareholders have thus prompted the scrutiny and re-
examination of some of the existing corporate governance practices. Considerable 
interest has also been generated in empirical research on the effectiveness of various 
corporate governance mechanisms and regulatory framework. The question arises as to 
how should regulators and corporations react to the prevalent trend to better corporate 
governance practices – an art of term that can connote different implications to different 
people and generate debate on a multitude of issues. Much reforming efforts upon the 
corporate governance standards are engineered on the basis that they correspond to good 
corporate governance practices, but the outcome often remains vague. There are varying 
shapes of corporate governance around the globe, often reflecting the country’s own 
peculiar local conditions and business cultures cutting across the tide of corporate 
governance reform. It would definitely be futile to look for a global standard corporate 
governance model that suits Malaysian corporate landscape in order to increase our 
global comparability. Thence, this chapter proposes that Malaysia should be searching 
to define and adopt what it deems to be the best approach towards good corporate 
governance practices reform. 
76 
 
 
Nonetheless, it is acknowledged that there is no single failsafe corporate governance 
model and system or ultimate principles since there will still be some recalcitrant 
corporate manipulators who attempt to outmanoeuvre the regulators and break free from 
the grips of laws. Clarke (2004) agreed that “It is important that most obvious abuses 
will be outlawed, and loopholes closed, but the ingenuity of self-interest will lead to the 
devising of new schemes to evade accountability”. Instead of sitting idly, the Malaysian 
regulators must hunt vigorously for any red flags from the corporate activities and 
related-party transactions. These vigilant acts can only be done if there is visible 
improvement in the effective implementation of corporate governance rules and 
practices.  A similar analogy can be derived from the recent issuance of unusual market 
activity (UMA) queries by Bursa Malaysia to acquire information and explanation from 
public-listed companies as to the sharp rise of its share price within a short span of time. 
On this note, the corporate regulators could effect a similar mechanism via drastic 
reform of the Malaysian corporate governance rules and practices in order to protect 
minority shareholders at an early stage.  
 
Basically, Vaughn and Ryan (2006) argued that it is hard to strike a fine balance 
between sensible regulations and unreasonable enforcement whereas the most effective 
internal check on corporate governance is the corporate directors. However, this 
dissertation views that the regulators should define a clear demarcation line between the 
need to regulate corporations and the means to implement effective enforcement at the 
same time. To fix corporate governance for minority interest, putting the trust on 
directors entirely may not be the best solution here. This is simply because the corporate 
directors are largely the majority shareholders themselves who would opt for protection 
of their own interests in the event of conflicting interests with minority shareholders. 
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Blair (1995) propounded that the rethinking of corporate governance should focus on 
the narrow application of corporate governance on the structure and functions of the 
board as well as the prerogatives and rights of shareholders in participating in the 
decision making process. However, several elements should be present in a corporate 
governance system in order for this to be effective. One of the significant components 
of corporate governance system in Malaysia is the checks and balances between 
regulators and corporations. Shouldn’t it be advisable for corporate Malaysia to have 
that effective checks and balances within the corporate structure itself? The answer is in 
the affirmative. 
 
In this regard, Detomasi (2002)  believed that corporate governance requires a strong 
public policy to be set up in a specific manner. In other words, governing laws and 
regulations should be explicitly spelled out in the corporate framework relating to good 
corporate governance practices.  This signifies that it is vital for regulators to create a 
solid corporate governance regime to be practised by the corporate players internally as 
well as externally. The existence of such corporate regime must be supported by 
revolutionary corporate governance rules and practices due to the evolving nature of 
modern corporations. Hence, the regulators, in the process of monitoring the corporate 
activities, should not lose out from those competitive corporations who race to the top 
via unethical and sophisticated acts.  
 
It has also become very apparent that the corporate scandals such as the Enron and 
Transmile unravelled that good corporate governance on its own cannot guarantee the 
triumph of a corporation for the benefits of minority shareholders. Alternatively, the 
growing importance of enterprise governance as the cornerstone of corporate 
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governance may shine some light on the protection of minority shareholders and 
preservation of shareholders’ values. The notion of effective corporate governance 
recapitulates the need to promote sound business operations and balanced corporate 
management while taking into consideration the significance of improving the 
interrelations between corporations and minority shareholders as well as establishing 
long-standing business transactions in ensuring that the interests of all stakeholders are 
well-protected. It is believed that corporate governance without enterprise governance is 
like an almond without kernel. 
 
One of the essential elements of enterprise governance is that corporations have to 
balance conformance with performance. Rather than sticking to the mere box-ticking 
approach, it is stoutly urged that Malaysian corporate governance reform should shift 
away from the box-ticking approach adopted by directors and corporate officers who 
blatantly ignore the effective implementation of corporate governance principles in a 
corporation. In other words, the regulators’ attentions should be drawn to the attainment 
of “results-driving” conformance and not mere “box-ticking” conformance by 
corporations. To undertake this conformance challenges, it is envisaged that 
corporations should be prepared to shift their gears from compliance of mandated 
corporate practices to performance of constructive institutional changes. 
 
In short, enterprise governance mainly centres on the most effectual control and 
management of corporate function. Aside from protecting shareholders’ rights, it also 
emphasises on the assured accomplishment of corporate objectives leading to excellent 
corporate performance and sustainable profitability. The studies conducted by Khatri, 
Leruth and Piesse (2002) found that corporate performance can be improved if the post-
crisis corporate governance reform is effectively implemented. Thus, the integrated 
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structure of enterprise governance with the corporate governance regime may well be 
directed to a competitive corporate actions and superior performance amongst the 
modern corporations in Malaysia. 
 
Furthermore, the regulators must also bear in mind that the advancement of dirty tactics 
and tricks used by corporations in the 21st century has led to the fact that the checks and 
balances between regulators and corporations must not lose its grips eventually. It is 
pertinent to point out that the corporate ownership of shareholdings nowadays 
comprises largely of institutional shareholders that are basically financial institutions, 
multinational corporations, investment-linked funds and gigantic government-linked 
corporations. All of them share one common facet – they are all public-listed 
corporations themselves. Inevitably, stringent corporate governance laws and practices 
are things they would want to shun away from in managing their corporations.  
 
Therefore, the time is right for the regulators to revisit the corporate governance regime 
in Malaysia by imposing a set of corporate governance best practices upon all public-
listed corporations in accordance with latest corporate developments that suit the local 
conditions and cultures. For instance, there is a need of a group of appointed 
independent auditors’ commission that would serve as the crucial link of corporate 
governance checks and balances on the selected corporations annually. This move 
indicates that an independent body is needed in order to ensure that the corporate 
actions from the bottom to the top do comply in totality with the corporate governance 
regime firmly established by the regulators. Besides that, it is significant for the 
regulators to draw up a plan for strategy and roadmap towards corporate governance 
reform in Malaysia. The ensuing section discusses how this plan can be possibly 
executed to facilitate the formulation of governance best practices. 
80 
 
 
3.6 Strategy and Roadmap for Corporate Governance Reform 
 
Generally, regulatory functions extend but not limited to the establishment and 
implementation of rules and regulations, effecting monitoring mechanisms and 
execution of enforcement activities. The World Bank (2005) has recommended in their 
Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC) that the enforcement 
capability of the statutory regulators should be further enhanced via the strengthening of 
independence of regulators, rationalisation of the regulatory framework as well as the 
modernisation of the range of regulatory enforcement powers. 
 
In this context, it follows that the Malaysian regulatory framework should be preventive 
in its prescriptive measures as opposed to prohibitive and punitive in nature. As the 
saying goes, “Prevention is better than cure”. The corporate governance system should 
embark on preventing corporations from acting to the disadvantages of minority 
shareholders. With the preventive-based system in mind, regulatory bodies should take 
corporate governance best practices as the core of the modern corporate law in 
implementing corporate governance rules and regulations. 
 
Developing country like Malaysia is in need of influx of international investors to boost 
the economy of the nation. The quest towards better investor protection lies in the steps 
taken to revamp the corporate governance system which is faced with the global trend 
that is forming an internationally recognized corporate governance standards and 
principles. The breadth and depth of today’s regulatory challenge is the corollary not 
just of the speed, severity, and unexpectedness of recent corporate crises but also of 
underlying evolution in the corporate environment that has been under way for a long 
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time. Hence, it is pertinent for the regulators to constantly keep the corporate 
governance framework in Malaysia cutting edge in light of the fact that many foreign 
jurisdictions with the most business-friendly regulations are constantly reforming their 
corporate governance framework. The World Bank (2008) remarked that constant 
reform is important by delivering the message that “if you are not reforming, another 
country will overtake you”. 
 
The recent unsatisfactory corporate governance ranking for Malaysia has warned the 
regulators that there is no room for complacency in the development of corporate 
governance framework if Malaysia wishes to be the leader in the corporate success 
stories. It is clearly evident that there is also no risk-proof corporate governance system 
where its resilience would be duly tested in times of crises. All the Malaysian regulators 
can do now is to always rigorously scrutinise and enhance the central theme of 
structural reform in corporate governance regime. In other words, the imperative 
corporate governance reform goes beyond mere refinement of rules and practices to the 
degree of regulatory perfection – strategic implementation of corporate governance best 
practices in the local corporations. 
 
As the corporate governance structures and system remains an integral part of the 
corporate and securities law, there should also be an upward shift towards enacting a 
comprehensive framework on the strategy and roadmap to reform the corporate 
governance landscape in Malaysia. Apart from the existing Corporate Law Reform 
Committee formed under the Companies Commission of Malaysia, it is proposed that 
the regulators, relevant agencies and selected corporations can further collaborate on the 
issues of corporate governance and devise a complete roadmap on how to implement 
better corporate governance regime in the local corporate world. The roadmap may lay 
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down the strategies for corporate governance reform within the next 10 years whilst 
incorporating the appropriate actions to be taken by the relevant authorities and agencies. 
It is recommended that a special taskforce or various working groups may be 
established for the aforesaid implementation of strategy. It should be borne in mind that 
this establishment of working groups or taskforces is different from the existing 
Corporate Law Reform Committee in which the latter only consists of selected 
corporate experts and legal professionals from various spectrums of expertise.  
 
Further, the special taskforce or working groups should take cautious note that corporate 
governance and minority shareholders’ rights do not co-exist in a vacuum. Minority 
shareholders’ rights are affected by other factors that reflect the distinctive corporate 
governance landscape and corporate culture. The extent to which the rights are 
exercised is heavily determined by the corporate structures and its business policies. 
Hence, all of these extraneous factors should be taken into consideration when 
formulating the best strategies and roadmap for corporate governance in Malaysia.  
 
In this respect, the special taskforce will also have to constantly monitor the working 
progress and corporate governance development in other jurisdictions to ensure that its 
recommended strategies and roadmap, if any, will not lag behind the well-established 
international corporate governance standards, without compromising the local corporate 
values and cultures. It has also become apparent that corporate governance will only 
benefit all stakeholders only if this is a result of a well-thought-out process of strategy 
and roadmap which are aptly tailored to a corporation’s needs. The underlying corporate 
governance principles and practices should also be meticulously comprehended by the 
various corporate stakeholders as well as the regulators. Only then will “best corporate 
governance practices” cease to remain as another dead phrase in order to be deeply 
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embedded into a corporate culture, rather than a resentful compliance with the strict 
letters of laws. 
 
Be that as it may, it would still be a daunting task to reform the existing corporate 
governance regime as it involves the balancing of different interests which, at times, 
may be in conflict with each other. Successful stock guru, Warren Buffett once 
mentioned that managers get shareholders they deserve17. However, the contrary is 
equally important since shareholders expect to have managers they deserve to run a 
corporation, and corporations they deserve as well. Hence, the strategy and roadmap for 
corporate governance reform in Malaysia should be primarily driven by the force of 
minority shareholders’ interest. 
 
3.7 Conclusion 
 
As can be seen from the study above, it appears that the existing status of corporate 
governance reforms made by the Malaysian regulators and agencies to tackle the 
corporate scandals has been generally effective, though there is still very much room for 
improvement. One must not lose sight of the fact that the corporate regime is dynamic 
and similarly, the regulatory rudiments presented in the discussions above have merely 
addressed a small part of the general improvements needed for corporate governance 
reform. In every sense, the Malaysian regulators should always be vigilant in this 
context such that corporations, especially minority shareholders of corporations, may be 
protected and eventually advance in the long run. 
 
                                                            
17
 Thomas, L. J. (January 26, 2005). Investment banker and client: A bond deepens. New York Times, at C1.   
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In a nutshell, it is the objective of this dissertation to enhance the systems for 
implementation of corporate governance best practices in order to facilitate the 
regulatory oversight functions of the relevant authorities. Laws and regulation can only 
form part of the entire corporate governance framework in Malaysia as other institutions 
such as Bursa Malaysia, Securities Commission Malaysia, Companies Commission 
Malaysia as well as MSWG and MICG are also part and parcel of the bigger picture in 
corporate governance reform. Hence, the collaboration of regulators, agencies, 
organisations and corporate entities may well be the answer to these vigorous 
changes in relation to corporate governance. Those changes are promoting wider, 
faster scrutiny of corporations and rendering conventional tactics less effective in 
addressing corporate challenges ahead. 
 
In this regard, the uphill challenge for regulators is to put in place a set of corporate 
governance best practices and systems that would help to reduce the statistical 
probability of corporate activities turning sour from a practical corporate governance 
standpoint. The lesson learnt from past corporate scandals around the world lies in the 
ability of regulators to detect the early signs of corporate malpractices amongst 
Malaysian corporations to avoid the long tiring process of dragging the responsible 
corporate criminals to court for hearings. As such, it is most instructive to examine the 
corporate governance reform in the other jurisdictions for improvement to be made to 
the local corporate governance framework. 
 
Undeniably, it remains a gargantuan task to effectively implement fundamental 
corporate governance reform since the recent tide of corporate scandals that intruded the 
West has pressed for a fresh focus on corporate governance in Asia, in particular, 
Malaysia. Nonetheless, the effort of changing the corporate landscape in Malaysia 
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should not be further delayed or avoided if the concerns of minority shareholders are to 
be assuaged. Corporate governance issues need to be addressed with some urgency in 
order to enhance the credibility of this territory as an investment hub in view of the 
current liberalisation measures taken under the recent national economic agenda. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE NEW PARADIGM OF CORPORATE PRIMACY:  
THE CONVERGENCE OF “DIRECTOR PRIMACY” AND “SHAREHOLDER 
PRIMACY” 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
The preceding chapters have identified some pertinent yet thorny issues on corporate 
governance. Some of these issues require further discussion on the weight that should 
be given to the various interests of shareholders, directors, employees, creditors, 
business partners, suppliers and other stakeholders of a corporation. At the threshold of 
managing a corporation, it is important to address the appropriate means on how to 
accurately articulate, properly balance and cautiously reconcile such distinctive interests 
in order to achieve the ends of formulating the best practices of corporate governance.  
 
This chapter seeks to set the right tone for the remainder of this dissertation by 
determining whether the best practices of corporate governance should rest on a 
narrower premise such as the interest and power of board and shareholders’ value or 
rather on a wider picture of a corporation. The ensuing discussion also entails the very 
cornerstone of corporate governance which defines the balance between various 
stakeholders in a corporation. This chapter will critically examine the need for a new 
paradigm of corporate primacy which finds its basis from both the norms of “director 
primacy” and “shareholder primacy”, and then analyse various case studies to 
understand how a corporation may interact with its board and shareholders in the long 
run.  
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Drawing on the widely accepted definition of corporate governance, this chapter will 
address the central question – whether directors should manage corporations for the 
benefit of shareholders per se or in the best interest of a corporation. The answer lies in 
the concept of corporate governance that best describes the system and structure of a 
corporation in Malaysia. The question of “primacy” norms will also be examined from 
the legal perspective of how a corporation is directed and controlled by directors as well 
as to whom the legal duties and obligations a director owes. 
 
4.2. The Unsettled Debate between “Director Primacy” v. “Shareholder 
Primacy” 
 
The question remains whether it is the fiduciary duty of directors to tailor their 
decisions in line with maximisation of shareholder wealth or towards the advancement 
of best interest of a corporation. In terms of corporate governance, the answer lies in the 
different concepts of “primacy” that should be adopted by directors and management of 
a corporation as the basis in their decision-making process. Such discussion of concepts 
is very relevant as regulators, in devising a set of corporate governance best practices, 
would often look at the ultimate interest that board serves in a corporation.  
 
Hence, the overarching focal point of this chapter is on the rethinking of these concepts 
in order to reshape the path leading to the best practices of corporate governance that 
will be discussed at length in Chapter 5 of this dissertation. In this regard, it will 
nonetheless be pertinent to first identify the existing concepts of “primacy” in various 
literatures. It is also necessary to appraise in how far these concepts of “primacy” entail 
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a complete or partial shift into a new proposed concept of “corporate primacy” in the 
corporate governance regime. 
 
4.2.1. “Shareholder Primacy” as the Prevalent Concept in 
Corporate Governance? 
 
The common understanding of corporate governance has long been absolute 
dependence on board acting on behalf of shareholders’ interests to oversee the business 
activities and direct the management of a corporation. Directors are mostly perceived as 
the guardian of shareholders’ interests since they are entrusted with the duty to conduct 
a corporation’s business affairs in the best interest of shareholders. As agents for 
shareholders, directors are entrusted with the essential duty to manage a corporation in 
the interests of shareholders who are principals under the purview of “shareholder 
primacy” norm. It was argued that “the triumph of the shareholder oriented model of the 
corporation over its principal competitors is now assured was attributed to the failure of 
alternative models” of a corporation whilst its success represents “the end of history for 
corporate law” (Hansmann & Kraakman, 2001). 
 
There is abundance of literatures that support the prevalence of “shareholder primacy” 
norm – the “standard shareholder-oriented model” which Hansmann and Kraakman 
(2001) claimed to be the dominant model of corporate structure in the United States and 
the United Kingdom. Among other scholars, Branson (2001) further added that although 
the possibility of global corporate governance system converging towards such 
“shareholder primacy” norm remains bleak, the model in the United States seems to 
adhere closely to the perception that profit maximisation should be the ultimate goal of 
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corporations and the nation. Roe (2001) even contended that the primary objective of 
the business in the United States is that of shareholder wealth maximisation. 
 
Interestingly, most of these scholars seem to question the possible global convergence 
of corporate governance models around the world towards the Anglo-American model 
which are largely structured based on the “shareholder primacy” model. In determining 
such a question, it leads to the issue of whether it is desirable to adopt a model which 
merely focuses on the maximisation of shareholder wealth. Hence, it is relevant here to 
discuss and analyse the concept that is heavily rested on maximising shareholder 
interest – “shareholder primacy”. 
 
4.2.1.1. Discussions and Analyses – “Shareholder Primacy” 
 
Undeniably, the evolving spirit of “shareholder primacy” has slowly formed part and 
parcel of many academic discussion on corporate governance. The prominence of this 
concept is clearly reflected in this part in which many scholars and academicians 
discussed why corporations should be managed in the interest of shareholders.  
 
Generally speaking, “shareholder primacy” finds its foundation in the concept that 
corporate ownership belongs to shareholders on whose behalf corporate governance 
should be administered. Such a concept has then given rise to the principles that a 
corporation should be managed in the best interest of shareholders as they are the actual 
owners of the corporation. As contrary to the best interest of corporation, the business 
affairs of corporations should be directed towards the maximisation of shareholder’s 
wealth. As such, the concept of “shareholder primacy” tends to equate the best interests 
of corporation with that of shareholders (Austin, Ford & Ramsay, 2005).  
 At the outset, it is per
important by directors as compared to the interests of other stakeholders in a 
corporation. The concept of “shareholder primacy” stands on the footing that the wealth 
of shareholders should be vigor
perception seems to suggest that maximisation of shareholder wealth constitutes the 
overriding aim and goal of a corporation (Mitchell, 2005).  The Illustration 4.1 below 
shows the rudiments of the “s
 
Illustration 4.1: The essential rudiments of the “shareholder primacy” concept
 
However, there is only partial truth in reality with regard to the ultimate aim and goal of 
the concept of “shareholder primacy” as it is only the 
have the ultimate controlling power over 
ceived that the interests of shareholders are deemed more 
ously maximised through various corporate actions. This 
hareholder primacy” norm. 
majority shareholders who will 
a corporation in real life scenarios. It is 
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highly unlikely that minority shareholders would even have the power to make 
decisions or proactively participate in the decision making process for a corporation. 
Although the concept of “shareholder primacy” is laudable, it remains an idealistic 
concept that may not withstand challenging tests that a corporation faces in this 
unpredictable corporate reality. Without the implementation of a proper corporate 
governance system, shareholders, especially minority has no or little control over the 
actions undertaken by directors. This brings the question to the fore – how can 
directors be held accountable for their acts and decisions in relation to the interest of 
shareholders whilst they are not subject to sufficient control by shareholders? As can 
be seen from Chapter 3 of this dissertation, minority shareholders are weakly 
protected against the stronger power of controlling shareholders in making biased 
decision or causing board decisions to be made in their favour. 
 
Furthermore, directors usually have direct access to a variety of information 
regarding the business and affairs of a corporation. Such information often includes 
financial figures, confidential information and price sensitive information which are 
not or have not been made available to shareholders or the public. For instance, 
directors may attempt to exploit any price sensitive information acquired in order to 
manipulate the shares of a corporation with the aim of reaping excessive personal 
gains from such illegal activities. This corporate malfeasance refers to the notorious 
act of insider trading which will mostly cause minority shareholders to suffer great 
losses when the share prices of a corporation plunges to the bottom as a result of 
such manipulation by the directors. 
 
As a result, it seems that the pure application of the concept of “shareholder primacy” 
may not be favourable in term of the protection of minority shareholders. After all, it 
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may eventually lead to abuse of power by boards to maximise the benefit of 
controlling shareholders at the pretence of “shareholder primacy”. However, such 
concept is partly applicable in the Malaysian context due to the local corporate 
environment and shareholders’ rights prescribed under the law. 
 
4.2.1.2. “Shareholder Primacy” in the Malaysian Context 
 
A closer look at the Malaysian public listed corporations would show that corporate 
governance regime in Malaysia is primarily driven by shareholder interests. The 
corporate arena in Malaysia seems to partially adopt the “shareholder primacy” concept 
in view of the local corporate law framework except that shareholders are deemed to be 
the legal owner of a corporation. The Malaysian case of Law Kam Loy & Anor v. Boltex 
Sdn Bhd & Ors [2005]18 reaffirmed the English case of Macaura v. Northern Assurance 
Co Ltd & Ors [1925]19 where it was said that “no shareholder has any right to any item 
of property owned by the company, for he has no legal or equitable interest therein. He 
is entitled to a share in the profits while the Company continues to carry on business 
and a share in the distribution of the surplus assets when the company is wound up”. 
Although shareholders are not deemed to be the legal owners of a corporation, the 
general approach by board is to treat shareholders as the ultimate owner of a corporation 
as they will have the legal and equitable right over the assets of a corporation in the 
event of liquidation or winding up proceeding. 
 
Moreover, the corporate law framework in Malaysia also sustains the existence of the 
“shareholder primacy” norm due to the various shareholders’ rights and powers granted. 
With the legal mandate given by the Malaysian company law, shareholders have the 
                                                            
18
 [2005] 3 CLJ 355. 
19
 [1925] AC 619. 
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legal rights to vote and elect directors who constitute the board. Such legal right to vote 
may give rise to a direct contractual relationship between corporations and shareholders. 
This is simply due to the contractual election of directors by shareholders on behalf of a 
corporation. Hence, the appointment of directors through this contractual relationship 
with shareholders may also indirectly bind the board to exercise duty of care and 
diligence which are owed to shareholders.  
 
Based on the concept of “shareholder primacy”, it implies that directors have the duties 
to manage the business affairs of corporations and to monitor its management so as to 
be satisfied that a corporation is being properly run in the best interests of shareholders. 
Apart from such “shareholder primacy” concept in Malaysia, there is also another 
concept termed as “director primacy” which has slowly gained its prominence in the 
local scene, especially in take-over cases. 
 
4.2.2. “Director Primacy” as an Alternate Concept in Corporate 
Governance? 
 
Apart from the “shareholder primacy” concept, it is interesting to note that there is an 
alternate concept in the corporate governance regime which is called as the “director 
primacy” norm. It is necessary to analyse and discuss this concept before we move on to 
determine the new concept to be adopted as the governance model in Malaysia. 
 
4.2.2.1. Discussions and Analyses – “Director Primacy” 
 
Basically, the concept of “director primacy” was advocated by Bainbridge (2001) who 
totally disagreed with the concept of “shareholder primacy” which is almost akin to the 
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“shareholder-oriented model” adopted predominantly in United States. The “director 
primacy” norm is distinguishable from the “shareholder primacy” norm in which the 
essential elements defining these two norms are that of the separation of ownership and 
control as well as the decision-making authority. Bainbridge (2001) claimed that it was 
inaccurate to say that shareholders are able to exercise corporate control via “ultimate 
decision making authority through proxy contests, institutional investor activism, 
shareholder litigation, and the market for corporate control” as far as the element of 
control is concerned. He argued that since the corporate law in the United States is 
structured on the premise of separation of ownership and control, shareholders are 
powerless in taking any corporate action since board or its subordinate is granted the 
authority to make most of the corporate decisions. Illustration 4.2 below illustrates the 
essential rudiments of the “director primacy” norm. 
 
 
Illustration 4.2: Elements constituting the “director primacy” concept. 
 
In this context, the “director primacy” notion opposes the very argument that 
shareholders play the most vital role in the decision making process simply due to the 
Decision-making 
authority
Control
Ownership
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understanding of principal-agent relationship between shareholders and directors. The 
“director primacy” norm rejects the argument that shareholders have ultimate ownership 
in a corporation since decision-making authority is vested in directors who are in a 
better position to maximise shareholders wealth. This is because shareholders consist of 
individuals with diverse interests and different levels of understanding. It would be 
difficult for a consensus decision to be made amongst shareholders even though they 
may pursue the same goal of wealth maximisation. In short, a corporation is not owned 
by shareholders and thus, directors are not their agents. It was argued that the board's 
decision-making powers do not emanate from shareholders alone, “but from the 
complete set of contracts constituting the firm” (Bainbridge, 2003).  
 
To substantiate his claim, Bainbridge further argued that by analysing the distinct 
principles of “shareholder primacy” norm, the missing link of such norm is found in the 
contention that shareholders do and should have the ultimate control right over a 
corporation. In this context, the term “shareholder wealth maximisation” could not be 
used interchangeably with the “shareholder primacy” norm since the two denote distinct 
principles. He claimed that the objective of shareholder primacy in maximising 
shareholder wealth could also be achieved by vesting absolute control and decision-
making authority with a board. It is merely an act of balancing the board’s authority 
with its accountability to shareholder wealth maximisation. 
 
All in all, the “director primacy” norm speaks of the absolute authority vested with a 
board alone in making decision for a corporation. It means that shareholders should be 
taken out of the whole picture of decision-making process since directors are also 
accountable to maximise shareholder wealth via the exercise of their discretionary 
authority in a corporation. As such, it is an idealistic concept where directors are 
entrusted with the sole decision
all. Both the concepts of “shareholder primacy” and “director primacy” share the 
common goal of shareholder wealth maximisation. The Illustration 4.3 shows the 
similarity and difference between the two
 
Illustration 4.3: The similarity and difference between the concepts of “shareholder 
primacy” and “director primacy”
 
Nonetheless, the pure application of such a “director primacy” concept will lead to 
expropriation of minority interest as the board authori
scrutiny by shareholders for the purpose of check and balance
application of the “director primacy” concept can
of take-over issues. 
 
4.2.2.2.
 
In relation to the application of “director primacy”, the Malaysian corporate law is best 
described in corporate take
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corporation may be privatised via the few avenues such as the offer to take over under 
the Malaysian Code on Take-Overs and Mergers 1998, substantial asset disposal or 
selective capital reduction and arrangement under Companies Act 1965, voluntary 
delisting from Bursa Malaysia and other corporate actions. One must bear in mind that 
all such corporate actions may lead to consequential devastative effect upon minority 
shareholders if the directors’ vast powers are not properly contained and scrutinised.  
For instance, the means to take over via substantial asset disposal under the Companies 
Act 1956 is most instructive in illustrating a dramatic corporate transaction involving 
the application of “director primacy” norm. Although approval at a general meeting is 
required for such a disposal by directors of the corporate undertaking or property under 
Section 132C of the Companies Act 1965, passing through the approval process is not 
hard in view of the board’s dominant control over the general meeting. 
 
Recently, EON Capital was caught in the tussle amongst its major shareholders due to 
the proposed take-over of all its assets and liabilities by Hong Leong Bank Berhad. 
Most often than not, such tussle arises from conflicting interests between different 
parties – the board, management and shareholders. The take-over offer also involved the 
interest of a corporation as a whole. If the corporate unrest continues, the end loser will 
be the minority shareholders. As such, the question remains whether directors should be 
given the absolute right of deciding on behalf of corporations and shareholders, 
especially in take-over transactions. 
 
Inadvertently, a take-over bid will indirectly give rise to overt conflicts of interest 
between directors and various stakeholders of a corporation, in particular the interest of 
shareholders. The possible arising conflict is due to the reason that board of offeree 
corporation has to consider whether the offer made by the offeror corporation is in the 
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best interest of the offeree corporation. Most often than not, it is hard for directors to 
weigh the interests of various stakeholders within a corporation as consensus for the 
best interests of a corporation is highly unlikely to be reached in such a complex 
situation. Not only that the offer has to be made to the board first, directors will have 
direct access to more significant information that may lead to insider trading by the 
directors. The manipulation of such information for the purpose of insider trading may 
further widen the gap of conflicting interests amongst the stakeholders of a corporation.  
 
Although the offer to take-over through acquisition of the offeree corporation’s shares is 
being directed to shareholders of the latter, it has to be conveyed or communicated to 
the offeree corporation’s board in the first instance. Furthermore, this so-called offer for 
the “acquisition of assets and liabilities” of the offeree corporation needs to be firstly 
approved and accepted by its board prior to the board’s recommendation to shareholders 
for their acceptance of the take-over offer. In any event, the problem of potential 
diverging interests is aggravated when directors reject the take-over offer for the ulterior 
purpose of retaining control over a corporation or accept the take-over offer to reap 
personal benefits. In the event of rejection of offer, this demand of control may arise 
from the fear of directors that a particular corporate take-over will result in the change 
of shareholdings which may eventually lead to the change of boardroom as well. In 
frustrating the take-over offer, directors may also seek protection under the wide-
ranging umbrella of “best interests of the corporation” and the defence of business 
judgment rule. Hence, directors will always have the first bite of the “take-over cherry” 
where they may prevent the opportunity of having the second bite of the cherry from 
reaching the general meeting for shareholders’ approval.  
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In fact, the worst case scenario may also occur in the event that the offeree corporation’s 
board accepts the offer and recommends it to shareholders. To avoid the offer from 
being rejected by shareholders, the board may choose to withhold certain vital 
information from coming within the knowledge of their shareholders in collaboration 
with the offeror corporation. For whatever reason it may be, the undesirable conduct of 
withholding the take-over information will inevitably have an impact on the process of 
deliberation by shareholders in reaching an informed decision to accept or reject the 
offer. As a result, the board may achieve their ultimate goal of benefiting themselves at 
the pretext of benefiting a corporation as a whole. 
 
From the foregoing discussion, it is obvious that the “director primacy” concept may 
not be the most suitable governance concept or model for Malaysia in view of the 
rampant cases of disputable take-over transactions. As a result, there is a need to revisit 
the appropriate “primacy” notion that a corporation should follow in formulating a set 
of corporate governance best practices. 
 
4.3. Emergence of the Concept of Corporate Primacy: The Means and 
Ends of Corporate Governance 
 
It is now clear that minority shareholders are not totally safe from the expropriation 
of controlling shareholders and the board’s abuse of power as highlighted in the 
above concepts of “shareholder primacy” and “director primacy”. Hence, this 
dissertation seeks to advocate a new notion of “corporate primacy” which can be 
termed as “Corprimacy”. Accordingly, this new concept of Corprimacy would 
suggest that there is a pressing need for fresh reform of the corporate governance 
regime in Malaysia in order to accommodate the ever-changing corporate landscape.  
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This section explains the concept of Corprimacy and examines its application in the 
formulation of the corporate governance best practices to protect minority 
shareholders. As contrasted with the concepts of “shareholder primacy” and 
“director primacy”, this new concept embarks on a different understanding on whose 
interest should a board consider as the primary factor in their decision-making 
process. There are also discussions on two recent case studies to delve into how the 
Corprimacy norm may be effective in protecting minority shareholders. The 
discussion of this new concept will definitely be used as the means to achieve the 
ends of this dissertation – the protection of minority shareholders via the 
formulation of corporate governance best practices of which will be further 
discussed in chapter 5 and 6.  
 
4.3.1. Corprimacy Explained – Convergence of “Shareholder   
Primacy” and “Director Primacy” 
 
As explained above, it is noted that the common goal of the concepts of “shareholder 
primacy” and “director primacy” is that of shareholder wealth maximisation. In 
other words, the convergence point of both concepts is at the shareholder interest 
rather than at the best interest of a corporation. One shall understand that the total 
maximisation of shareholder interest does not necessarily end up in the best interest 
of a corporation which is considered as the key element in protecting minority 
shareholders. There is a specific section 4.3.2 on how the Corprimacy approaches 
the “best interest of the corporation” as mandated under the Malaysian company law. 
First of all, this section looks at how the convergence of “shareholder primacy” and 
“director primacy” concepts can explain the essential rudiments of Corprimacy.  
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Borrowing the words of Bainbridge (2003) in relation to the “director primacy” concept, 
a director supposedly serves as a “Platonic guardian” who watches over the interest of a 
corporation. Bainbridge descriptively argued that “corporate law vests the board of 
directors with a non-reviewable power of discretionary fiat”. In practice, directors do 
not put the interest of corporations in the forefront. This is due to the existing tension of 
conflicting interests and over-reliance on its management. It is a fact that a board will 
hardly possess all the necessary skills or information to govern and manage a 
corporation. They still need to rely on the information or expert advice provided by 
other officers in the corporation or professionals hired. Due to such heavy reliance on 
the management, it would be a daunting task for directors to vigorously guard the 
interest of the corporation. As such, there shall be a check and balance mechanism that 
ensures the equilibrium of board accountability and decision-making authority. Under 
the corporate law of the United States, Bainbridge (2002) opined that “control is vested 
in the board - not shareholders” as the board of directors is an institution of corporate 
governance. Bainbridge (2002a) also justified his argument that control is ultimately 
vested in the board under the corporate law of United States instead of the Chief 
Executive Officer since “groups make better decisions than individuals under certain 
conditions” and “group decision-making is an important constraint on agency costs”.  
 
These issues raise the concern regarding the viability of “director primacy” or 
“shareholder primacy” norm. As for the concept of “director primacy”, the central basis 
lies in the weak controlling powers of shareholders where control is vested in a board. 
Strictly speaking, it does not make any significant difference to argue that “director 
primacy” connotes more controlling power which is vested with a board since it still 
does not rule out the fact that a director must exercise his control in the best interest of a 
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corporation. In the world of Corprimacy, there is no one single stakeholder who plays 
more superior role than the others. As a separate legal entity, a corporation must not be 
sustained in the long term without the overall complementary roles played by all 
relevant stakeholders like directors, shareholders, employees, creditors, suppliers and so 
forth. These complementary roles act together as the supplementary forces that support 
the pillars of governance system of a corporation. In other words, it is not necessarily 
important to address the superiority of directors in controlling a corporation since sound 
corporate governance structure requires the concerted effort from various corporate 
constituencies.  
 
Although the “director primacy” concept claims that directors have the ultimate control 
over a corporation, it is not an unusual phenomenon cutting across every single 
corporation, in particular in Malaysia where some of the major public-listed 
corporations or government-linked corporations have institutional shareholders who 
hold substantial stakes in the shares of some corporations. For instance, as an enormous 
pension fund, the Employee Provident Fund holds various large shareholdings in many 
highly valued public-listed corporations like Sime Darby Bhd, Malayan Banking Bhd, 
Tenaga Nasional Bhd, Malaysian Resources Corp Bhd (MRCB), IOI Corporation Bhd 
and so on. Usually, these substantial stakes will entitle them some seats on the board 
representation of which it signifies indirect board control. Even if there is no board 
representation, such major institutional shareholders have sizeable control on the 
direction of a corporation via their shareholding power and pressure on the board. They 
may be the ones who have the ultimate majority control over a corporation and not the 
board. Thus, it is not correct to say that all the controlling power is entrusted on a board 
alone without due consideration of controlling power of the institutional shareholders or 
individual substantial shareholders who are not part of the board. As the saying goes, 
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“absolute power corrupts absolutely”. This is the main objective of Corprimacy where 
there shall be a balance of control between the board and shareholders. Such 
shareholder control can be cultivated via their dominant roles of participation and 
activism.  
 
Basically, it is not the intention of Corprimacy to take away the decision-making 
authority of directors in a corporation. Rather, it is propounded that shareholders should 
be given more dominant role in steering the direction of corporations as well as more 
power to influence the board’s decision as when the need arises. Dent (2008) supported 
that shareholder influence should be enlarged through the mutual agreement with the 
corporation. Stout (2007) rightly pointed out that “if investors truly believed greater 
shareholder control meant better corporate performance, they could ‘vote with their 
wallets’ by preferring shares in firms that give shareholders more control”. It means that 
the shareholder control may be transformed into greater shareholder pressure on a board 
via the threat of pulling out their share investments from the corporation.  
 
From the opposite side of the same spectrum, “shareholder primacy” advocates that 
directors shall run a corporation in the interest of shareholders in view of the fact that 
they are the agents of their principals – shareholders who are predominantly the owners 
of the corporation. In response to this, Blair and Stout (1999) predicted that “the way 
corporate law actually works in practice is consistent with the notion that directors are 
independent hierarchs whose fiduciary obligations run to the corporate entity itself and 
only instrumentally to any of its participants” and they are not agents because “they are 
not subject to direct control or supervision by anyone, including the firm’s 
shareholders”. Legally speaking, it is indeed true that directors are not agents of 
shareholders but rather they owe fiduciaries duties to a corporation itself. One should 
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not lose sight of the fact that these fiduciary duties originate from the legal 
responsibilities that a director owes to a corporate entity.  
 
The very existence of a public-listed corporation survives on various constituents that 
form and support the corporation. This is very different from the context of a privately 
held corporation where there are only a few directors who own all the shares in the 
corporation. The constituents in a public-listed corporation include the stakeholders like 
shareholders, employees, creditors, suppliers and so forth. Pure objective of shareholder 
wealth maximisation will not secure the best interest of a corporation. This is because a 
corporation survives on the lifeblood of capital from its shareholders and creditors, 
business interest with the suppliers and customers as well as working hands of the 
employees. Furthermore, the sole objective of shareholder wealth maximisation may not 
sustain the long term interest of a corporation if directors are also the majority or 
substantial shareholders of the corporation. In such a scenario, it is hard to ignore the 
personal interest of the board have in a corporation itself. It should be borne in mind 
that the strong presence of controlling shareholders on board representation does not 
necessarily mean that the board should only strive for the shareholder wealth 
maximisation to the extent of neglecting the interests of the other stakeholders like 
minority shareholders, employees, creditors, suppliers and so forth. If these interests are 
not given due consideration that they rightly deserve, it will ultimately create a domino 
adverse effect upon minority shareholders. For instance, if the employees’ interests are 
not properly considered by a board, there may be mass resignation of employees who 
protest against the board policy. This will create instability in a corporation where 
minority shareholders’ interest could be affected by the sharp decline of shareholder 
value. 
 
All in all, the concepts of “shar
realigned to constitute the ultimate objective of 
minority shareholder. Corprimacy
and balanced shareholder wealth maximisat
concepts of “shareholder primacy” and “director primacy” at the best interest of 
corporations which is further discussed in the next section. 
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Illustration 4.4: The convergence of director primacy and shareholder primacy towards 
Corprimacy 
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4.3.2. The Corprimacy Approach towards “Best Interest of the 
Corporation” 
 
The foregoing discussion points to the Corprimacy approach towards “the best interest 
of the corporation” in laying the foundation for the corporate governance best practices 
(as illustrated in Illustration 4.5 below). Such understanding of Corprimacy is vital for a 
board to adopt a set of corporate governance best practices that will lead to higher 
shareholder control and participation as well as a balanced shareholder wealth 
maximisation that benefits a corporation as a whole. This set of corporate governance 
best practices is formulated in chapter 5 and the concluding chapter 6 with the ultimate 
aim of protecting minority shareholders. 
 
 
Illustration 4.5: The Corprimacy approach towards the best interest of the corporation 
 
Basically, section 132(1B) of the Companies Act 1965 requires directors to exercise 
their business judgment in the best interest of a corporation in order to avoid breach of 
their fiduciary duties to the corporation. The “best interest of a company” is not 
statutorily defined in the statute. On this note, the High Level Finance Committee has 
recommended in its Report on Corporate Governance that it should not be statutorily 
codified after considering the need to maintain the flexibility of such term. However, 
Corprimacy
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this dissertation recognises that there is a need to statutorily clarify the term “best 
interest of a company” as clear definition of such term would lead to certainty of law on 
the duties of directors. Prior to the coming into force of Companies Law (Amendment) 
Act 2007, the old provision required a director to act honestly and use reasonable 
diligence in the discharge of his duties under Section 132(1) of the Companies Act 1965. 
Notwithstanding that the current provision still requires a director to act in good faith in 
the best interest of a company, it does not clearly spell out in whose interest the business 
and affairs of a corporation should be managed or directed. This is due to the absence of 
definition on the “best interest of the company” in the law. In this regard, directors have 
no clue whilst deciding whether to consider the interests of other stakeholders like the 
creditors, employees, customers and so on.  
 
At this juncture, suffice to say that it is important to stipulate its definition for the 
purpose of defining the duties that directors owe to a corporation. Inevitably, the 
clarification of “best interest of a company” will then further substantiate the argument 
that Corprimacy should prevail over the “director primacy” and “shareholder primacy”. 
Moreover, the cautious formulation of Corprimacy as the central theme for directors’ 
duties rebukes the misperception amongst directors who believe that they are appointed 
to represent the best interests of shareholders who are responsible for their appointment. 
Notwithstanding the significance to have statutory clarification on the term “best 
interest of a company”, one must not lose sight of the complications that may arise from 
clarifying this term in view of the fact that the term addresses varying definitions in 
different contexts. Hence, it may be said that the term entails different applications 
which necessitate separate analysis of directors’ duties on a piecemeal basis.  
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For instance, there may be situations where directors are required to consider the 
interests of shareholders as a whole. Usually, these situations involve corporate 
transactions or decisions that would substantially affect the rights and interests of 
shareholders. This is because shareholders’ interests, as a group, would be put at stake 
in corporate transactions like alteration of corporation’s constitution, merger and 
acquisitions, corporate take-over, large share transfer or acquisition, exploration of new 
businesses  and disposition of substantial assets belonging to the corporation. On the 
other hand, the interests of creditors may be placed in priority over other stakeholders in 
the event that a corporation is near to insolvency or in cases where a winding up 
proceeding has been instituted against the corporation. For the purpose of flexibility, it 
is understood that the Malaysian law does not provide a conclusive definition of the 
term “best interest of the company” as its application is not exhaustive in nature. As 
such, it is the objective of Corprimacy to ensure that a board adheres to governance 
best practices in determining the best interest of a corporation.  
 
Striking the same chord with Corprimacy, board is legally required to exercise its 
powers in the best interest of a corporation. In terms of corporate governance, this 
dissertation argues that it does not paint an accurate picture to say that directors owe 
direct legal duties to act in the best interest of shareholders only. Both the concepts of 
“director primacy” and the “shareholder primacy” assume that the board should seek to 
uphold the best interest of shareholders – the shareholder wealth maximisation. Be that 
as it may, Corprimacy entails a completely different view on the model of corporate 
governance that should be moulded in accordance with the proper understanding of the 
“best interest of the corporation”. Although a board owes a primary responsibility to 
shareholders, the interests of other stakeholders are hard to be ignored in view of the 
best interest of a corporation. 
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As compared with the understanding of “best interest” in United Kingdom, Section 172 
of the UK Companies Act 2006 states that a director has a duty to promote the success 
of a corporation for the benefit of its members as a whole, having regard to: 
 
(a) the likely consequences of any decision in the long term, (b) the interests of 
the company’s employees, (c) the need to foster the company’s business 
relationships with suppliers, customers and others, (d) the impact of the 
company’s operations on the community and the environment, (e) the 
desirability of the company maintaining a reputation for high standards of 
business conduct, and (f) the need to act fairly as between members of the 
company.  
 
From the reading of the aforesaid provision, it can be seen that the company law in the 
United Kingdom has crept away from the restricted interpretation of “best interest of a 
corporation” towards a more encompassing approach that takes into consideration the 
likely long term consequences of any decision, the importance of good corporate 
reputation, the principles of fairness within a corporation as well as the interests of the 
various stakeholders. Hence, the Malaysian governance practices should be tailored 
with such duty to promote the success of a corporation for the best interest of all 
stakeholders which would result in better protection for minority shareholders. 
  
A case in point to illustrate Corprimacy is that of the Transmile scandal. The 
corporation’s over-leveraging of borrowings to purchase new fleets of airplanes had 
unnecessarily incurred exorbitant liabilities on the corporation itself. Due to such huge 
debts, some of the directors who are prosecuted by the Securities Commission sought to 
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avoid the share price from plunging to the bottom via the submission of false financial 
reports to the Securities Commission. Such inconsideration of the best interest of the 
corporation generally has caused a fortune not only to the corporation but also a great 
loss of shareholder value. Transmile may not be sustainable due to the liabilities owed 
to the creditors. This is because the creditors may institute winding-up proceeding upon 
the corporation which in turn would threaten its sustainability. If the corporation is 
unable to service its debts or make a quick turnaround, it may risk the fate of being 
wound up or collapse. This neglect of best interest of the corporation has put 
shareholders, especially minority ones at stake. The inability of repayment of debts may 
also end up in massive retrenchment of employees which will affect the daily operation 
of the corporation’s business activities. If the board had taken the best interest of all the 
stakeholders into consideration, they could have decided otherwise in regard of the 
purchase of airplanes. They may also think twice before committing the fraudulent 
misconduct of submitting false statement to the Securities Commission.  
 
The importance of considering the best interest of a corporation can also be seen in 
Section 132(1E) of the Companies Act 1965 where the nominee director is bound to act 
in the best interest of a corporation in the event of conflict with the interest of his 
nominator. In other words, nominee shall only act in the interest of his nominator who is 
normally the shareholder of a corporation. He owes a duty to the corporation that he is 
serving rather than the nominator who appointed him. Hence, the prevalence of the best 
interest of a corporation over other individual interest reaffirms Corprimacy that all the 
stakeholders’ interests are to be considered in the board’s decision-making process.  
 
In short, Corprimacy aims to create a win-win situation for every stakeholder in the 
best interest of a corporation. As part of the corporate governance best practices, a board 
should also consider the
Their consideration of the best interest of 
promote the success and sustainability of 
enhancement of shareholders’
stakeholders based on the 
corporation. 
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corporate governance really matters to the realm of corporate law. Perhaps, one may 
argue that Corprimacy may at best give rise to just another emblematic “primacy” 
argument which will never find its meeting point with other similar “primacy arguments” 
by scholars at the end of the road. Scholars will doubt the necessity and practicality as 
regard to the creation of conflicting “primacy” in the realm of corporate governance.  
 
In fact, the differences between “shareholder primacy” and “director primacy” do not 
really matter. It also does not matter whether the global corporate governance models 
are converging towards either “primacy” norms. Rather, it is advocated that the 
convergence point should be directed towards the Corprimacy approach of best interest 
of a corporation. This is because the implications of certain legal rules that govern the 
division of powers between corporate stakeholders are often examined based on the 
short term and long term values of the shareholder. Thence, this dissertation attempts to 
clarify the many doubts arising out of the rationality of adopting this new Corprimacy 
through exploratory analysis on its functionality as well as its practical application in 
shaping a new model of corporate governance for the protection of minority 
shareholders. With such a new model, it is hoped that it will help to set the right course 
for directors in managing and directing the business and affairs of corporations. 
 
Bearing these objectives in mind, Corprimacy essentially pushes for a fresh rethinking 
of the corporate governance framework that is commonly implemented throughout most 
of the corporations. It does not necessarily imply that the corporate players should 
completely pay no heed to the established principle that shareholders’ interests must be 
vigorously defended. After all, this is what corporate governance matters in preserving 
shareholders’ value as well as protecting minority shareholders’ interest – the central 
thesis of this dissertation. In other words, there is neither radical change from the 
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existing concepts of “primacy” nor drastic deviation from the well-established 
principles of corporate governance when it comes to Corprimacy. It merely differs in 
terms of the understanding of best interest of a corporation and the practical application 
of Corprimacy in formulating the corporate governance best practices. Henceforth, 
Corprimacy may be adopted to set the tone for the formulation of corporate governance 
best practices that this dissertation seeks to achieve.  
 
Essentially, there is a pressing need to have an efficient system of corporate governance 
that provides sufficient supervision over the roles and duties of directors in order to 
avoid abuse of powers by them. Such a system must not only serve to warrant that 
directors and officers of a corporation comply strictly with all laws and regulations but 
also to ensure that they constantly act and make their decisions in the corporation’s best 
interest. After all, the underlying principles of Corprimacy capture the the essential 
ingredients of corporate legal rules of which both the concepts of “shareholder primacy” 
and “director primacy” have overlooked. A deeper understanding of corporate law will 
also unravel the corporate governance best practices based on the best interest of a 
corporation, significance of directors’ roles, separation of governance and management, 
proximate interplay between shareholders and corporation and so forth. All these 
elements will be further explained and critically examined in the following sections. 
 
4.3.4. Application of Corprimacy in the Formulation of the 
Corporate Governance Best Practices 
 
The application of Corprimacy in the formulation of corporate governance best 
practices in this section covers, amongst others, the separation of governance and 
management role, the redefining of directors’ roles as well as harmonising the rights 
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of the majority and minority shareholders. All of these application and 
understanding are important to set the right path for the formulation of corporate 
governance best practices in the ensuing chapters.  
 
4.3.4.1. Separation of the Dual Roles of Governance and 
Management  
 
First of all, there shall be a clear understanding on the difference between the terms 
“governance” and “management”. However, this distinction may seem to be ambiguous 
and both terms are often muddled in practice. It is imperative to clearly understand the 
distinctive definitions and usage of governance and management as it delineates the 
interplay between the roles of board and managers.  
 
The management tasks of a corporation are usually delegated to the appointed 
management team or top executives of the corporation. In Burland v. Earle [1902]20, 
Lord Davey stated that “the Court will not interfere with the internal management of 
companies acting within their powers, and in fact has no jurisdiction to do so”. As such, 
there is legitimate expectation that these executives will diligently carry out their 
corporate actions and effectively manage the entire corporation in accordance with their 
respective assigned portfolios. On the other hand, the duty of governance is legally 
entrusted to the board of a corporation in which they shoulder the legal obligations to 
oversee the work or performance of the management team as well as to ensure that 
conflicts of interest are resolved wherever possible. In other words, a management team 
is answerable to the board for every corporate action they take in the course of business. 
Such board-management relationship would mean that board governance has 
                                                            
20
 [1902] AC 83, 93. 
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intertwined roles with the management as the decision or plan made by the former will 
be transformed into actions by the latter. Hence, both governance and management have 
relatively significant impact on each other.  
 
In case of conflicting decisions between board and management, board authority shall 
prevail as provided under the corporate law. Being an institutional structure, most 
corporations seem to position their boards at the apex of corporate hierarchy where the 
boards have the power to appoint and dismiss their management. Nonetheless, it 
remains to be seen whether the superior position of board entails it to be described as a 
model of “director primacy”. Theoretically, it is sound to vest the powers of governance 
in the hands of board. Being responsible for the governance of the corporate structure, a 
board is in charge for the hiring as well as firing of the top executives or management 
team in a corporation. However, the rationale of retaining this conventional practice has 
gradually changed due to the latest development of corporate law. In the modern 
corporate practice, it is hard to have a total clear-cut separation of governance and 
management. Most often than not, the dividing line is muddled by the hesitation of 
board in sacking the top executives like the Chief Executive Officer or President since 
they feel that it is time-consuming and costly to do so.  
 
Moreover, a Chief Executive Officer or President who is usually the founder of a 
corporation, will be the one that recommends directors to be elected into the board at the 
general meeting. As the founder or successor to the corporation, the thin dividing line 
between governance and management is completely erased from the horizon of 
organisational structure in which the same individual will hold the highest post in the 
management chart as well as the chairmanship of the board. Such management pressure 
upon the board would prejudice the board’s decision-making process in the governance 
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system of a corporation. This flies in the face of Corprimacy which advocates the best 
interest of a corporation. This is because the CEO’s interference in the governance role 
of a board can lead to possible abuse of power. 
 
Without a clear separation of the dual roles of management and governance, the 
shareholder approval process of either the appointment or dismissal of directors 
becomes an uphill battle since the management is the one who will select and nominate 
the board members. Similarly, it will be easier for CEO to appoint top executives as he 
or she has the ultimate control over the board which would approve the nomination. As 
a result, this may lead to the concentration of directors and executives who are 
connected via close family ties or other related relationships or interests amongst them. 
Hence, the objective of check and balance mechanism in controlling a corporation will 
inevitably be compromised by such a highly family-dominated corporate structure.  
 
In relation to a sound corporate governance framework, Detomasi (2002) expressed 
the view that the board’s function is to primarily examine the strategy of a 
corporation on the whole by continuously searching for “weak points in the 
organizational functions and operations” and “by retrospectively studying the 
previous decisions made by the corporation”. Therefore, as the apex of the 
governance structure in a corporation, a board should play their oversight role in 
directing the management via their policies and strategies. Directors should guide 
the management in implementing their decisions in accordance with the corporate 
governance best practices. All in all, the distinctive nature of the governance and 
management shall not divide the supplementary roles between board and management. 
Rather, it should strengthen the execution of these separate roles in the best interest of a 
corporation. 
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4.3.4.2. Redefining the Roles of Directors as the Cornerstone of 
Corprimacy 
 
First and foremost, it is noted that there is no one comprehensive definition of whom 
and what constitutes a “director” in a corporation under the Companies Act 1965 since 
Section 4 of the Companies Act 1965 only defines a director as “any person occupying 
the position of director of a corporation by whatever name called and includes a person 
in accordance with whose directions or instructions the directors of a corporation are 
accustomed to act and an alternate or substitute director”. It is simply not adequate for 
one to thoroughly understand the nature and roles of a director by merely reading 
between the defining lines in the Companies Act 1965.  
 
Recognising the discrepancy found in the definition of “director” under the Companies 
Act 1965, it is commendable to note that the Securities Commission Malaysia has 
recently endeavoured to extend the scope of the definition to include officers that 
occupy the top management of a corporation through the passing of the Capital Markets 
and Services (Amendment) Act 2009. For the purpose of the new provision on 
prohibited conduct of director or officer of a listed corporation under Section 317A, 
paragraph 4 of that provision reads that “‘director’ includes a person who is a director, 
chief executive officer, chief operating officer, chief financial controller or any other 
person primarily responsible for the operations or financial management of a company, 
by whatever name called”. As such, the coverage of who assumes the role of a “director” 
is widened in order to reflect the corporate reality in which those who are primarily 
responsible for the operations or financial management of a corporation do not come 
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under the definition of “director” as they are merely the management team employed by 
a corporation. 
 
In this context, the insertion of the new definition of “director” under the new Section 
317A of the Capital Markets and Services Act 2007 is deemed as a major step towards 
enhancing the accountability of top management executives in view of the fact that they 
are usually the ones that run the day-to-day business and affairs of a corporation. Most 
often than not, they are also the ultimate decision-makers whose decisions are 
subsequently endorsed or rubber-stamped by the board. The enhanced scope of the 
definition is not too-far-fetched and it must not be seen as a burdensome measure that 
restricts the creativity of the management. It follows that the aforesaid new definition of 
“director” should be incorporated into the Companies Act 1965. Even if the 
Parliament’s intention is to leave the definition of “director” as it is in the Companies 
Act 1965, Corprimacy entails that the roles of a director should be further enhanced in 
order to include the roles of the management. 
 
Apparently, there is a need to strike a balance between excessive authority and absolute 
accountability pertaining to the roles of a director. In line with Corprimacy, the 
governance structure of a corporation must be crafted in such a way to include the 
accountability of its management arm in order to make directors and officers 
collectively responsible for the operation of the corporation. Since early beginning of 
the 20th century, the term “corporate governance” has been a contentious phenomenon 
in the United States, where the famous co-authors of the book “The Modern 
Corporation and Private Property” – Berle and Means (1932) was of the view that the 
majority of public corporations are operated not in the interests of their supposed 
owners – shareholders, but in the interests of the management of the corporation.  
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On the contrary, Kala Anandarajah (2001) argued that a director is legally obliged to 
carry out his duties with a view to enhancing the interest of a corporation either by 
increasing profits, reducing costs or even positive publicity of the corporation. Hence, it 
can be seen that there are diverging views as to whose interest should a board seek to 
enhance or protect. It goes back to the discussion on the legal responsibilities and duties 
of a board. In the course of explaining Corprimacy, it is important to revisit the proper 
understanding on the legal responsibilities and duties of the board. This section reveals 
that the regulators and scholars are bound by the conventional interpretation in defining 
and formulating the directors’ duties and functions. As a result, this has inevitably led to 
the restricted application of directors’ duties in the realm of corporate governance based 
on the limited models of corporate governance, namely, the “shareholder primacy” and 
the “director primacy”.  
 
Though the heated debate on which “primacy” should prevail continues relentlessly, it 
is imperative to note that regardless of which scholarly opinion wins the arguments of 
“primacy” in due course, the extent to which the legal duties and obligations a director 
owes must be clearly defined and understood before any further contention proceeds. In 
this regard, the first question ought to be asked is – to whom such legal duties and 
obligations directors owe in corporate law? The answer to this question will determine 
the appropriate factors that directors should consider in their decision making process. It 
is then prudent that directors will have a clear-cut mindset and direction as to the 
measurement of the balanced interest within a corporation. To respond to this question, 
it is necessary to peruse the relevant laws in order to reach a satisfactory finding that 
suits the local corporate cultures. 
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With regard to the roles and functions of a board, Section 131B(1) of the Companies 
Act 1965 states that “the business and affairs of a company must be managed by, or 
under the direction of, the board of directors”. It is clear that a board has the mandatory 
obligation to either manage or direct the business and affairs of a corporation as this 
section uses the word “must”. Such stipulation aims to reinforce the wordings contained 
in Article 73 of Table A of the Companies Act 1965 which also states that “the business 
of the company shall be managed by the directors”. From the legal point of view, 
Section 131B(1) of the Companies Act 1965 is distinguishable from Article 73 of Table 
A of the Companies Act 1965 as the entire running of the business and administrative 
operation of a corporation lies solely in the hands of a board as the former uses the 
words “business and affair” whilst the latter only covers business. Hence, it is wider in 
scope in relation to the roles and duties of a board as it enhances the management or 
supervisory functions of directors. 
 
However, this legal obligation is not absolute and unqualified as it is toned down by a 
qualifying provision under Section 131B(2) of the Companies Act 1965 which provides 
that “the board of directors has all the powers necessary for managing and for directing 
and supervising the management of the business and affairs of the company subject to 
any modification, exception or limitation contained in this Act or in the memorandum 
or articles of association of the company”. The rationale of having such a qualifying 
provision goes in tandem with the purpose of limiting the roles and powers of a board. 
Although a board generally has unfettered powers needed to manage and oversee the 
whole corporation, Section 131B(2) specifically allows the company’s constitution to 
modify or limit their powers completely or partially. Thus, it does not necessarily mean 
that directors must manage or direct the business and affairs of a corporation themselves 
since they may effectively delegate these powers of managing to the top management of 
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a corporation via the memorandum or articles of association of the corporation. By 
reading this provision per se, one may come to the interpretation that the law has 
provided an alternate channel for the board to minimise their responsibilities to the least 
possible. This “escapism” from liabilities may happen in the event that a board calls for 
a general meeting to obtain consent from the members of a corporation in order to 
delegate most of their powers to the management by altering the corporation’s 
constitution. The likelihood of being successful in doing so is quite minimal within a 
corporate structure which has more public shareholders who are not related to the 
directors as it will be difficult to achieve a special majority to amend. 
 
On the flip side of the same coin, the Malaysian corporate structure is family-dominant 
and shareholding-concentrated in which directors are also the substantial or majority 
shareholders in a corporation. Most often than not, these directors would have no 
trouble to make decisions for furtherance of their own interests. Mohammad Rizal 
Salim (2009) reiterated that “the low threshold of public shareholding spread required 
of listed companies and a relatively poor enforcement regime is a fertile ground for 
concentrated shareholding to flourish”. Without more controlling shareholding power, it 
easily enables them to alter the memorandum or articles of association of a corporation 
without much hassle. Such a wide unhealthy empowerment may subject to abuse by the 
board to the disadvantage of the corporation which would usually lead to expropriation 
of minority interests.  
 
Despite of the aforesaid flaws in the laws, it is highly commendable for the regulator to 
set out the roles and functions of a board in the Companies Act 1965. Nonetheless, it is 
equally important to clarify the perimeters of directors’ roles and duties in respect of 
managing and directing a corporation in whose interest. To transform the core nature of 
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directors’ roles and duties, it should be supported by viable enforcement mechanism in 
which the spirit of Corprimacy may be upheld. In that sense, a proper understanding of 
Corprimacy may be constructive to set out the theoretical framework underlying 
directors’ roles and duties which will in turn respond to the models of corporate 
governance – should a corporation be managed or directed in the best interest of the 
corporation (Corprimacy model) or for shareholder wealth maximisation (the 
shareholder primacy norm) or for the interests of stakeholders under the board’s control 
(the director primacy model)? 
 
Setting out the roles and duties of directors is in no way an easy task. There are a 
myriad of issues since different corporations have different system, cultures and 
responsibilities. The best string to tie up the different knots is the act of balancing the 
authority and accountability by directors. Such balancing act can be fine-tuned in the 
context of Corprimacy pertaining to the directors’ duties and responsibilities. 
           
4.3.4.3. Duty of Reasonable Care, Skill and Diligence in the 
Context of Corprimacy 
 
The law on the duties of directors can be traced back to the long established principles 
of director’s duties in the common law position. In Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co 
Ltd (1925) CH 407, it was held that “in discharging the duties of his position, a director 
must act honestly; but he must also exercise some degree of both skill and diligence”. 
The court added that there would be no breach of director’s duties “so long as a director 
acts honestly he cannot be made responsible in damages unless guilty of gross or 
inculpably negligence in a business sense.” The rule is quite relaxed in the common law 
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as there is higher proof of gross negligence in a business sense in order to hold a 
director liable for his actions. 
 
As regard to the duties of care, skill and diligence of a director in Malaysia, Section 
132(1A) of the Companies Act 1965 clearly stipulates that “a director of a company 
shall exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence with (a) the knowledge, skill and 
experience which may reasonably be expected of a director having the same 
responsibilities; and (b) any additional knowledge, skill and experience which the 
director in fact has”. The new subsection 132(1A) introduces the test of objectivity and 
reasonableness into the standard of duty a director shall comply. Subsection 132(1A) 
can be divided into two limbs where the first limb (a) lays down the minimum 
expectation of duty from all directors based on the one’s knowledge and skill whilst the 
second limb (b) imposes a higher responsibilities upon those directors who possess 
additional knowledge, skill and experience. Thence, a director who professes himself as 
the expert or qualified specialist in a particular subject matter or area shall shoulder 
more duties and responsibilities than the general directors at large. They are reasonably 
expected to exercise higher standard of due diligence and care.  
 
In discharging his duties, a director may also rely on information provided by others in 
reaching a decision. It is provided under Section 132(1C) of the Companies Act 1965 
that “a director may rely on the information, professional or expert advice, opinions, 
reports or statements including financial statements and other financial data, prepared, 
presented or made” by the officer or person entrusted with the matter concerned. For all 
intents and purposes, it is impractical to leave all the management duties to directors to 
personally perform them. Particularly, there is great commercial need to delegate 
corporate powers and functions to the management body in large corporations. Hence, a 
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director must be able to reasonably rely on the information or expert opinions in 
arriving at a more holistic decision for the best interest of a corporation. The rationale of 
the aforesaid provision is also in tandem with the objective of Corprimacy where 
absolute corporate power would corrupt directors absolutely. For this reason, it is 
necessary to spread the corporate control over the business affairs of a corporation to the 
executives who are tasked with the daily management duties.  
 
However, Section 132(1C) is not a provision that a director can simply rely upon in 
justifying his decision or action. This is because the reliance must be one that is made 
on reasonable ground. The deeming provision for a reasonable reliance can be found 
under the ambit of Section 132(1D) where it provides two requirements that first the 
reliance was made by a director “in good faith” and “after making an independent 
assessment of the information or advice, opinions, reports or statements, including 
financial statements and other financial data, having regard to the director's knowledge 
of the company and the complexity of the structure and operation of the company”. To 
ensure that Corprimacy is being pursued, a director has to reasonably believe that the 
officers of the corporation or any other professionals engaged will competently 
discharge their duties in the best interest of the corporation. Despite that directors may 
reasonably rely on the information provided, it is still pertinent for directors to be 
watchful and vigilant at the helm in overseeing the management as part of their 
governance role as well as supervisory function.  
 
All in all, the significance of Corprimacy approach towards the fiduciary duties of 
directors are generally based on the principles of higher board accountability, balanced 
board authority with the management and shareholders, the best interest of a corporation 
and the business judgment rule which will be further discussed in chapter 5. Besides the 
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roles and responsibilities of the directors, the following section continues to harmonise 
the rights of majority shareholders and minority in a bid to uphold the concept of 
Corprimacy. 
 
4.3.5. Harmonising the Rights of the Majority and Minority 
Shareholders at the Crossroad of Corprimacy 
 
A few decades ago, Jensen and Meckling (1976) had cautioned that the growing levels 
of ownership in corporations would engender the management to expropriate corporate 
capital to the disadvantage of minority shareholders. This is due to the fact that they 
have more control over the utilisation of the assets and liabilities as well as direct access 
to pertinent information about their corporations. Hence, they were of the view that such 
high level of ownership would then lead to increased risks of managerial entrenchment 
which is realised through the institution of a conforming board of directors, cross-
shareholdings, participation in unfair related party transactions, redundant borrowings 
from different banks and excessive executive remuneration.  
 
Furthermore, the rule in Foss v. Harbottle has unwontedly given birth to the “majority 
rule” which has then become a nightmare that haunted minority shareholder for 
centuries. Although the present company law in Malaysia sought to overcome the 
“majority rule” via the introduction of statutory derivative actions, it is very much to no 
avail in view of its post-remedial effect. The fact remains that such “principle of the 
supremacy of the majority rights of shareholders in a joint stock company” would mean 
that “a member has agreed to submit to the will of the majority provided that that will is 
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expressed in accordance with the law and articles of association” (per Raja Azlan Shah J 
in Mooney & Ors v. Peat, Marwick, Michell & Company & Anor [1966]21).  
 
In this context, the oft-cited words of Lord Wilberforce in Re Kong Thai Sawmill (Miri) 
Sdn Bhd [1978] 22  are most instructive in illustrating the “majority rule” which 
overpowers the rights of minority. With regard to the remedy available for minority 
under Section 181(i)(a) of the Companies Act 1965, Lord Clyde in Thompson v. 
Drysdale required that “there must be awareness of that interest and an evident decision 
to override it or to brush it aside or to set at nought the proper company procedure”. In 
Re Khong Thai Sawmill, it is noted that the oppression rule has since been made more 
difficult for minority shareholders to seek remedy when their rights are prejudiced. The 
requirement of “a visible departure from the standard of fair dealing and a violation of 
the conditions of fair play which a shareholder is entitled to expect” is an unnecessary 
burden that will weigh down the success rate of minority in a case of oppression. It is 
definitely a gargantuan task to prove that the majority has the awareness of the 
minority’s interest and that they have evidently decided to override it. In this regard, 
this infamous case does not truly underscore the principle of Corprimacy where it is of 
utmost importance to harmonise the rights of majority and minority shareholders for the 
best interest of a corporation as a whole. 
 
To make matter worse, the case of Low Tien Sang & Sons Holding Sdn Bhd & Ors v. 
How Kem Chin & Ors [1999]23 has also further widened the gap of conflicting interests 
between majority and minority when the court reasoned that “it does not constitute 
oppression for those in control to insist upon the adoption of a policy on a matter of 
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 1 LNS 109. 
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 2 MLJ 227. 
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 [1999] 1 LNS 163. 
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business on which there may be legitimate differences of opinion, nor is it oppression if 
an existing state of inequality results from the provisions of the constitution of the 
company and not from any action on the part of those in control”. The aforesaid case 
found its support in the earlier English case – Re Harmer Ltd (1959)24 where Romer LJ 
said that “for a petition to succeed it must be shown that there has been oppression in a 
real sense of members qua shareholders, and not merely a subordination of their wishes 
to the power of the voting majority”. 
 
It is not uncommon to find scholars arguing on the issue of conflicting interest between 
minority and majority shareholders. Some would champion the rights of minority 
shareholders while others would promote the rights of shareholders as a whole. At this 
very juncture, the baffling issue remains whether shareholders wealth should be 
maximised as an en bloc or corporate objectives and interests should take priority. If 
shareholder primacy norm prevails, the next question arises – to what extent will the 
shareholder wealth be maximised as an en bloc? In practice, controlling shareholders 
who are usually the majority have louder voice and final say in the sense that their 
voting powers are stronger than minority. It seems that majority shareholders control the 
“en bloc” and indirectly represent the voice of the “en bloc”. Consequently, it is highly 
likely that the interest of minority will often be prejudiced in which they would reap the 
least benefit, or worse still, suffer losses at their own peril.  
 
Such dilemma is as a result of the differences in opinions pertaining to the diverging 
definition of primacy and the principles that define these norms. The greatest hurdle 
here is to reconcile the variance in applications in order to iron out the unresolved issues 
and find a common theme among these issues. Supposedly, a sound corporate 
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governance framework should have considerable room for the protection and 
preservation of legitimate interests of minority shareholders. This is simply because 
majority shareholders often defy minority shareholder rights by initiating steps to assert 
their authority over a corporation with the evil intention to dwindle the standings of 
minority against them.  
 
In a nutshell, the objective of Corprimacy is to harmonise the rights of majority who 
mostly sit on a board and that of minority shareholders who mostly remain outside of 
the board. It seeks to strike a balance between two extremes in order to reach an axis 
point where a corporation can sail smoothly as an entity in general. The balancing scale 
involves the participation of all relevant stakeholders within a corporation to realise the 
objective of Corprimacy – best interest of the corporation. Hence, this dissertation aims 
to formulate corporate governance best practices that can be adopted to afford the 
minimum protection to minority shareholders based on the model of Corprimacy. It 
should be borne in mind that the formulation of the corporate governance best practices 
is not sustainable without active shareholder activism. 
 
4.3.6. Enhancing Shareholder and Investor Activism Through the 
Sustenance of Corprimacy 
 
Sustaining Corprimacy constitutes a means towards enhancing shareholder and investor 
activism in the long run. It should not merely be perceived as an ends itself since the 
level of shareholder and investor activism greatly depends on the continuing application 
of Corprimacy within a corporate entity. Perhaps, shareholder activism may stem from 
the mistrust and scepticism in the wake of recent corporate scandals where most of 
shareholders have started to lose faith in the board. Theoretically, the conventional 
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shareholder primacy would suggest that directors should manage or direct the business 
and affairs of corporations on behalf of shareholders who are the owners of the 
corporations.  
 
Unknowingly, this common perception has given rise to a lower shareholder activism as 
they tend to rely heavily on the directors’ duties to manage a corporation in their best 
interest. Such passive reliance has led to increased control of a corporation by directors 
who often do not live up to their expected responsibilities. In Malaysia, it is common 
that shareholders with controlling stakes are often actively involved in the management 
of the businesses as they need to take care of their substantial interest of ownership in a 
corporation. Hence, this dual identity of owner-manager relationship triggers more 
unwelcoming opportunities for controlling shareholders to expropriate the interest of 
minority shareholders.  
 
In this regard, it is of utmost importance to implement a set of corporate governance 
best practices which is corporate-centric in nature. Having the Corprimacy model, it is 
highly likely that controlling shareholders would endeavour their best to align their 
interests with those of minority shareholders as the corporate interest would always be 
put in top priority. For the benefit of a corporation, controlling shareholders will have to 
take into consideration the interest of a corporation as a whole whilst making any 
decision or taking any corporate action. This is due to the push factor of Corprimacy 
that motivates them to enhance the performance of their corporation for the best interest 
of the entire corporation. Simply put, the advancement of the corporate interest will in 
turn result in the increased corporate value or performance that will benefit all 
stakeholders of a corporation in the long run. Such interest-balancing act would further 
encourage minority shareholders to actively participate in the management of a 
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corporation in order to be better equipped with the knowledge of the past, present and 
future activities of the corporation in which they have invested.  
 
As a result, a board will no longer be dominated by controlling shareholders only as 
minority shareholders would also vigorously call for their representatives to be elected 
to the board. This will help to create a more balanced board composition where a check 
and balance mechanism can be set up as an internal control of the board’s decision. In 
an effort to make a board aware of and more responsive to their interests, they may also 
regularly submit proposals to the board for proxy solicitations and convening general 
meetings to decide on a particular transaction. Hence, it is clear that the enhanced 
shareholder activism would render the corporation action undertaken by directors to be 
closely scrutinised by shareholders. Dent (2008) argued that “shareholder control would 
not be perfect - no system dependent on human beings can be - but it would be far better 
than the CEO-dominated boards we have now”. It is also not evidently proven that more 
shareholder control would provide a better governance mechanism to a corporation, 
especially a corporation who has a CEO-dominated board. Be that as it may, there is an 
ardent need to enhance the shareholder activism in order to add to the frail shareholder 
control over large corporations as shareholder activism can be an important tool to 
reconcile the “competing interests of corporations and society” (Monks, 2007). 
 
Moreover, the active involvement by institutional shareholders or investors forms an 
integral part of shareholder activism as it basically reflect that board’s decision is under 
effective scrutiny to ensure higher level of accountability amongst directors. 
Institutional shareholders may also intervene into board’s actions when corporate 
performance is declining as well as exercise voting power to push for a transformation 
in corporate policies or change in the management team. Based on the crux of 
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Corprimacy, institutional shareholders may play their vital part as the watchdog for the 
corporate actions or decisions made by board and management. To a certain extent, 
such activism would divest the total control and power of board and management in 
which the institutional shareholders would share the role and function of governing and 
managing the corporation. In this context, the mounting shareholder activism by 
institutional investors in changing the governance structure of hedge funds has been so 
remarkable that “the record supports the proposition that they have shifted the balance 
of corporate power in the direction of outside shareholders and their financial agendas, 
perhaps heralding a modification of the prevailing description of a separation of 
ownership and control” Bratton (2006). This follows that increasing shareholder 
activism can lead to the erosion of “director primacy” which finds its basis on the 
separation of ownership and control. 
 
In the current challenging corporate world, directors should be prepared to allow 
shareholders, especially minority shareholders as well as other investors to actively play 
a significant role in governing corporate practices. A study has been conducted by the 
Oxford Analytica (1992) on the G7 Countries’ Board Directors and Corporate 
Governance, the report showed that corporations will have to give investors more of a 
role in governance in order to compete for capital (Monks & Minow, 1995). Undeniably, 
the outcome of the report exemplifies the very cornerstone of Corprimacy where every 
constituent or corporate player within a corporation has a collective and interdependent 
role to play to preserve and enhance the best interest of a corporation as a whole.  
 
In conclusion, shareholders and investors may not be directly involved in the day-to-day 
management of a corporation as they are not supposed to be the managers of the 
corporation. Be that as it may, the greater need for activism on their part to participate in 
the governance processes directly could not be easily ignored or brushed aside
board as the concept of 
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a corporation including minority shareholders when corporate reputation and survival 
are at stake. Illustration 4.7 below highlights the correlative relat
enhancement of shareholder activism and the reduction of minority oppression.
 
Illustration 4.7: Correlative relationship between the enhancement of shareholder 
activism and the reduction of minority oppression
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been instrumental in improving the corporate governance best practices of both the 
corporations. 
 
4.4.1. Board Tussle in Petra Perdana  
 
On December 2009, Petra Perdana disposed 25.03% of Petra Energy to ease its bank 
borrowings by about RM150 millions with a residual cash balance of about RM116 
millions as well as to accelerate Petra Perdana’s fleet expansion and renewal 
programme. The corporation also planned to divest the remaining 29.59% stake held in 
the latter. However, former executive director of Petra Perdana, Shamsul Saad who is 
currently the company’s new managing director, had filed and obtained court injunction 
to stop the sale of remaining 29.59% shares in Petra Energy. He challenged the move of 
the company on the basis that “the conditions set by the board were not met, namely, 
that the sale should be conducted en bloc and on an open tender basis. The en bloc 
condition inherently already requires shareholder approval in an extraordinary general 
meeting”. He added that “to execute this share sale piecemeal without reverting to the 
board undermines the requirements for shareholder approval”. It was also claimed that 
the sale was at more than 12% discount where “it breached the shareholder mandate of 
not more than 10% discount”. (The Star Biz News, January 2010). 
 
On 9 February 2010, the Star Biz (2010) news reported that the former Executive 
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Petra Perdana, Tengku Datuk Ibrahim Petra 
“has exercised his executive powers to temporarily suspend senior management and key 
personnel of the company until Feb 3”. Tengku Datuk Ibrahim Petra reasoned out that 
“this action (suspension) has nothing to do with vendetta, as some may perceive. Every 
shareholder has the right to invoke Section 145 of the Companies Act if the board fails 
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in its functions”. Apart from that, he was also reported of claiming that “instead of 
jointly supporting the board’s efforts to uphold the company’s image and manage its 
challenges, the senior management and key personnel chose to look the other way and 
use the opportunity to pursue their own agenda in seeking board representations in the 
company”. 
 
Due to the dissatisfaction over the sale of 25% stake in Petra Energy, Shamsul Saad and 
another 10 shareholders of Petra Perdana had subsequently called for an extraordinary 
general meeting on 4 February 2010 to remove four directors including Tengku Ibrahim 
Petra and his wife, Datin Nariza Hajjar Hashim as well as two other independent non-
executive directors. In an attempt to relinquish the rights of the then suspended directors 
to call for the extraordinary general meeting by Tengku Datuk Ibrahim Petra, the fact 
remained that their removal did not prevent or stop the suspended directors from 
requisitioning an extraordinary general meeting as of shareholders rights. They argued 
that “we are still shareholders. The suspension is pertaining to our employment and it 
does not change shareholders’ rights. We are doing things merely to uphold minority 
shareholders’ rights and for the good of the company.” As a result, the special meeting 
witnessed the removal of Tengku Datuk Ibrahim Petra as the Executive Chairman and 
Chief Executive Officer of Petra Perdana.  
 
In the beginning of 2009, the share price of Petra Perdana was floating around at the 
level of RM 1.20. Following the big bull trap of rising stocks, it once reached the level 
of RM 3.14 on 15 June 2009. However, this high level of share price did not hold long 
as it began to fall following Petra Perdana’s sale of 25% stake in Petra Energy Bhd 
(“Petra Energy”) – a subsidiary of Petra Perdana broke out to the public. As minority 
shareholders did not realise about the underlying problem behind the sale, they 
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helplessly ignored the alarming signal which persisted till the occurrence of share slump 
and the revelation of disputes within the management of the corporation. In relation to 
the sharp fall in share price, the Chief Executive Officer of MSWG, Rita Benoy Bushon 
also commented that “minority shareholders stood to suffer the most in the ensuing 
battle between the two sides, with the long-term vision of the group now blurred and in 
disarray” and it “could have a negative impact on earnings as well as the share price, 
until the issue is resolved” (The Star Biz News, January 2010). Hence, it seemed that a 
fast end to the tussle would benefit minority shareholders as the dispute between the 
two camps might affect the company’s fundamentals, in particular its operational and 
financial performance. 
 
It was noted that the resolution to remove the four directors was largely depending on 
the votes by minority shareholders since each of the two rivals collectively own 12% to 
15% of Petra Perdana. It reflected the significance of shareholder activisms led by 
minority shareholders in transforming the management and governance structure of a 
corporation. The role of an institutional investor may not be undermined as well in light 
of the fact that Lembaga Tabung Haji and Permodalan Nasional Bhd collectively hold 
16% stake while Amanah Saham Wawasan 2020 holds another 7.6%. As such, it could 
be seen that the united strength of the institutional investors and minority shareholders 
would generate a forceful power that may move any changes in a corporation.  
 
4.4.2. Ho Hup Construction Co Bhd 
 
Ho Hup was once a gigantic construction and engineering corporation that laid hands in 
the building of the Petronas Twin Towers, National Sports Complex, and Kuala Lumpur 
International Airport. However, the sale of two parcels of land which were owned by 
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Ho Hup has sparked off the burning battle between Ho Hup’s former managing director, 
Lim Ching Choy and Ho Hup’s substantial shareholder and current managing director, 
Datuk Low Tuck Choy who owns another company named Low Chee & Sons Sdn Bhd 
which had founded Ho Hup. It was alleged that the two parcels of freehold land were 
being sold at below market rates. On top of that, Datuk Low Tuck Choy also claimed 
that the regularisation plan submitted to Bursa Malaysia to lift Ho Hup’s Practice Note 
17 (PN17) status was not “in the best interests of minority shareholders.”  
 
In a similar twist with the Petra Perdana’s board tussle, two substantial shareholders of 
Ho Hup, Low Chee & Sons Sdn Bhd and Choo Soo Har had also called for the 
extraordinary general meeting on 4 February 2010 to remove 8 out of 9 directors 
including Lim Ching Choy in order to give way to the appointment of 6 new directors. 
The extraordinary general meeting was considered as the forum for shareholders to 
decide on the fate of the corporation in such as tense conflicts. However, the 
extraordinary general meeting was not held as scheduled on 4 February 2010 due to the 
injunction order obtained by Ho Hup’s controlling shareholder Extreme System Sdn 
Bhd in bringing the meeting to a halt. The High Court granted the order on the technical 
ground that the notice of the said meeting was “one day short of the 28-day notice 
period as required under the law”. Notwithstanding this, the extraordinary general 
meeting managed to be requisitioned on March 17 where some 55.94% of shareholders 
voted for the removal of Datuk Vincent Lye, Lim Ching Choy, Datuk Liew Lee Leong, 
Long Mohd Nor Amran Long Ibrahim, Mohd Shahril Hamzah and Foo Ton Hin. 
 
Arising out of rancorous board tussle, the then board of Ho Hup had also decided to 
enter into a joint development arrangement with Pioneer Haven Sdn Bhd (“Pioneer 
Haven”) which is a wholly owned subsidiary of Malton Bhd to develop a piece of 60-
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acre land in Bukit Jalil via Ho Hup’s subsidiary, Bukit Jalil Development Sdn Bhd 
(“Bukit Jalil Development”). The large 60-acre land is a substantial asset belonged to 
Ho Hup. From the arrangement, it appears that it is in the best interest of the corporation 
to develop the land for the purpose of projecting the revenue of Ho Hup. It is noted that 
the unprofitable arrangement did not require any Ho Hup’s shareholder approval to be 
concluded with Pioneer Haven since it did not involve transfer or disposal of a 
substantial property of the former.  As such, the aforesaid board decision was legally 
correct as it has not contravened any provision under the Malaysian company laws.  
 
Supposedly, there is nothing unusual or wrong about the said decision. Nevertheless, a 
closer perusal of the terms of the deal raises the question whether the decision was 
actually made in the best interest of the corporation based on the industry practice and 
acceptable according to common business sense. Although the terms stipulate that all 
cost would be borne by Bukit Jalil Development and Ho Hup as the parent corporation, 
there was an obvious unbalanced or disproportionate entitlement of profits granted to 
Bukit Jalil Development which would only be entitled to 17% profit subject to a 
minimum entitlement of RM265 millions in return. This agreed terms were grossly 
unreasonable in the business sense in view of the expected sales revenue of billions in 
value over a period of 10 years. What added up to the unreasonableness was that the 
owner of the land – Ho Hup was entitled to a significantly low profit as compared to the 
developer of the land. 
 
In the Bursa announcement, the then board of Ho Hup merely stated the rationale that 
“in the absence of any refinancing options, the entry into the joint development 
arrangement presents a viable alternative to restructure the amount owing to the existing 
charge and avoid foreclosure of the land.” From this statement, it could be reasoned that 
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the main purpose of the deal was to avoid the foreclosure of the land by irrevocably 
authorising Pioneer Haven to retain the original document of title of the land until 
subdivision. At one hand, the rationale seemed to be heroic in securing the asset of the 
corporation from being foreclosed. At the other hand, the deal was done at the expense 
of the best interest of the corporation. In the long run, the corporation would suffer 
substantial reduction in prospecting earnings which would in turn greatly affect the 
shareholder value. In addition, the decision was made in a hasten manner by the then 
board of Ho Hup a day before the change of boardroom which was passed through by 
an extraordinary general meeting initiated by the current board. Hence, it was a dubious 
deal when the then board of Ho Hup has anticipated the possibility of their removal 
during the meeting next day. There may be the intention of sabotage done to the 
corporation in such a revengeful situation. 
 
As explained above, it is imperative that the then board of Ho Hup should have 
disclosed to the Bursa and the public pertaining to various factors that they have 
considered in justifying that the deal was in the best interests of Ho Hup by going 
beyond mere statement of “best interest of the corporation and its shareholders”. It was 
uncertain as to whether the entitlement to a minimum amount of RM 265 millions was 
intended to cover all or part of the costs in acquiring the 60-acre land or for other 
ulterior purpose only know to the then board. Such uncertainties could have been 
clarified if the then board of Ho Hup has provided some explanation in coming to the 
said agreed term. Without deep entrenchment of ethical value in the governance system, 
it seems that the directors of the then board had washed their hands to swiftly flee from 
the irresponsible deal concluded by the entangled corporation, at least, in term of legal 
sanction.  
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4.5. Corprimacy – The New Way Forward in Malaysia 
 
Recently, the corporate community has witnessed that the local regulatory approach is 
gradually shifting towards Corprimacy norm in setting the corporate governance 
standards with the ultimate objective of protecting minority shareholders. The 
Corprimacy approach is evident in the latest amendments of the Malaysian Capital 
Markets and Services Act 2007 via the Capital Markets and Services (Amendment) Acr 
2009. A new Section 317A was introduced in the Capital Markets and Services Act 
2007 to empower the Securities Commission Malaysia to take action against those 
directors or officers who intentionally cause wrongful loss to the public-listed 
corporations. Subsection (2) of the provision states that “this section is in addition to 
and not in derogation of any law relating to the duties or liabilities of directors or 
officers of a listed corporation”. Hence, it is understood that the new provision seeks to 
lift the corporate governance standard in relation to the duties and liabilities of directors 
as well as other officers in a corporation. It is intended to discourage directors and 
officers from engaging in unethical conducts or making irresponsible decisions that may 
be detrimental to a corporation. In this regard, the duties and roles of directors and 
officers must be aligned with the interest of a corporation as a whole. The new 
provision only prohibits conducts of directors or officers that cause wrongful loss to a 
corporation and not to shareholders per se. Hence, it reaffirms the cornerstone of 
Corprimacy which places the best interest of corporation as the primary or superior 
consideration over other interests. Most regulators garner their lessons not from 
corporate governance principles or corporate performance figures but from historical 
corporate failures. Being the capital market regulator, the laudable move of the 
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Securities Commission Malaysia has further substantiated the need for the adoption of 
Corprimacy as the new concept of corporate governance in Malaysia. 
 
4.6. Conclusion 
 
In short, Corprimacy may reflect a better picture of interaction within a corporation 
itself. Corporate governance best practices should not be heavily geared towards the 
interest of a board since the effective implementation of the goals set by the board will 
ensure that the “business judgment rule” is exercised in the best interest of the whole 
corporation in the long run. For instance, the Star Business News (Mac, 2010) also 
reported that following the recent financial crisis, many countries have prioritised 
corporate governance as their key reform agenda in which the ensuing corporate 
governance standard adopted for financial institutions are built on the following key 
tenets: 
 
… clear separation of management and oversight functions, adequately 
competent and committed boards, presence of a strong independent element on 
the board, and a clear, explicit and dedicated focus on the oversight 
responsibilities of the board for risk, internal controls, remuneration, and 
directors and management performance and succession.  
 
To sum up, the Malaysian corporate governance bar can only be raised if every 
corporate player in the capital market plays each role in complying with the form and 
substance of the corporate governance best practices. Nik Ramlah Mahmood (2010), the 
Managing Director of Securities Commission Malaysia has rightly addressed the 
underlying theme of Corprimacy which can become the means and ends of corporate 
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governance. It was explained that the corporate governance bar can be raised via “oiling 
the basic legal requirements with high doses of ethics, integrity and morality”. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
CRITICAL DISCUSSION: 
FORMULATION OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE BEST PRACTICES 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The discussion in Chapter 4 reveals that the Malaysian corporate law regime favours the 
notion of Corprimacy. This is apparent from the approach taken by the Malaysian High 
Level Finance Committee on Corporate Governance that corporations should be 
managed “with the ultimate objective to enhance long term shareholder values, whilst 
taking into account the interests of other stakeholders” (Report on Corporate 
Governance, 1999). In other words, best interest of a corporation should encompass the 
interest of all members and stakeholders of the corporation as a whole. This is akin to 
the Corprimacy notion which will guide the formulation of corporate governance best 
practices in relation to the main theme of this dissertation – the protection of minority 
shareholders. 
 
From the international perspective of corporate governance, Cheffins (2009) elaborated 
on the evolving development trend in the United States where he identified few 
significant attributes of a “shareholder value model” such as independent directors, 
shareholder activism and performance-based compensation. It is important that 
Malaysia should step up corporate governance best practices by focusing on the 
abovementioned attributes of “shareholder value model” as advocated in the United 
States. Such attributes are akin to the main theme of this dissertation – the protection of 
minority shareholders. Therefore, this chapter will emphasise on the corporate 
143 
 
governance best practices that create, preserve and deliver values to a corporation with 
the vision of protecting minority shareholders in the long run. This is due to the simple 
analogy that the best interest of a corporation is positively correlated with the interest of 
minority shareholders.  
 
Since Corprimacy requires that minority interest be aligned with the best interest of a 
corporation, this chapter is divided into several important sections in order to 
collectively formulate a set of corporate governance best practices with the aim of 
protecting the interest of minority shareholders. The first section will deal with the 
different potential conflict of interests in a corporation and best practices that may 
minimise such conflicts. It will then continue with the discussion on the importance of 
board disclosures and transparency issues. The remaining sections will propose best 
practices such as board independence, enhanced shareholders’ rights and powers as well 
as a higher level of board accountability. The results of this formulation is succinctly 
summarised in the final chapter of this dissertation. 
 
5.2 Dealing with Conflicts of Interests within a Corporation 
 
In paving the path to a better corporate governance system, it is necessary to examine 
the question of what ends a board should seek to achieve in their decision-making 
process. The ends will determine what means to be devised in achieving the desired 
result of protecting minority shareholders. It is suggested that directors should formulate 
their decisions based on the primary interest of their shareholders or in the best interest 
of a corporation. As can be seen from Chapter 4, some argued in favour of shareholder’s 
interests as directors are mere stewards of their interests. On the other hand, some 
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championed for the idea that directors should have absolute decision-making power in 
maximising shareholder wealth.  
 
Regardless of what these scholars views are, chapter 4 has made it clear that the interest 
of all stakeholders within a corporation should be the primary concern in relation to 
corporate governance best practices. Corprimacy does not confine the best interest of 
corporation to dealing with conflict of interest between directors and shareholders per se. 
But it extends beyond the narrow interpretation of corporation to include the conflict of 
interest with all other members and stakeholders of a corporation like creditors, 
employees, suppliers and management as well. As such, every constituent of a corporate 
entity has vital role to play in making sure that the best interest of a corporation is being 
upheld by the board. To do so, shareholders, especially minority shareholders need to be 
equipped with stronger power and voice to achieve the ultimate objective of governance 
best practices. This best practice will be further explained in Section 5.9 of this chapter. 
 
However, conflict of interests may sometimes sway directors away from their fiduciary 
duties of loyalty to their corporation. Pertaining to this limitation of fiduciary duty in the 
event of conflicts, Scott (1998) described that conflicts of interest may arise in 
situations where there is excessive compensation, misappropriation of corporate fund or 
worst still siphoning of corporate wealth by the mangers themselves. The mushrooming 
of these conflicts of interests will lead to the constant restraint of directors’ duties when 
personal interest overshadows the interest of corporation and shareholders. This was 
exactly what happened in the Enron or Transmile case in which financial misstatement 
was the main root cause of corporate downfall. To avoid sharp fall in share price, the 
directors of Enron decided to take matter into their own hands via inflation of financial 
figures at a large magnitude. When the corporate malpractice unfolded, the biggest loser 
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remains minority shareholders who had no chance to exit from the corporation. Thus, 
the study of corporate governance best practices should begin at the doorstep of 
identifying different conflict of interest before ascertaining the directors’ duties. 
Illustration 5.1 below is more accurate in outlaying the directors’ duties to avoid 
conflict of interest in public-listed corporation where shareholder base is opened to the 
public at large. Minority shareholders are most vulnerable in the governance structure 
and system of these large public corporations due to its diverse conflict of interests. 
That is the reason why this dissertation only discusses on the protection of minority 
shareholders in public-listed corporations. 
 
 
Illustration 5.1: Statutory duties to avoid conflicts of interest 
 
Apart from the director’s statutory duty to avoid the conflicts of interest above, potential 
conflicts of interest such as those in a related-party transaction may also exist within a 
corporation due to its complex organisational structure and nature of business (as shown 
in Illustration 5.2 below). It is a fact of corporate life that is hard to be ignored and 
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Illustration 5.2: Potential conflicts of interests in a corporation
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At times, conflicts of interests may arise when directors or management representing 
majority shareholders seek to use company resources to acquire assets or other 
corporations that are not associated with the core business activity of a corporation or 
are indirectly related to directors or majority shareholders. In an announcement to the 
Bursa Malaysia (25 November, 2005), AKN Technology Berhad (“AKN”) had entered 
into an agreement to acquire 100% equity interest Paramount Discovery Sdn Bhd 
(“Paramount”) and its subsidiary companies at a purchase consideration of RM 30.8 
million. The acquisition appeared to have nothing unusual on its face of transaction. 
Although it was not a related-party transaction, the acquisition itself was rather 
questionable – the core business activity of AKN is principally in the semi-conductor 
industry while Paramount is involved in the rubber glove coating business. The business 
activities of the two companies are entirely different to the extent that it raised 
considerable doubt with regard to the motive behind the acquisition. Therefore, it does 
not make commercial sense for directors to engage in any transaction that is not 
connected with the corporation’s core business activity. In other words, directors must 
be able to identify the potential conflict of interest with their current core business 
activity as a result of such contradictory commercial interest. At the end of the day, 
minority shareholders will be the ones who face the risk of losing their entire 
investment should the conflicting business interest cause the corporation a great fortune. 
 
Hitherto, various mechanisms had been employed to align the interests of management 
to shareholders, such as profit sharing, efficiency wages, and performance measurement 
including financial statements, stock options as well as the threat of firing.  Since the 
introduction of Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the United States, Zabihollah Rezaee (2007) 
rightly highlighted “commitment to the highest ethical standards” as the objective of 
good corporate governance to avoid potential conflicts of interest in a corporation. This 
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is where board ethics comes into play as a tool for avoidance of potential conflict of 
interest. Board ethics is further addressed in section 5.8 of this chapter in moving 
towards a holistic corporate cultural reform. All in all, the discussion on conflicts of 
interest in a corporation is never satisfactory without further examination on some case 
studies in the real life situation. The ensuing section embarks on some interesting twist 
of events in related-party transactions in Malaysia. 
 
5.3 Case Studies for Conflicts of Interest in Related-Party Transactions 
 
The focus is thrown on the related-party transaction since it is widely touted as one of 
the most common cases leading to conflicts of interests between board and shareholders. 
Such transactions often culminate in unfavourable losses to minority shareholders. The 
case studies shown below testify for the result of inevitable conflicts of interest and how 
a director should practice good governance in managing these cases. 
 
Generally, corporate ownership of a typical Asian corporation is likely to be 
concentrated in a single group – a family or the State. The majority of corporations in 
South East Asian countries are controlled and managed by family members (Claessens, 
Djankov and Lang, 2000) except that State-ownership model is more likely to be seen in 
communist country like China. In Malaysia, it is very common that many family-
dominated corporations use the related-party transactions or special purpose vehicles as 
a tool to expropriate wealth from minority shareholders. This is due to the structure of 
family-dominant control that makes it easy for related-party transactions to take place, 
in particular when some of the entities complement or exist to sustain and facilitate the 
operations of one another. 
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The senior management and board positions in these family-controlled corporations are 
often occupied by family members and close allies or proxies. Due to muddled dividing 
line between ownership and management in corporate structures, it is more likely that 
any related party transaction can be easily tainted with conflicts of interest that could 
short-change unwitting investors. For instance, a public-listed corporation could channel 
its surplus cash to its unlisted parent for an indefinite period, denying itself and its 
minority shareholders the opportunity to generate higher returns through strategic 
investments. Worst still, a corporation could purchase assets and liabilities from an 
unlisted affiliate at an inflated price – an obvious means of siphoning away the wealth 
of a public entity into the private interests of the same controlling shareholders. 
Ryngaert and Thomas (2007) noted that directors and officers are considered to have 
involved in related-party transactions when they entered into contracts with their 
“relatives, large shareholders, other firms that the officers and directors are affiliated 
with, or even with themselves” to lease, acquire, purchase, dispose of the assets of the 
corporation as well as in employment matters. It was added that these contracts are most 
often favourable to the related parties involved. As such, the desired wealth 
maximisation in related-party transactions eventually belongs to controlling 
shareholders who are either directors themselves or represent the directors.  
 
In respect of the most prominent type of related-party transactions, it covers “loans to 
related parties; payments to company officers for services that were either unapproved 
or non-existent; and sales of goods or services to related entities in which the existence 
of the relationship was not disclosed”. The pattern of cash flow was explained in the 
context of corporate fund embezzlement and misleading financial statement. The inflow 
of cash into a corporation is usually connected to the former whereas the outflow of 
cash from a corporation is related to the latter. Whilst finding that related-party 
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transaction was the key feature of fraud, they gave the example of “fictitious sales” 
being used as mechanisms for tunnelling of corporate fortune to a related party on the 
pretext of such non-existent sales (Henry, et al., 2007). These pose as red flags for 
fraudulent act or mala fide on the part of directors involved in related-party transactions. 
As such, it is very important for board or management to recognise these red flags 
before it is too late to save a corporation from reaching verge of destruction. 
 
The involvement of directors in a related-party transaction inevitably will affect the 
value of their corporation. Empirically, a study of corporations in China found that the 
more often a corporation engaged in related-party transactions, the lower its firm value 
(Liu & Lu, 2004). Corporations that provide loans to their related parties also received 
lower market valuations than those corporations that either minimised or avoided the 
practice entirely (Jiang, Yue, & Lee, 2005). Moreover, public-listed corporations in 
Hong Kong also faced “negative abnormal stock returns” by simply making an 
announcement of a related-party transaction. These findings suggest that related-party 
transactions could negatively affect the shareholder value although the transactions are 
not necessarily abusive (Cheung, Rau & Stouraitis, 2004). In the United States, Gordon, 
Henry, and Palia (2004) also found that those corporations that involved in high volume 
of related-party transactions are more likely to show evidence of “weaker corporate 
governance practices.” 
 
In a related party transaction, the Business Times (16 December, 2009) reported that 
“Genting Malaysia bought two firms which own the 25-storey Wisma Genting and two 
parcels of land in Segambut for RM228.6 million from its parent, Genting Bhd”. It was 
also reported that “it did not need to get the approval of shareholders or regulators for 
the purchases as the price did not exceed 5 per cent of its shareholder funds”. The 
corporate action was criticised by Rita Benoy Bushon that “given
structure, common major shareholders and common directors in related companies 
involved in the proposals and the absolute cash amounts involved, the proposed 
acquisitions ought to be put to non
shareholders of Genting Malaysia even though the rules stipulate a higher threshold”. 
Such comment speaks of the importance of giving the right to minority shareholders to 
vote or at least have some say in any related party transaction regardless of i
transaction. Even though the acquisition undertaken by Genting Malaysia may raise red 
flags of corporate fraud, it does not necessarily mean that the rela
involves any element of fraud or cre
it does create opportunity for 
commit fraud in disguise in order to gain personal interest.
 
Illustration 5.3:  Dealing with conflicts of interests
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To sum up, the inherent risk of facing conflicts of interests in a corporation is nigh 
impossible to be eliminated since conflicting interests will never end so long as it 
contradicts the personal interest of a director. In dealing with conflicts of interests in a 
corporation, the best practices can be best summarised in Illustration 5.3 above. What 
needs to be done is that minority shareholders ought to be protected from any 
undesirable consequences arising from such conflicting interest. In relation to this, 
section 5.9 of this chapter discusses some of the best practices to enhance shareholder’s 
rights and powers in decision-making process in view of the potential conflict of interest 
arising within a corporation.  
 
5.4 New Board Disclosures and Transparency 
 
Undeniably, corporate governance is all about disclosure of any interest that a director 
may have in his corporate dealings to a corporation as well as disclosure of information 
to shareholders. Mallin (2002) highlighted that “information to shareholders is one of 
the most important aspects of corporate governance, as it reflects the degree of 
transparency and accountability of the corporations towards its shareholders”. Knowing 
the importance of disclosure requirement, Cadbury (1999) believed that “the foundation 
of any structure of corporate governance is disclosure. Openness is the basis of public 
confidence in the corporate system and funds will flow to centres of economic activity 
that inspire trust”. Shareholders must be able to put their complete trust upon a board to 
represent their interest. It is necessary to develop a strong foundation of trust and 
confidence in corporations by way of frank disclosure and open policies.  
 
Without sufficient disclosure, directors may hide negative financial results or 
information from the public
On the opposite side of the same coin, directors may also use the sensitive information 
of a corporation to their advantage by manipulating the share price of the corporation. 
Seligman (1983) viewed that “in the absence of a compulsory corporate disclosure 
system some issuers will conceal or misrepresent information material to investment 
decisions.” Most often than not, 
made by directors as they do not have direct access to material information in a 
corporation. But this “information asymmetries” should not be allowed to compromise 
the very corporate governance principle that speaks of corporate d
information to shareholders and o
rests on Corprimacy norm that shareholders have 
corporation. This reflects the mandatory requirement of corporate disclosure system 
implemented in the Malaysia
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The Illustration 5.4 above spells out the existing disclosure requirements for public-
listed corporations in Malaysia which are driven towards a disclosure-based corporate 
regime. It is noted that this section is not intended to reinvent the corporate wheel in 
regards of the existing disclosure requirements. The discussion goes beyond the 
boundary of mandatory disclosure as required under the Companies Act 1965 and the 
Bursa Listing Requirements. This is because disclosure ought not to be confined to 
quarterly financial reporting and major Bursa announcement only. It is neither 
satisfactory to stop at step 2 and 3 (as shown in Illustration 5.4) if one wishes to achieve 
higher board disclosure and transparency. In the context of Corprimacy, the stepping 
stone acts as the link or bridge for the existing disclosure-based corporate regime to 
reach a new level of board disclosure for the purpose of better transparency. The 
stepping stone here is meant to be the enhanced disclosure best practices that shall form 
part of the corporate governance system in a corporation.  
 
Under the Malaysian Bursa Listing Requirement, a board is required to give a statement 
in Bursa announcement as to their opinion that a particular transaction or dealing by a 
corporation is in the best interest of the corporations and its shareholders. There is no 
further explanation or justification required from directors as to how the board had 
exercised their business judgment in good faith for proper purpose in arriving at the 
opinion that the transaction or dealing is in the best interest of the corporation. This is a 
fundamental flaw in the disclosure practice. In adopting the Corprimacy approach, it is 
proposed that a board should be made to disclose to the Bursa and the public pertaining 
to the various factors that they have considered in justifying that a particular transaction 
is in the best interests of a corporation by going beyond mere statement of “best interest 
of the corporation and its shareholders”. It is viewed that such disclosure is vital in 
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ensuring the decision made by the board is acceptable in business sense to the 
corporation and its shareholders as a whole. This is because what is in the best interest 
of the corporation in the mind of the board might not be the same with the opinions of 
other relevant stakeholders.  
 
In this regard, one may raise doubts as to the practicality of having such a disclosure 
where it would lead to never-ending decision-making process. The response to this will 
be that the requirement of disclosure of information is not intended to hinder a board 
from making their decisions. Rather, the rationale of such disclosure is in line with the 
objective of Corprimacy to transcend all legal boundaries in stepping into higher ethical 
decision and board accountability. It will indirectly incorporate a sense of ethical values 
in the board when deciding whether a particular transaction is in the best interest of the 
corporation. That is why Corprimacy sternly believes in having shareholders to act as a 
watchdog over a board for the purpose of ensuring check and balance in the corporate 
management. 
 
Another proposed best practice covers the extent of interest which a director is bound to 
disclose. It should be extended and not limited to only related-party transaction and 
interested matters. In other words, a director is obliged to disclose any interest or 
connection that he may have or know of in a particular transaction. It is not sufficient 
that the director merely disclose certain information pertaining to his interest but it 
should also include any third party interest directly or indirectly related to him that may 
be at variance with the interest of the corporate entity as a result of the transaction. This 
is to ensure that directors exercise their best independent judgments while deciding 
whether a proposed transaction is in the best interest of the corporation. This enhanced 
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disclosure best practice is vital in protecting minority shareholders whilst leaving no 
room for directors to commit malpractices. 
 
In term of better transparency, there should be full board disclosure to shareholders on 
the background of the nominees who hold shares on behalf of the directors concerned. 
Mushera (2001) also recognised the problem of “nominee holdings by hiding the true 
beneficial owner” in public-listed corporations. This problem is worsened in a family-
concentrated corporation where the director who founded the corporation will usually 
hold substantial amount of shares through his nominee holdings. In other words, it will 
be hard for other shareholders and investors to understand the real picture of 
shareholdings a director has in a corporation by screening through the financial reports. 
This may lead to manipulation of share price by the director concerned via huge 
acquisition or disposal of his nominee shareholdings in the corporation if they withhold 
any sensitive information from the public. 
 
The focus of this disclosure best practice in corporate governance system should be put 
on the basis of protecting minority shareholders. The objective of having constant full 
disclosure regarding the affairs and financial matters of a corporation is to educate 
shareholders so that they are kept updated with the latest information. With sufficient 
information, they may then easily form their decision based on the constructive data and 
figures in hands. Ho (2003) assumed that “if minority shareholders grow increasingly 
active and knowledgeable and become the ‘first line of defence’, more protection for 
minority shareholders will be put in place. For instance, disclosure requirements need 
investor vigilance to monitor actual practices, particularly in terms of related-party 
transaction disclosures”. One ought to remember that most of the minority shareholders 
are unsophisticated retail investors as compared with large institutional shareholders. 
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They may not have the necessary resources to be vigilant enough in monitoring the 
board practices. As a result, enhanced disclosure best practice shall be the stepping 
stone to complement the lack of resources and inadequate shareholder activism amongst 
minority shareholders. 
 
Having greater level of disclosure and transparency, minority shareholders would have 
the opportunity to pull out their investment from a corporation if there is any untoward 
situation faced by the board. At the same time, shareholders will be well aware of any 
unfavourable transaction that a director intends to enter into, of which the director’s 
interest conflicts with the best interest of the corporation in the short run. Such 
enhanced disclosure will help to ensure that minority shareholders are given sufficient 
notice to act rationally and swiftly. 
 
5.5 Increased Integrity of Independent Directors 
 
Apart from the aforesaid disclosure best practices, integrity is always the main concern 
when it comes to corporate failure or collapse. The disclosure best practices hinge on 
the integrity of a director sitting in the board of a corporation. Even if there is 
implementation of disclosure best practices in the governance system of a corporation, it 
remains a failure if a director does not hold on to the highest level of truthfulness and 
uprightness. However, it is difficult to instil integrity in every single director since a 
board is usually composed of different mix of individuals from diverse backgrounds and 
characters. Hence, it will be wise to begin the discussion on integrity of independent 
directors who are supposed to be independent from a board. It is instructive to examine 
how an independent director can play their role and exercise independence with higher 
integrity and trust.  
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First of all, an independent director must possess the necessary skill, knowledge and 
experience to independently assess board’s decision based on the intrinsic value of the 
subject matter discussed in a board meeting. In Beam v. Stewart (2004), the United 
State’s Delaware Supreme Court reaffirmed that “the primary basis upon which a 
director’s independence must be measured is whether the director’s decision is based on 
the corporate merits of the subject before the board, rather than extraneous 
considerations or influences”. Basically, there are two limbs which can be deduced from 
that case. The first limb requires directors to evaluate the corporate merits of the subject 
before a board. To do so, an independent director will need to have sufficient 
knowledge of the subject matter discussed in the boardroom. Thus, personal 
qualification and skill of a director will be called into question since he should exercise 
his independent judgment in making his own assessment and decision. It will be hard to 
imagine that minority shareholders will be properly protected by an independent 
director who is lack of experience and knowledge to detect any irregularity in a board. 
 
With regard to the background and knowledge of an independent director, Barker (2009) 
augured well that higher quantity of independent directors in the boards of the United 
Kingdom and European banks proved to be inadequate in preventing financial crisis 
from happening in 2007/2008. It was explained that “unless allied with specialist 
knowledge and training - the technical independence of directors does not necessarily 
translate into the critical and independent thinking that uncovers fault lines in complex 
business strategies”. Of course, it will be idealistic to have independent directors who 
are experts or specialist in their own field. However, when we touch on the issue of 
integrity, it does not necessarily mean that an independent director ought to have the 
highest qualification or specialisation to be appointed to the board. The technical duties 
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of examining the records or statements are best left to the internal and external auditors 
of a corporation.  
 
Rather, it makes more practical sense when Barker (2009) argued that “the convening of 
a distinguished panel of men and women will be ineffectual if those directors do not 
also possess the expertise to understand the fundamentals of the company’s business 
and the attendant risks”. Due to the complicated intricacies in the modern business 
reality, independent directors must have the minimum qualification or working 
experience on business administration or financial matters or at least possess some basic 
knowledge on the business activity of a corporation that they are hired. This is simply 
because the reason of having one-third of independent directors in a board is to ensure 
that they can apply their independent mind without being largely influenced or 
dominantly controlled by other non-independent directors. Having the basic 
understanding of the policies and business of a corporation, an independent director is 
able to uncover any potential conflict of interests or risks that may give way to 
corporate malfeasance. This in turn contributes to greater integrity and independence of 
which an independent director is the guardian of minority shareholders interest. 
 
In furtherance to the need of appropriate background and basic knowledge, an 
independent director should not be contended with his or her existing qualification and 
skill possessed. There shall be a constant quest for more relevant information regarding 
the business activities and financial affairs of a corporation even if they are merely 
independent non-executive directors of the corporation.  With the required information 
and knowledge, an independent director will be better equipped with the skill of 
examining and accessing the veracity of information disclosed to the board by the 
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management team. On this note, Flannigan (2009) rightly re-evaluated how an 
independent director should act nowadays: 
 
Independent directors are frequently identified as instruments of investment 
protection for passive capital. They ostensibly enhance the quality of corporate 
decisions and constrain opportunism. In many instances, however, independent 
directors serve active capital openly or tacitly, or they provide a supportive 
veneer of legitimacy while offering ineffectual oversight. Independence is often 
a façade or an illusion. It is compromised by levered or career-advancing 
deference, community of ideology, social fraternity, fear of marginalisation, 
managed information access and a variety of other significant behavioural 
incentives and limitations. These factors impel independent directors to ‘see’ the 
logic or utility of the proposals of controlling coalitions. They become tools, 
rather than filters, of the agendas of active capital. 
 
Based on the above re-evaluation by Flannigan, it is definitely not an overstatement to 
say that independent directors are the guardian of capital for minority shareholders who 
are generally inactive in their investment approach. On the other hand, it is also not an 
understatement to agree that they often serve the interest of majority shareholders who 
control a corporation due to several internal and extraneous factors such as the 
enticement of monetary rewards, retaining of their board position and denial of access to 
certain information. This is the very reason why independent directors should break free 
from the chain used by controlling shareholders in order to find out the wrongdoings of 
other directors in a board. They should not accept whatever information fed by the 
board or management during meetings. But they should carefully sieve through the 
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information and critically scrutinise them in the presence of the board. If it is 
successfully done, then independence shall no longer be a facade but a reality. 
 
Essentially, the integrity of director’s independence centres on the axis of business 
judgment rule. In Aronson v. Lewis (1984)25, the United State’s Delaware Supreme 
Court ruled that “the requirement of director independence inheres in the conception 
and rationale of the business judgment rule”.  It means that an independent director shall 
adhere to the standard of business judgment rule as required by the corporate law. The 
Corprimacy inheres that the business judgment rule should be exercised in the best 
interest of a corporation which includes the entire stakeholders. They are expected to 
introduce elements of objectivity and impartiality into board decisions due to their 
independent stand. Sadly, this is not the case in the real corporate life where 
independent directors are appointed in public-listed corporation for two plain reasons – 
to fulfil the one-third requirement under the Bursa Listing Requirements and to take 
advantage of their connection and social status for the purpose of securing projects and 
other marketing related duties. 
 
Transmile scandal is a case on point. The unfortunate event happened in Transmile case 
would have somewhat been avoided had the independent directors exercised their 
business judgment rule in detecting the misleading financial statement. It certainly did 
not make commercial or financial sense that Transmile was making huge profits at an 
increasing rate when the corporation had just bought few airplanes which had not been 
geared into operation yet. Hence, the cash outflow of the corporation in the purchase 
costs of the airplanes should have been taken into consideration by the independent 
directors before approving the financial statements. On 28 October 2011, the Sessions 
                                                            
25473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984). 
162 
 
Court has delivered the first landmark decision where the two independent directors 
who sit in the audit committee of Transmile were sentenced to 1 year imprisonment for 
knowingly authorising the submission of misleading financial statement to Bursa 
Malaysia under Section 122B(b)(bb) of the Securities Industry Act 1983. The Star News 
(12 November, 2011) reported that: 
 
… the judge emphasised that the audit committee has specific duties, functions 
and responsibilities and that the investing public rely on them very much. He 
said that in this case the evidence showed a blatant disregard of the seriousness 
of the concerns on the contra transactions when the committee was told by 
Deloitte (Transmile's auditors then) that the contra transactions were very 
unusual and lacked commercial justification. These, he said, were sufficient 
warning bells and as audit committee members, they should have raised these 
issues to the board but instead failed to do so. 
 
The above decision sent a clear message across boardroom that good corporate 
governance requires cautious exercise of business judgment rule on the part of 
independent directors as their integrity will stand to protect minority shareholders as a 
whole. They should not act as “ornamental pieces” whose duties are restricted to 
attending board meetings regularly in order to rubber-stamp financial reports and other 
documents. As mentioned earlier, independent directors are expected to scrutinise 
corporate decisions and matters.  
 
Generally, an independent director should not be under the dominance and control of 
any entity or individual directly or indirectly. That is the gist of director’s independence 
in accordance with Paragraph 1.01 of the Bursa Listing Requirements where an 
163 
 
independent director must not be an executive director or officer of the listed 
corporation. Further, the Listing Requirements prohibit major shareholders or nominees 
acting for the executive director or major shareholders from being appointed as the 
independent directors of the listed corporation. The underlying rationale of this rule is to 
minimise the dominance and control of executive directors and majority shareholders. 
In this context, minority shareholders will hardly be protected if the hands of an 
independent director are tied by the dominance and control of non-independent directors 
who are often the controlling or majority shareholders of a corporation. If an 
independent director is not truly independent in the practice, then it makes things easier 
for majority shareholders to expropriate wealth from minority shareholders by engaging 
in manipulative scheme or act that speculates the value of a corporation’s share price. 
 
An independent director is hardly independent when practically he or she is appointed 
by the board that comprises of controlling shareholders and management team. Bhagat 
and Black (1999) criticized the credibility of independent directors as “lapdogs rather 
than “watchdogs” over the affairs of corporations. Most often than not, an independent 
director will not be bold enough to challenge or question the decision of other directors 
who jointly appointed him onto the board. This is akin to a “lapdog” as what Bhagat and 
Black (1999) lamented on the integrity of an independent director.  As such, it will be 
extremely odd to see that they will not rubber stamp the board decision when asked to 
do so by other non-independent executive directors who are also their appointers. In this 
regard, it is right to say that pure independence will only happen when fear or favour is 
totally eliminated or greatly reduced. At that point, they are no longer afraid of being 
removed from the board by controlling shareholders.  
 
164 
 
Nevertheless, mere presence of dominance and control upon an independent director 
does not always mean that the independent director is not independent in the absence of 
conflicting interests and personal benefits arising from a particular decision or 
transaction. It is worthy to note that the “relevant inquiry is not how the director got his 
position, but rather how he comports himself in that position” as viewed by the United 
States Delaware Court of Chancery in Andreae v. Andreae (1992)26. The real test of 
how an individual comports himself as an independent director in a board stands on the 
strong footing of integrity. The case of Andreae v. Andreae (1992) postulates the need 
to understand the importance of distinguishing one’s position as an independent director 
with one’s self awareness of duties and responsibilities towards the corporation as a 
whole.  
 
For instance, in a recent takeover bid reported in the Star News (January 12, 2011), the 
independent directors of PLUS Expressways Bhd (PLUS) had taken a constructive 
approach of requiring bidders to pay an upfront deposit of RM50 million with the 
offeree company and to provide proof of funding “as a means to determine their 
seriousness and credibility” within a given deadline. On 12 January 2011, one of the 
bidders, Jelas Ulung Sdn Bhd failed to deposit the said amount of money to PLUS. In a 
way, this brilliant action has greatly eliminated uncertainties surrounding the takeover 
bid over the assets and liabilities of PLUS. The reduction of uncertainties will also help 
to ward off any unwanted share price speculation of PLUS. The aforesaid action taken 
by the independent directors is laudable in view of the proactiveness shown on their part. 
The independent directors had indeed exercised their business judgment rule in a way 
that uphold their integrity of independence without fear or favour to any internal or 
external party.  
                                                            
26
 1992 Del. Ch. LEXIS 44, *14 (Del. Ch. Mar. 3, 1992). 
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Notwithstanding that an independent director may be truly independent from a board, it 
makes little difference to the level of protection of minority shareholders if there is no 
integrity on the part of the independent director. For example, even if the independent 
directors may have discovered the hanky-panky of the financial status of a corporation 
but they choose to be quiet instead and indirectly condone the action or decision of the 
other non-independent directors. For this reason alone, no level of independence could 
save a corporation if their integrity is overshadowed by greed and position. At the end 
of the day, it is the professionalism that an independent director should portray in 
upholding their integrity in managing a corporation. Independent directors must be able 
to garner the respect from their colleagues sitting in the same board so that their words 
are being heard and well accepted. They should not feel intimidated to question the 
board and voice out their concern. To be able to do so, it entails business acumen along 
with sufficient information in their hands. After all, their integrity lies on the legitimate 
expectation that they champion the interests of a corporation, in particular minority 
shareholders who are vulnerable to oppression by majority shareholders. Besides 
independence within the board itself, it is also important to gauge the appropriate level 
of board independence from the management in the context of Corprimacy. 
 
5.6 Modernising Board Independence from the Management 
 
Strictly speaking, there is no law or rule in Malaysia that prescribe for board 
independence from management. Neither there is any law that can explain the sound 
level of independence a director or board should have in making a decision. This is 
mainly due to the difficulty to measure the degree of independence since it concerns the 
minds of directors. Although it is nigh impossible to quantify the extent of 
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independence, it is possible to put in place several best practices that a board should 
adopt in order to be truly independent from the management.  
 
At times, the corporate sector may be confused with the concepts of “director 
independence” and “board independence”. Indeed, there are differences between the 
two concepts in the eyes of Corprimacy. To have modernised board independence, it is 
of utmost priority to first examine the thin line that separates the two concepts. 
Although both the concepts share some similarities in their attributes and integrity, 
director independence strikes on the distinctive independence of each individual director 
in a board as compared with board independence which requires a board to be 
independent from the external influence and control of management team. Director 
independence is more predominantly seen in the values of an independent director as 
they are supposed to be independent from other directors in a board based on the 
eligibility of their appointment. For this reason, it is very unlikely that non-independent 
directors are truly independent since most of them are also appointed as executive 
officers in corporations.  
 
On the other hand, the characteristics of board independence was laid down in Aronson 
v. Lewis (1984) to mean that every director must be able to form their own business 
judgment even if they have to rely on their colleagues who are more qualified and 
expert in the subject matter discussed. In other words, board should be independent 
from the influence and control of the management apart from self-independence within 
the board. This means that directors’ independence is the subset of board independence 
in which the former is an internal factor while the latter is an external factor to the board.  
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Illustration 5.5: Relationship between director, board and management in relation to 
board independence. 
 
As we can see from the relationship between director, board and management as shown 
in Illustration 5.5 above, directors’ independence originates from the core value of 
integrity and evolves into board independence from the management. In other words, 
independent directors may play an important role in board independence by providing 
independent assessment of board decision without any influence from the management. 
 
As for the best practice of board independence, the Illustration 5.6 below shows the 
example of how a board deals with decisions involving governance and management 
issues in a corporation. Hansmann and Kraakman (2004) drew a fine demarcation of 
roles between a board and the management team where the latter should initiate and 
execute decisions whilst the former should monitor and ratify decisions. Beatty (2003) 
also shared the similar view on the distinctive roles of board and management. All these 
views constitute the key to the attainment of board independence from the management. 
Individual Director 
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To further enlighten these views, governance decisions are usually made by 
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on the management decision and the information disclosed to them. It was noted that 
directors rely on the management for information on important matters. But a board, as 
a whole, should be able to query that information in order to form their own 
independent opinion. Hence, it is not an issue whether a board should consist of more 
independent directors when it comes to board independence. What matters is whether a 
board can make decisions without undue influence from management.  
 
In support of the behavioural aspect of board independence, Pahn (1998) discussed that 
there is little relationship between board structure and board independence since the 
boards must be prepared to fulfil their fiduciary duties without compromising their 
independence in making decisions. Dalley (2006) concurred that “a director who merely 
rubber-stamps the decision of management has failed in her duty of care because she 
has not exercised her own independent, informed judgment”. Board independence from 
management can only be attained with strict adherence of fiduciary duties by a director. 
Becht, Bolton and Roell (2005) criticised that boards often fail to be truly independent 
from management due to these two reasons – control of information by management as 
well as directors’ preference to “play a less confrontational ‘advisory’  role than a more 
critical monitoring role”. 
 
On the other side of the same token, it may be argued by some scholars that it is hard to 
achieve board independence when CEO is inadvertently trapped between the policy 
decisions of the board from above and the policy implementation from below, by the 
top management team. This argument does not always hold water as CEO has wide 
managerial power that may influence board decision. As the leader of the management 
team, he will have ample discretionary power to carry out the implementation of board 
decision. As a result, board decision may not be turned into the desired board activity at 
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the implementation stage by the management team. Baysinger and Hoskisson (1990) 
agreed that “managers dominate their boards by using their de facto power to select and 
compensate directors and by exploiting personal ties with them”. In certain situation, 
CEO may manipulate the compensation arrangement devised for directors apart from 
dictating the final dividends to be issued to shareholders at large. CEO is able to 
manoeuvre his way up to the top with no problem at all. Such CEO’s power and control 
over a board will just get stronger in a situation of CEO duality where the CEO is also 
the managing director or the Chairman and director of a corporation. Nonetheless, CEO 
duality should not be a stumbling block for the implementation of board independence. 
In relation to this board structure, other directors in a board, especially independent 
directors must be organised to act in such unhealthy situation of board control by CEO. 
Board independence necessitates a board to set the tone from top to bottom rather than 
the opposite. To begin with, a Chairman could be the one who sets the right tone and 
precedent in a board since they often have the final say to reject or accept the proposal 
by management.  
 
In the course of achieving board independence, directors should not breach their duties 
by merely relying on the management to deliver value to a corporation. It is the primary 
duty of a director to exercise their independent business judgment while dealing with 
the management. As discussed, an independent director should also play the role of 
watching over the board in controlling and supervising the actions of management. In 
modern terms, board should no longer be depending on the management who has been 
delegated with the decision-making power to manage a corporation. Greenfield (2007) 
opined that a “common challenge in corporate governance is how to utilize the 
distinctive capabilities of the management team most effectively without giving it so 
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much independence that it will ignore the concerns of those who contribute to the 
company’s success”.  
 
In the local scene, the proposed acquisition of Garuda Energy (“Garuda”) by Perisai 
Petroleum Technology Berhad (“Perisai”) sparked off a recent case study on the 
significance of creating board independence that delivers value to the corporation. On 
30 March 2011, The Business Times (30 March, 2011) reported that Perisai proposed to 
acquire Garuda from its former major shareholder and managing director, Nagendran 
Nadarajah for a sum of RM 210 million consisting of RM 150 million cash and 92.3 
million new shares at 65 cent per unit. RHB Research (2011) commented that the 
proposed acquisition is questionable as it provides the avenue for the former controlling 
shareholder to re-enter the company via the proposed 92.3 million new shares 
amounting to 13.5% of the company’s equity. Further, the share price of 65 cent per 
unit is at a discount of 20% from the closing price of RM 0.81 on the previous day. 
Another interesting issue is that Perisai sold Garuda to Nagendran Nadarajah in 2010 
for a small amount of RM 15 million only as compared to the whopping offer price of 
RM 210 million. The deliberation of the aforesaid proposals shall be meticulously 
considered by the board based on independent due diligence report and business 
judgment rule for the benefit of the entire corporation including minority shareholders. 
 
In a nutshell, it is hoped that the Perisai’s case will not repeat the history of corporate 
collapse since the Transmile scandal was the classic example of how a board failed to 
be truly independent from the management. The misleading financial statement was 
prepared by the management for the approval of the board. To make matter worse, the 
board never questioned the veracity and accuracy of the statement in view of the fact 
that the managing director was also the CEO of the corporation. Naturally, he was the 
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ultimate decision maker with great dominance and control over the board. The interest 
of minority shareholders could have been protected if the best practice of board 
independence is effectively implemented. To substantiate this, the tipping point for the 
best practice of board independence is the active involvement by a board and 
shareholders in the corporate affairs and management-related issues. 
 
5.7 More Active Board Involvement in Strategic Planning and other 
Management related matters 
 
Traditionally, boardroom is a meeting place where people with authority and control get 
together to approve matters concerning a corporation. It is usually the birthplace for 
board resolutions, policy-making and other decision-making related matters. In the 
modern time, evolution of corporate governance is at a fast-growing pace. Boardroom 
should no longer remain as what it used to be. It should be utilised as a room for heated 
intellectual discourse and robust strategic corporate planning.  Regardless of the diverse 
backgrounds of directors in the boardroom, every director including non-executive 
director should take up part of the role as a professional manager who actively manages 
the business and affairs of a corporation whilst supervising the management team at the 
same time.  
 
In this regard, Parker (1996) emphasised the importance of having appropriate strategic 
plans and objectives implemented within a corporation since “they can guide decision-
making, improve corporate efficiency and effectiveness and provide the basis for longer 
term performance evaluation”. Noting the importance of effective implementation of 
corporate planning and strategy, it is high time that the board of directors should 
actively participate in the process of charting the course for corporate planning and 
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strategies, rather than merely rubber-stamping the proposed corporate plans submitted 
by the management. Ingley and Wu (2007) opined that “boards engaged in strategic 
thinking are closer to providing a strategic consulting service to the management team 
rather than simply monitoring a firm’s performance or its strategic behaviour”. Only 
with active involvement in the corporate planning and management related matters can 
directors fully understand the corporate policies in order to ensure proper 
implementation of the strategies. Furthermore, board will also be able to verify the 
accuracy of information and data supplied to them by the management team. Such 
active involvement will gradually transform into an effective monitoring mechanism 
that enhance corporate performance that can sustain shareholder value.  
 
Nonetheless, some may persistently argue that directors may not have the time and 
energy required to run and oversee a corporation as these duties should be better 
entrusted to managers who are appointed to perform such job responsibilities. It is not 
necessary that a director should have spared ample time from their daily routines to 
actively participate in the strategic planning or management of a corporation. In other 
words, active participation or involvement in corporate management is still part and 
parcel of the fiduciary duties that a director owes to the corporation. In practice, a non-
executive director or an independent director is not expected to actually take over the 
job of an executive or CEO in managing the daily affairs of the corporation.  Be that as 
it may, they should be roped into the process of planning and drafting of corporate 
policies and strategies from time to time. This is to ensure that non-executive directors 
and independent directors are able to form better judgment when deciding on matters 
that they are fully aware of since they are well-equipped with the necessary information. 
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On the other hand, it was also argued that a board may not have the professional 
expertise to manage a corporation. The spill-over effect of active involvement by 
directors is that it may lead to excessive micromanagement of a corporation of which it 
is neither desirable to the directors nor the management. This argument does not hold 
water since the standard of business judgment rule as discussed earlier will come into 
play. Directors are not expected to exercise their utmost professional expertise to 
participate in the process of corporate planning and strategic management. Their active 
participation is significant in facilitating their monitoring and supervisory functions. As 
such, to better gauge the extent and level of board involvement, Millstein (1995) 
pointed out several factors that should be considered – board access to the same 
information as management, board capability to apply that information for better 
business judgment than the management as well as its implication upon corporate 
performance and other risk related issues. 
 
Basically, the aforesaid factors necessitate the consideration of commitment and 
background of directors of a corporation. An informed decision-making process entails 
higher commitment from a board to discover more information and to undertake the 
responsibilities to digest the information before making any decision. In the case of 
Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc. (1989)27, the United States Supreme 
Court agreed that “no one, after all, has access to more information concerning the 
corporation’s present and future condition [than managers]”. Hence, Corprimacy 
requires that directors shall endeavour their best to obtain as much information as 
possible from the management or other sources on a regular basis. It is no doubt that 
such process will definitely consume much time and effort on the part of the board. That 
is the reason why Millstein also put forward time and cost as the prime factors to be 
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taken into consideration by board in order to ascertain the overall corporate performance 
as a result of board involvement in a specific governance matter. 
 
In contrast, it is also common to see that most of the boards place heavy reliance on the 
management to feed them with all the necessary information and figures. In this context, 
Aiman (2009) addressed the reasonableness of director’s reliance on information 
disclosed by the management as well as the corresponding duty of auditors in relation to 
financial reporting in which the reliance must be reasonable and directors must exercise 
“a modest level of scrutiny” rather than mere “unquestioning reliance”. This duty of 
reasonable reliance corresponds with the best practice of board independence as 
discussed earlier. As such, we can see that the relationship between active involvements 
of board in management-related matters is closely intertwined with the very rudiment of 
board independence from management.  
 
Legally speaking, the Companies Law Act 1965 also mandates directors to manage and 
direct the affair of a corporation. Once delegated, board must directly oversee the 
direction of the management in managing the corporation on their behalf. As Fama and 
Jensen (1983) classified a corporation’s decision process into “decision management 
(initiation and implementation)” and “decision control (ratification and monitoring)”, 
the former should rest on the shoulder of the officers to make decision regarding the 
daily affairs of a corporation whilst the latter should be the responsibility of directors to 
control the decision-making power delegated to the management. This is also to avoid 
any future dispute between the board and management as Salim and Lawton (2008) 
condemned that the court’s “overly pro-management attitude” hinders the enforcement 
of directors’ duties in overseeing the management. Hence, it continues that the best 
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practices of board independence and active involvement by board shall also be further 
substantiated by good corporate culture and strong board ethics. 
 
5.8 Corporate Cultural Reform and Board Ethics 
 
This section seeks to discuss the various cultural norms that have long been embedded 
beneath the boardroom carpet and to propose some effective change to such 
conventional cultural norms in order to effectively implement good board ethics in a 
corporation. This is also necessary to strengthen the abovementioned best practices of 
corporate governance. 
 
To begin with, an empirical study was conducted by Hirota, Miyajima and Katsuyuki 
(2007) on the corporate culture of Japanese corporations and it was found that “the 
strength of corporate culture significantly affects corporate policies such as employment 
policy, management structure, and financial structure”. The study also concluded that 
corporate culture is central to the understanding and formulation of the corporate 
policies which would lead to better corporate performance. Nonetheless, there shall be 
material change in the mindset of directors in order to effect any transformation in the 
corporate culture.  
 
First and foremost, there shall be gradual board departure from the corporate cultural 
norms of complying with the majority rather than voicing out one’s constructive dissent 
and views. In this context, Sang-Woo Nam and Il Chong Nam (2004) commented on 
the modest corporate culture in Asian corporations where “independent directors may 
be far less independent in their behavior than those in Western countries”. This is where 
independent directors need to play their roles effectively within a board. To do so, they 
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may have to adapt to mindset change that challenge the decision or action by the other 
directors in a corporation. 
 
While having internal board discussion, Sonnenfeld (2002) opined that “the highest 
performing companies have extremely contentious boards that regard dissent as an 
obligation and that treat no subject as undiscussable”. This is in accordance with 
Corprimacy notion that board should always seek to create and add value to the 
corporation. It is almost certain that value will not be created if a board is composed of 
many “Yes” directors rather than “No” directors. As business judgment rule is 
perceived as part of the duties of a director, there is nothing wrong for a board to 
encourage contentious arguments in board meetings. Such constructive arguments will 
certainly help to enable a fruitful discussion that bears effective solution at the end of 
the day. 
 
In relation to this, boards should be easily acceptable to the idea of constructive 
discussion as part of good corporate cultural reform. Arguments should not be taken 
negatively as a challenge to each director sitting on the board. Rather, board arguments 
should be given credit as a “constructive conflicts” which produce different opinions 
and fresh perspectives from the directors. It is better to have more minds than just 
having one mind in generating positive results to corporate performance. Holloway and 
Rhyn (2005) rightly pointed out that “this would be better interpreted as ‘constructive’ 
conflicts, rather than just mere dissent, where the aim is to deliver more robust and 
effective decision outcomes”. They further proposed that “the roles of the chair and 
independent directors are central to guaranteeing that this robustness occurs by ensuring 
that both individual and collective voices/opinions are heard and valued”. Furthermore, 
it is appreciated that constructive conflicts are tolerable in terms of good corporate 
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governance as they bring about positive cultural changes to the boardroom. These 
changes are believed to have the effect of uplifting the level of board independence in 
making sound decisions that will eventually benefit the corporation as a whole. This is 
because a board should act and decide in concert as an entity regardless of any 
conflicting opinions amongst them.  
 
Secondly, Holloway and Rhyn (2005) also argued for “more active involvement in the 
decision-making by employees through participative decision-making and enhanced 
levels of direct staff ownership in the organisation”. Such involvement would “entail 
‘quantum’ changes in organisational values, culture, followership and prevailing senior 
executive top-down approach to decision-making. The leadership [then] becomes one of 
facilitation and support, not the current dominant ‘command and control” mindset”. To 
do this, a board may even do the courtesy of inviting certain employees or staffs in a 
corporation to channel their concerns and opinions pertaining to a particular board 
action or decision. With such involvement in the board decision-making process, 
employees will feel personal attachment with the board as well as a sense of belonging 
to the corporation when performing their daily duties. Employees will also better 
understand the policies of the board as they take part in the decision-making process. As 
such, employees will find it easier to facilitate and support the execution of board 
decisions from the bottom level of the corporation.  
 
Thirdly, another proposed cultural change is that of enforcing substance over form when 
it comes to implementing the best practices of corporate governance. In this regard, 
corporation may choose to perfectly complying with the corporate governance standards 
rather than the gist of corporate governance principles. It may be true that there is no 
evidence as to the correlation between corporate governance and corporate performance. 
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As a result, directors or management of a corporation feel complacent over their 
inaction regarding the actual implementation of corporate governance best practices due 
to the missing link of better result in corporate performance. Nevertheless, it is high 
time for directors to rethink their beliefs as the effective enforcement of corporate 
governance best practices will provide sufficient protective shields against sharp decline 
in corporate performance and create reasonable opportunity to avoid corporate failures 
as well. For example, Sloan (2002) addressed that the main cause of Enron collapse was 
due to the lack of “legal and moral responsibilities to produce honest books and records” 
on the part of the board. 
 
Fourthly, cultural reform within a board will not be complete without the highest level 
of board ethics being put in place. In this regard, Aminah (2005) brilliantly illustrated 
the need of business ethics as the “glue” that push all individuals to do the right thing in 
order to achieve the “same vision and mission”. This will help to ensure that directors 
and management stick together in a good value system of governance ethics. Speaking 
of board ethics, trust and candor are two essential elements in pursuing good corporate 
ethical responsibilities. It is clear that no law can test the level of trustworthiness and 
honesty a director has. It is something related to the sense of ethical responsibilities 
deep down in the heart of directors. Nonetheless, it may still be instilled through strong 
cultural values of trust and candor as an exemplary board to the entire corporation and 
society. Sonnenfeld (2002) emphasised that it is important to have “a climate of trust 
and candor” as well as “a culture of open dissent” in order to create a critical and 
constructive board culture and social responsibilities. As can be seen from above, the 
corporate scandal in Enron is equivalent with the failure of board to act effectively. 
Board should portray good board leadership and ethics from the top. It is evident that 
the auditors in Enron failed to perform their duties in detecting the fraud committed by 
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the management. It is partly attributed to the board’s breach of duties to oversee and 
direct the affairs of the corporation. Hence, board should supervise the management and 
filter whatever information and data produced by the management.  
 
In a nutshell, all the aforementioned proposals, if implemented properly, will eventually 
lead to a healthy corporate culture that promotes strict adherence to board 
responsibilities and ethics. In turn, minority shareholders will reap the benefit from the 
creation and preservation of values in a corporation via drastic corporate cultural reform. 
In relation to this, Flanagan, Little and Watts (2005) proposed an alternative 
“professional” approach to governance which is more effective. Directors must act in a 
professional manner that upholds integrity and high board ethics in order to protect the 
interest of minority shareholders. The question of effective implementation will not 
arise if the aforementioned best practices are put in place in a corporation to encourage 
gradual transformation of corporate culture and board ethics. Nevertheless, it is correct 
to say that board ethics vary from corporations to corporations in view of different 
corporate structure and board composition. As such, it will be difficult to devise a set of 
board ethics that suit all corporations. Recognising the challenges faced in the self-
regulation of board mindset, it is imperative to enhance shareholders’ rights and powers 
in order to provide a mechanism of check and balance. 
 
5.9 Enhancing the Shareholder’s Rights and Powers 
 
Basically, the roles of shareholders must not be muddled with the significance of 
shareholder activism. An institutional shareholder may be actively participating in the 
general meeting or voicing dissatisfactions to the board of a corporation. Some 
shareholders may even raise persistent objection against the action or decision taken by 
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the board and management. The only missing link is that these shareholders are not 
empowered to effectively challenge such action or decision. In other words, most 
shareholders can be seen as a toothless tigers with no claws to control and monitor the 
daily operation carried out by the management as well as the decision-making process 
in the boardroom. To make matter worse, the majority rule further prevents minority 
shareholders to act as an effective watchdog since often the majority shareholders will 
also have the final say on the direction and management of a corporation due to their 
substantial controlling stakes. 
 
 
Illustration 5.7: Overview of shareholders’ statutory rights 
 
Despite the statutory rights granted to shareholders (as shown in Illustration 5.7 above), 
the majority rule outlines the need to enhance shareholders’ rights and powers. In this 
context, it is advisable for the regulators to empower shareholders, especially minority 
ones to exercise more rights and powers in order to ensure that their concerns are 
addressed across the board table. Such empowerment is an important step towards a 
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higher accountability of the board as envisioned by the concept of Corprimacy. It is 
undeniable that the increasing roles of shareholders will create greater accountability on 
the part of boards and management where it provides alternative monitoring mechanism 
to stringent regulation and dry laws. Hence, this section seeks to critically examine the 
desirable rights and powers that a shareholder should have whilst proposing some 
mechanisms or practices that may enhance their rights and powers over corporation 
decisions and actions. 
 
However, the effectiveness of granting shareholders right to control a corporation is 
uncertain in view of the power of controlling shareholders. Claessens and Fan (2003) 
argued that even if minority shareholders may have the equity interest in a corporation, 
it is still comparatively weak in preventing majority shareholders to take away minority 
rights. Based on empirical analysis, Listokin (2009) concluded that “increasing 
shareholder power without making other reforms to governance may not have an impact, 
but a failure to increase shareholder power may prevent the benefits of other corporate 
governance reforms, such as increased shareholder activism, from being realized”. With 
regard to the effectiveness of shareholders’ power, it is not a question of whether 
minority shareholders are able to speak against the stronger voice of controlling 
shareholders. The right question here is whether shareholder empowerment will 
improve the corporate governance system as well as facilitate the implementation of 
best practices.  
 
Having said that, the code-based comply-or-explain concept in Malaysia does not and 
cannot exist in vacuum in the absence of the supplementary roles of shareholders in 
ensuring that directors do in reality adopt the principles of corporate governance and 
effectively implement the corporate governance best practices as embedded in the 
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Malaysian governance code. The empowerment of shareholders’ rights and powers will 
become a major transition from the conventional “box-ticking” approach. At this 
juncture, it is not acceptable for boards to simply pick and choose to comply with any 
practices that the boards favour based on their whims and fancies. In refusing to comply 
with certain code-based principles or best practices, boards will have to face their 
shareholders to explain and convince them that it is in the best interest of the 
corporation to stick with such non-compliance. To do so, they would have to do more 
than mere explanation to the regulators and shareholders without any solid foundation 
or reasonable basis. Shareholders should understand that one of the red flags of 
corporate malfeasance may be attributed by the board’s blatant reluctance or 
unjustifiable failure to comply with the Code requirements. 
 
Moreover, the objectives of the regulators may be different from the ultimate goal of 
shareholders where the former desires of strict compliance with the rules and regulation 
while the latter aims to pursue wealth and to achieve better long-term value within a 
corporation that they invest in. Thence, the comply-or-explain concept should not be 
stretched by directors to the extent that they are able to flout the rules of the regulators 
as well as to ignore the goals of shareholders at the same time. With regard to 
effectiveness of comply-or-explain approach in the United Kingdom, the Korn/Ferry 
Institute (2007) carried out a study in 2007 via questionnaires completed by almost 800 
directors from leading organizations in Asia Pacific, Europe and North America. The 
survey results found that 71 % of the surveyed participants agreed that the United 
Kingdom Combined Code of Conduct is an effective tool for corporate governance. 
However, only a simple majority of 51% of the surveyed participants agreed that the 
Combined Code requirements make their boards more cautious. On the same note, 
Montagnon (2008) opined that “shareholders cannot exercise their rights of ownership 
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unless a suitable framework allows them to do so”. He gave an example where 
shareholders may be helpful in promoting the independence of the internal audit process 
but they are helpless in devising and enforcing the audit requirements. It means that 
minority shareholders would not be able to play significant roles in ensuring the proper 
implementation of corporate governance best practices in the absence of clear code 
requirements. Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) found that “firms with stronger 
shareholder rights had higher firm value, higher profits, higher sales growth, lower 
capital expenditures, and made fewer corporate acquisitions”. Certainly, it will be in the 
best interest of a corporation to enhance shareholders’ rights and powers by letting 
shareholders to have some say in the board decision-making process. 
 
However, Dalley (2008) questioned the practicality of Bebchuk’s proposals to “let 
shareholders make business decisions”. It was argued that certain group of shareholders 
may abuse the power given to control the board via “persuasion, threats, and public 
exhortation”. Even in the context of shareholders’ voting right, Clark (1986) perceived 
the right as “a fraud or a mere ceremony designed to give a veneer of legitimacy to 
managerial power”. In support of this argument, Bainbridge (2008) also responded that 
shareholders’ voting right should be invoked sparingly as a last resort to hold the board 
accountable for their decisions and actions. 
 
Recognising the potential abuse of such power in the encroachment of managerial 
power, it is timely to gauge the appropriate level of shareholder participation in 
governance related matters. In this context, Hill (1998) examined the relationship 
between the appropriate level of shareholder participation in corporate governance and 
the importance of shareholder interests within a corporate structure. She envisioned that 
there is a need for changes in the roles of shareholder since shareholders are able to 
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monitor and regulate managerial actions and decisions effectively. The effectiveness of 
shareholder consent in general meeting pertaining to related-party transactions was also 
questioned by Hill since “the extent to which shareholder consent provides a serious 
constraint on managerial decisions under the related party transactions is unclear”. It is 
true that shareholder approval on particular transactions entered by a corporation may 
serve as an important regulatory tool in the corporate governance mechanism of a 
corporation. However, it is believed that the power and role prescribed to shareholders 
under the Malaysian corporate law is not sufficient enough in view of increased 
complexity in modern corporate transactions and board decisions. 
 
By empowering shareholders to monitor board and management, it does not necessarily 
mean that shareholders are given the direct responsibility of managing a corporation. It 
remains the duties of director to direct and manage a corporation. Hence, it is nothing 
close to what Manne (1967) anticipated that “if the principal economic function of the 
corporate form is to amass the funds of investors, qua investors, we should not 
anticipate their demanding or wanting a direct role in the management of the company”. 
In contrast, Aguilera (2005) identified the interrelationship between board, management 
and shareholders where “boards are the intermediary governance body between 
shareholders and management”. In TW Services, Inc. v. SWT Acquisition Corp (1989)28, 
the United States Court was of the same view that “while corporate democracy is a 
pertinent concept, a corporation is not a New England town meeting; directors, not 
shareholders, have responsibilities to manage the business and affairs of the corporation, 
subject however to a fiduciary obligation”. The remainder of this section discusses the 
issue of how shareholders, in particular minority shareholders, can ensure that directors 
                                                            
28
  Delaware Journal of Corporate Law, Vol. 14, 1169. 
186 
 
are accountable for their actions and decisions by having more say in corporate strategic 
decisions and corporate governance related matters. 
 
5.9.1 Shareholders to Have More Say in Corporate Strategic 
Decisions and Corporate Governance Related Matters 
 
Apart from increasing board involvement in the strategic planning of a corporation, 
minority shareholders should also be given more say in corporate strategic decisions 
and corporate governance related matters. The power of shareholders to have a say 
should not be understood as a stumbling stone to the development of a corporation in 
term of its business decisions. It should be considered as necessary safeguard for 
minority shareholders to monitor corporate actions and board decisions that are 
prejudicial to the interests of the corporation, in particular minority shareholders. The 
board will have no choice but to bear in mind the implication of a decision or action 
upon the long-term value of shareholders. Needless to say, shareholders’ involvement in 
such a decision-making process would also mean that directors will be more cautious in 
making decisions so that their board’s decisions do not contradict the best interests of a 
corporation as a whole. 
 
Notwithstanding that, Blair and Stout (2006) commented that shareholders should have 
limited say in the corporate strategy and key decision since shareholders have elected 
directors to manage the corporation. Based on the separate function of each organ in a 
corporation, the argument is that directors should have the legal right to determine 
business strategy and to decide on other management related matters. Similarly, 
Bainbridge (2006) was not fond of the idea of active shareholder participation due to the 
reason that “under conditions of widely dispersed information and the need for speed in 
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decisions, authoritative control at the tactical level is essential for success”. It was said 
that active shareholder participation may interrupt the practical operation of a 
corporation. For instance, shareholders may perceive a contract as non-favourable to 
them while the board thinks otherwise in the best interest of the entire corporation. This 
may hamper the strategic direction of a corporation when shareholders start to disrupt 
the basic principle of separation of control and ownership. Whincop (2001) also 
opposed the idea of granting shareholders the powers to participate in the management 
decision-making process. He was of the view that shareholders may abuse the power to 
reap benefits for themselves in the absence of any fiduciary duty towards a corporation.  
 
On the contrary, the more prevailing problem here is that of expropriation of minority 
interest by majority shareholders. This is where Shleifer and Vishny (1997) worried that 
“as ownership gets beyond a certain point, the large owners gain nearly full control and 
prefer to use firms to generate private benefits of control that are not shared by minority 
shareholders”. This lack of shared control is aggravated by the constraint faced by 
shareholders in exerting their rights and powers in a corporation. Scott (1999) 
highlighted the limited power of shareholders where they have inadequate information 
to monitor boards in public-listed corporations. As a result, it will be easier for a board 
and controlling shareholders to cover up any matter that are not beneficial to minority 
shareholders if they are being left out from the decision-making process. To resolve this 
conflict, Gomes and Novaes (2005) supported the notion of sharing control between 
controlling and minority shareholders in a given governance structure. As most of the 
directors are controlling shareholders, minority shareholders may benefit from this 
sharing of control rather than letting directors monitor the corporation on their behalf. 
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Gillan and Starks (1998) pointed out that if shareholders are not satisfied with board 
performance, they have three options: “sell their shares, that is, ‘vote with their feet’, 
hold their shares and voice their dissatisfaction, or hold their shares and do nothing”. 
Instead of threatening to exit a corporation via mass selling of shares, minority 
shareholders will have the last golden opportunity to put a stop-loss on the deterioration 
of the corporate performance or preventive measure on the mushrooming of corporate 
malfeasance. On this note, Zetzsche (2005) further categorized shareholder’s rights into 
two distinctive voices on decision and accountability. The voice on decision involves 
voice that “may yield a change in control” whereas the voice on accountability 
“facilitates shareholder monitoring”. In the United States case of Unocal Corp. v. Mesa 
Petroleum Co (1985)29, it was clear that “if the stockholders are displeased with the 
action of their elected representatives, the powers of corporate democracy are at their 
disposal to turn the board out”. However, this kind of voice on decision may hardly 
yield a change in control in Malaysian corporate environment which does not encourage 
the growth of shareholder activism. Rather, it is the voice on accountability that needs 
to be amplified in order to facilitate shareholder monitoring on board decisions and 
actions. To further enhance shareholders activism for the purpose of such voice on 
accountability, shareholders should also be allowed to have more solid determinative 
say on the corporate governance issues of a corporation. 
 
Most often than not, directors will also try to restrict the questions from shareholders to 
the matters stated in the agenda of a meeting only unless there is any pressing arising 
matter. As a result, it will seriously hamper shareholders’ rights to hold the board 
accountable. Prior to any AGM, shareholders should be given the opportunity to submit 
to the corporation their proposals on various corporate governance issues so that such 
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issues can be discussed during the AGM. This is to say that shareholders are involved in 
the setting of the agenda for the AGM. By doing so, the board has little choice but to 
critically deliberate on shareholders’ proposals before the AGM. Shareholders can 
reasonably expect better explanation by the board since they have sufficient time to 
prepare their explanation. In the event of dissatisfactory explanations, shareholders may 
appropriately exercise their right to demand for rectification on the part of directors or 
to hold the board accountable for their malpractices, if any.  
 
In the United States, “shareholder proposals on corporate governance issues are 
typically submitted under Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 14a-8, which 
permits a shareholder to include a proposal and a 500-word supporting statement in the 
proxy statement distributed by a company for its annual shareholder meeting” (Black, 
1998). Apart from merely inserting a corporate governance statement in the 
corporation’s annual report, it will be in the best interest of the corporation to let 
shareholders to propose good governance best practices that may help to improvise the 
governance system of a corporation. If the proposed practices are deemed to be 
acceptable by the board, they may be included in the annual report as part of the 
governance system to be implemented in the coming year. 
 
However, some commentators argued that shareholders will not have the appropriate 
understanding of the governance issues in a corporation since they are not actively 
involved in the daily management of the corporation. This could be counter-argued with 
the adoption of Corprimacy concept as every player in a corporation works as an 
important factor of the entire chain of production in the corporate governance system. 
Hence, by having more rights of participation in the affairs of a corporation, 
shareholders will have a better understanding of a corporation in order to form better 
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judgment on its corporate governance system and practices. They may not be actively 
involved in the management but they have an active role to play as the watchdog of the 
corporation.  
 
Ostensibly, it may be argued that shareholders have been accorded many statutory rights 
to attend and vote at an AGM of the corporation they invested in. In fact, such 
participatory right does not seek to resolve the corporate governance issues of the 
corporation. Unlike the vigorous approach taken by shareholders in the United States, 
the Malaysian social culture normally does not really encourage shareholders to actively 
question the board during an AGM. Most of shareholders, especially individual 
investors prefer to be passive listeners rather than active inquirers in such general 
meetings. This may be partly due to their lack of knowledge to properly understand the 
information disseminated by the board. Some of these shareholders are speculative 
investors aiming for short-term quick return of investment. They are not really 
concerned much with the agenda of the meeting so long as they are satisfied with the 
reported corporate performance. Only positive figures of profit and high dividend yield 
that capture their attention most. Nonetheless, it does not rule out the corporate 
governance best practice that shareholders should have more say in such a meeting. On 
this note, Mcconvill and Bagaric (2004) sternly argued that: 
 
While it is important that the board and management have every opportunity to 
proceed with the business of making money for the company without being 
subjected to the corporate ‘straightjacket’ of shareholder harassment and 
disturbance, opening up the doors to shareholders only one day a year for coffee, 
cake and questions tips the corporate governance pendulum too far in the other 
direction. 
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Furthermore, there is very minimum discussion between board and shareholders in 
respect of a corporation’s business plans and strategies due to constraint of meeting time 
as well as predetermined corporate strategies and decisions made by the board prior to 
an AGM. These problems in turn lead to the lack of effective communication between 
board and shareholders as shareholders’ limited participatory rights only accrue in 
general meetings. To make matter worse, the attendance of shareholders at AGM is low 
and resolution still can be passed even without minority shareholders’ presence. Scott 
(1999) concurred that “shareholder approval is likely to be a foregone formality in a 
public corporation”. This is true in view of the lack of en bloc shareholders’ voice due 
to the wide disperses of minority shareholders comprising of retail investors. Thus, it 
seems that after all, AGM should not be used as the only forum for shareholders to 
participate in the decision-making process of a corporation.  
 
In relation to this, shareholders should be constantly consulted about the governance 
matters that shape the direction of a corporation as they arise. Bebchuk (2006) explained 
that “the choice is not between imperfect decision-making by shareholders and a 
mechanism generating perfect decisions”. It is the close collaboration between board 
and shareholders as the members of a corporation that produces perfect decisions for the 
protection of minority shareholders. This is also the whole idea of adopting Corprimacy 
in the governance system of a corporation. In this regard, some may view that 
communication barrier is the main concern in considering constant communication 
between board and shareholders. Thus, in improving board communication with 
shareholders, Boros (2004) proposed electronic communication as a tool for constant 
engagement between board and shareholders. Hence, board engagement with 
shareholders will not be confined to corporate communication during AGM only. 
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Despite the fact that corporations are mandated to hold meetings with their shareholders, 
the Australian Parliament’s Explanatory Memorandum to the Company Law Review 
Bill 1997 states that shareholders should have a reasonable opportunity to communicate 
with the board during the meeting. In Malaysia, Section 143 of the Companies Act 1965 
provides that a general meeting of a corporation must be held annually. Having the right 
to attend meeting, the fact remains that shareholders do not have the say to influence or 
challenge the decision made by the board. Bowen CJ in the Australian case of Re 
Compaction Systems Pty Ltd [1976] 30  was of the view that “the right to advance 
arguments and to influence the course of discussion may in some circumstances have an 
effect, even a decisive effect, on the decision reached”. As such, it is vital to put in place 
a corporate governance system in which shareholders may argue or challenge the board 
decision in an AGM. 
 
By the same token, it is believed that stakeholders will also benefit from such active 
shareholder participation and shared control in the affairs of a corporation. This is due 
to the reason that stakeholders like employees, creditors and clients also wish to protect 
their interests by entrusting part of the responsibilities on shareholders. In this regard, 
Dent (2009) opined that shared control should be given to shareholders because they are 
the “primary residual claimants”. Macey (1999) also put forward the similar point that 
“shareholders, as residual claimants, have the greatest incentive to maximize the value 
of the firm”. These shareholders are highly motivated to enhance shareholders value 
while participating in corporate decision-making process.  
 
                                                            
30
 [1976] 2 NSWLR 477, 485. 
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Summing up the importance of granting more say to shareholders, especially minority 
shareholders in the decision-making process, the White Paper on corporate governance 
in Asia, the OECD (2003) acknowledged that “shareholders must have some means of 
reconciling their differing interests, goals and investment horizons into basic strategic 
decisions”. Although shareholder activism is commendable, Romano (2001) conducted 
empirical research and found that such shareholder proposal has trivial outcome or 
insignificant impact on corporate performance. Notwithstanding this, Romano’s finding 
on the relationship between shareholder proposals and corporate performance does not 
discard the fact that it is in the best interest of a corporation and shareholders to sustain 
both values in the long run. In other words, shareholder activism facilitates the 
enhanced voice on accountability of which it may preserve the shareholder value by 
having more say on corporate strategies and governance-related matters. Evidently, 
corporate scandals like the Enron and Transmile could have been detected earlier if 
shareholders were given more say in governance related matters to keep a check and 
balance mechanism on the board. 
 
5.9.2 Right to Actively Participate in the Board Nomination and 
Election Process 
 
Over and above the right to participate in the decision-making process of a corporation, 
shareholders should also have the right to actively participate in board nomination 
process. In normal circumstance, a nomination committee has the right to recommend to 
the Board, candidates for all directorships as well as memberships of all board 
committees of a corporation. Although the Companies Act 1965 allows shareholders to 
nominate their directors, this right is rarely exercised by them in practice. This is partly 
due to poor awareness of such nomination right. Even if they wish to nominate a 
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director, their effort will still be in vain as the approval of their recommendation 
depends on the ultimate decision of the board. Hence, it is even more obvious that 
minority shareholders should have the right to nominate their choice of directors to be 
elected into the board.  
 
Based on the cost-benefit analysis, the result of having elected shareholder-nominated 
directors in comparison with the cost involved is not desirable. The United States 
Securities and Exchange Commission Task Force on Shareholder Proposals (2003) 
reported that “new mechanisms to increase on a routine basis shareholder participation 
in director selection will not be worth their costs because they will not likely result in 
significant numbers of shareholder-nominated directors being elected”. Therefore, 
feasible studies on a cost-efficient mechanism of shareholder participation in board 
nomination process should be carried out by the board who intends to adopt this best 
practice. It is not the quantity of shareholder-nominated directors or the cost of such 
nomination process that matters in terms of good corporate governance. It is the quality 
of improved board accountability that benefits a corporation as a whole. Comparatively, 
the overall benefit outweighs the cost incurred in the long run. Shareholder-nominated 
directors will have higher sense of accountability towards their shareholders who have 
nominated them. The benefit is most significant in the level of accountability when a 
board decides or acts.  
 
In respect of enhancing the voice of shareholders on accountability, proxy access may 
be contemplated as one of the options to create a more democratic board that operates 
for the best interest of a corporation as a whole. In this context, Bebchuk (2003) agreed 
that directors who are selected by shareholders will benefit from the “reduced insulation” 
and “increased accountability”. The Council for Institutional Investors (2010) defined 
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proxy access rule as “a crucial mechanism that gives shareowners a meaningful voice 
in corporate board elections.  It refers to the right of shareowners to place their 
nominees for director on the company's proxy card”. In the United States, the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) took the bold initiatives to amend the federal proxy 
access and other rules to facilitate the rights of shareholders to nominate directors to a 
company’s board on 25 August 2010. Amongst others, the new rules state that (1) 
“shareholders who otherwise are provided the opportunity to nominate directors at a 
shareholder meeting under applicable state or foreign law would be able to have their 
nominees included in the company proxy materials sent to all shareholders” and (2) 
“shareholders also have the ability to use the shareholder proposal process to establish 
procedures for the inclusion of shareholder director nominations in company proxy 
materials” (SEC, 2010a). 
 
In this regard, the Chairman of the SEC was also of the view that “as a matter of 
fairness and accountability, long-term significant shareholders should have a means of 
nominating candidates to the boards of the companies that they own” (Goldfarb, 2010). 
The SEC believed that “these rules will benefit shareholders by improving corporate 
suffrage, the disclosure provided in connection with corporate proxy solicitations, and 
communication between shareholders in the proxy process” (SEC, 2010b). These 
amendments speak of the core principle of Corprimacy where the corporate governance 
best practices are all about the act of balancing the board accountability and authority in 
the best interest of a corporation. If a director is found to be irresponsible or not 
performing over a period of time, then shareholders may vote to remove directors from 
the corporate board in order to make way for more qualified candidates to take over the 
directorship. Warner (2010) opined that “proxy access is being hailed as a game changer 
that significantly enhances shareholder rights and, in particular, is widely believed to 
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give institutional investors unprecedented power in board director elections”. There is 
an ardent need to have a proxy access rule in Malaysia that allows shareholders, 
especially minority shareholders to nominate their choice of directors to represent their 
interest in a corporation. 
 
In moving towards a more transparent board composition, it is important to have a 
similar proxy disclosure rule which is implemented in the United States which compels 
corporations to reason out why each director is nominated based on their qualification 
and background. If the fact that going through the regulatory process of enacting the 
proxy disclosure rule is tedious, it is advisable to incorporate similar proxy disclsoure 
procedure in the corporate governance best practices code. However, the efficacy of 
such proxy disclosure rules is questionable since “for many boards, the focus of this 
exercise was simply to engage legal experts in wordsmithing a re-nomination rationale 
for current directors, rather than addressing gaps in board composition itself” (Behan, 
2010). It is believed that such gap in the board composition may be filled by the 
shareholder participation in board nomination process. Even if the proxy access or 
disclosure rule is not implemented in Malaysia for any reason, Corprimacy requires that 
shareholders should take part in board nomination process for the purpose of higher 
board transparency and accountability.  
 
At the very least, shareholders should have the right to be consulted with regard to the 
selection of candidates for directorships by the nomination committee before the whole 
voting process takes place. Principally, nomination committee should conduct objective 
selection without any favouritism. However, it is very difficult to achieve such 
objectivity in the modern corporate practice. Hence, shareholders’ participation would 
inevitably improve the objectivity test in the nomination process. Having consultation 
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with shareholders in nomination process, it will not only benefit the overall corporate 
governance in terms of a balanced mixed of directors in the board, it will also smoothen 
the process of nomination and appointment of directors since the selected candidates 
would have been screened and pre-approved by shareholders as a whole prior to the 
voting process. This new approach will certainly provide an opportunity for 
shareholders, especially minority shareholders, to have a say as to the candidates of 
their choice to represent them in the boardroom as well as to protect their interest in the 
long run. In other words, it will also indirectly grant shareholders the power to decide 
on the appropriate board structure of a corporation.  
 
The foregoing discussion shows that shareholders should be given the right to nominate 
their own directors via a more cost effective channel prior to an AGM. Perhaps, 
shareholders may bear their own cost and expenses in nominating directors. Even if this 
best practice is not considered cost effective, other alternative options should be given 
due weight by a board. One of them will be that of consultation with shareholders on 
their choice of directors. A board may propose a slate of directors for the secondment by 
shareholders prior to the AGM. If shareholders oppose any one or more of the directors, 
then they may notify the nomination committee of the objection. The nomination 
committee will have the discretion of accepting or rejecting the objection. In the event 
of acceptance, the nomination committee should consider to re-nominate new director 
or better still, request for new nomination from shareholders themselves. In case of 
rejection, the nomination committee will have to explain their reason of rejection to 
shareholders in the AGM. The nomination ball will then roll into shareholders’ court to 
nominate their choice of directors during the AGM and it is up to the votes by all 
shareholders present in the AGM. Such enhanced shareholder democracy is certainly 
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the pivotal to the notion of Corprimacy where every constituent in a corporation has a 
role to play. 
 
Instead of granting shareholders right to nominate the directors, Sullivan and Cromwell 
(2003) proposed that a nominating committee should consist of all independent 
directors who have the required skill and knowledge to select better candidates. It was 
argued that they are more capable of sieving through the recommendations from the 
management and making selection of director nominees. Reasonably the nomination 
committee should have the upper hand to recommend candidates for directorships in a 
corporation due to their ability to assess the eligibility and qualification of a person 
based on the corporate values and needs. Be that as it may, a nomination committee 
comprises of independent directors who are not totally independent from the 
manipulation by executive directors and other substantial shareholders. All the members 
of a nomination committee could be independent, but it does not rule out the fact that 
they are only one-third of the directors who sit in the board. They may have the power 
to select and recommend candidates for directorships. Paradoxically, the board, as a 
whole, would have the ultimate majority casting votes to approve or disapprove the 
selection by the nomination committee.  
 
Similarly, Bainbridge (2002) propounded that “even the election of directors (absent a 
proxy contest) is predetermined by the existing board nominating the next year’s board”. 
As such, it is unlikely to see an impartial selection based on pure performance and 
qualifications as the nomination committee will tailor their recommendation based on 
the preferences of the board instead. Furthermore, independence is not always the only 
panacea when it comes to conflict of interest within the board. To align conflicting 
interests in a corporation, Abdul Wahid (2005) believed that good governance is 
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achieved by letting the owners, i.e., shareholders of a corporation to elect directors who 
will then appoint and monitor the management team. 
 
Even if this best practice of shareholder-nominated director is not adopted by the board, 
shareholders shall be given reasonable time and opportunity prior to the AGM to 
understand the reason why the nominated slate of directors should be appointed to the 
board. The board should also provide concrete explanation on how the nominated 
directors can help to create or deliver values to a corporation and thus, adding to the 
shareholder value. It is viewed that the election of directors does not stop at the voting 
rights of shareholders. Shareholder rights should advance into the realm of nomination 
process as well. As a result, directors will be more susceptible to shareholders’ views in 
the meetings once they reckon the presence of shareholder power and pressure on the 
nomination and election process. 
 
In short, there shall be corporate governance best practices of providing the right forum 
and opportunities to shareholders to actively participate in the board nomination and 
election process. Minority shareholders will be better protected since directors will fear 
of losing their positions due to increasing shareholder pressure and active monitoring. In 
completing such best practices, effort must also be carried out by a corporation and the 
regulators to revive shareholder activism for the aforesaid purposes. 
 
5.9.3 Reviving Shareholder Activism 
 
In the realm of reviving shareholder activism, focus is thrown on the best practices of a 
corporation rather than the initiatives of regulators which have been briefly discussed in 
chapter 4. Despite the establishment of the MSWG, the shareholder activism is still 
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relatively weak in relation to the governance system of a corporation. Most of the 
boards are not keen to encourage shareholder activism for fear of interference in their 
daily affairs. Paradoxically, Henwood (1997) believed that shareholders nowadays “are 
far less passive, boards less rubber-stampish, and managements less autonomous than at 
any time since Berle and Means”. This does not paint the real picture in the modern 
corporate world as board and management creatively obtain shareholders’ approval 
during general meetings. One could not compare shareholder activism using the 
spectacles of Berle and Means with spectacles of 21st century. This is because boards 
have become more sophisticated and well-verse in management tactics that may fool 
shareholders in the end. Due to complicated financial terms and corporate matters, most 
shareholders choose to be passive as long as they are rewarded with dividends and 
bonuses. As such, it is very difficult for shareholders to be actively involved in 
corporate affairs in the absence of good governance mechanism. 
 
With regard to the shareholder activism in the United States, Partnoy and Thomas (2007) 
were of the view that “after 25 years, institutional shareholder activism appears to have 
had relatively little impact on US corporate governance.” Karpoff (2001) also found that 
shareholder activism has little or no impact on the share price and earning of a 
corporation. In contrast, Smith (1996) found that “shareholder activism is largely 
successful in changing governance structure and, when successful, results in a 
statistically significant increase in shareholder wealth”. Regardless of the good or bad of 
shareholder activism, one may not deny the fact that shareholder activism is required to 
facilitate their participation in the corporate strategies, governance-related matters and 
board nomination process as discussed above. This chapter does not intend to repeat the 
discussion on how significant is the shareholder activism in corporate governance as it 
has been vividly evidenced in previous chapter. 
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Essentially, Corprimacy necessitates that board should seek to stimulate shareholder 
activism via improved communication and productive meetings. Davis (2003) 
illustrated underlying the right behind the shareholder activism is that of the general 
meeting where shareholders may drag the directors to the meeting table for explanation 
and discussion. Despite of the general meeting where shareholders and board only 
gather to meet once a year, there shall be a governance system where shareholders may 
regularly engage with the board on the affairs and activities of the corporation. It should 
not be seen as a hurdle against the board efficacy as such best practices provide a 
conduit pipe for the board to know their shareholders better and vice versa. The 
enhanced shareholder activism will provide a good check and balance on the board 
activity.  
 
All in all, shareholder activism should be revitalised in order to facilitate the exercise of 
shareholders’ rights and powers. In the absence of shareholder activism, rights and 
powers given to shareholders will remain as white elephants with no implication on 
board decision and action at all. This is clearly evident in the case of Transmile where 
shareholders have no means to discover that the financial information provided by the 
board was fraudulent in fact during the AGM. Without strong shareholder activism, it is 
likely to be a foregone formality of “rubber-stamping” the information fed by the board. 
Hence, shareholders activism is positively related to better corporate governance 
through enhancement of shareholders’ rights and powers. 
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5.10 Best Practices of Executive Remuneration Policy 
 
As part of the reform on corporate governance best practices, it is high time to revisit 
the executive remuneration policy in order to ensure that there is no excessive 
remuneration which may jeopardise the financial standing of a corporation. Without 
adequate constraint and monitoring on the remuneration policy, Bebchuk and Fried 
(2004) identified several reasons that cause excessive remuneration package to the 
executives – management pressure, empathy to executives, lack of incentive to 
negotiate the remuneration and board failure in their oversight role. When board fails to 
perform their oversight role, it is necessary to improve the shareholder monitoring 
mechanism upon the remuneration policy of a corporation. Recognising the importance 
of reviving shareholder activism, this section discusses how shareholders can also play 
their roles in the governance system of a corporation in relation to remuneration policy. 
 
It follows that excessive remuneration has induced heated debate amongst scholars and 
regulators on the reasonableness and appropriateness of the sum paid to the board and 
the management in foreign countries. Bebchuk (2005) argued that “without adequate 
constraints and incentives, management might divert resources through excessive pay, 
self-dealing, or other means”. For instance, excessive executive compensation at Fannie 
Mae in the United States was one of the major causes of its winding up during the 
recent financial crisis. The unreasonable executive remuneration policy in Fannie Mae 
was devised as a scam to cover up the huge amount of pay not connection to 
performance (Bebchuk & Fried, 2005). Notwithstanding shareholders’ right to approve 
an increase in directors’ remuneration during general meeting as provided under Para 
7.24 of the Bursa Listing Requirements, it is still vague as to what amounts to directors’ 
remuneration. It is questionable whether the word “remuneration” includes fees, bonus 
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payments, commissions, shares allotment and/or dividends since the law does not 
provide any clear definition of “remuneration”. Even if shareholders may have the right 
to vote on any increase of directors’ remunerations, the next question that should be 
asked is whether there is any right to vote on the pre-determined amount of directors’ 
remuneration. In practice, it is very rare to have a shareholder proposing or deciding on 
the remuneration policies of a corporation as the corporation is in a better position to 
decide based on the corporation’s internal financial status. 
 
First of all, it is a good corporate governance practice that remuneration committee 
should spell out the executive compensation policies and packages in details. Gordon 
(2006) proposed that “the compensation committee (or the independent directors that 
have taken on that role for companies without a compensation committee) should 
prepare and include in the proxy statement their compensation discussion and analysis.” 
Looking at the local scenario, the Malaysian Code provides that “the company’s annual 
report should contain details of the remuneration of each director”. However, most of 
the company’s annual reports in Malaysia do not stipulate the detailed remuneration of 
each director. For example, according to the Sime Darby Berhad’s Annual Report 2009, 
the remuneration of directors was categorized into executive and non-executive 
directors without specific amount of remuneration of individual director. Furthermore, 
there was no breakdown of the remuneration paid to the directors – bonus payment, 
salary, allowance or other compensation amount. As such, it is difficult for shareholders 
to gauge the reasonableness of the remuneration amounts and packages based on the 
total annual net profit of the corporation during the AGM. It defeats the purpose of 
seeking shareholders’ approval in the first place as it seems to be a “rubber-stamping” 
event in the AGM. 
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Similarly, Ho (2003) also pointed out the reluctance of the Hong Kong’s corporation in 
disclosing their corporate policies on executive compensations due to the reason of 
privacy.  Due to such non-transparency, the Hong Kong’s regulator implemented 
measures to increase the disclosure of the details on the directors’ remuneration to 
include the “aggregate amount, analysis by components, analysis by bands, 
remuneration policy, fixed versus discretionary pay, the value of options realized, and 
amount by individual name”. At the very minimum, the Malaysian regulator should 
amend the Code to include the aforesaid details of analysis and information on the 
board remuneration. This is to ensure that the remuneration committee and the board are 
accountable for their decision of pay to the executives by taking into consideration the 
best interest of a corporation.  
 
By adopting the best practice of disclosure, it will certainly boost the confidence of 
shareholders who witness higher board transparency. Moreover, shareholders and other 
stakeholders like creditors may form better judgment as to how their capital and loans 
are utilised by the directors. In the restructuring of remuneration policy, a corporation 
should also devise some models of executive compensation based on reasonable 
quantitative and qualitative criterions that benefit the corporation in the long run. It has 
been argued that there must be transparency and reasonableness as to the amounts of 
executive pay (Ho, 2003). This is simply because excessive executive remuneration 
may eventually culminate in additional costs to shareholders, especially its prejudicial 
impact on minority shareholders. 
 
To enhance shareholder monitoring on the board, it is also proposed that there should be 
“say on pay” where shareholders are given the right to vote on the remuneration policy 
and package of a corporation. In this regard, McClatchy (2009) mentioned that a 
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corporation will detail out the executive remuneration policy in its annual proxy 
statement and it is opened for shareholders to put their non-binding vote on the said 
policy. It means that shareholders will not have the final say on the remuneration policy 
but a mere indirect advisory vote to increase or to decrease the amount of remuneration. 
Having the same rhythm with the notion of Corprimacy, shareholders who are more 
sophisticated investors may challenge the board and demand for justification on the 
determined pay. 
 
Apart from detailed disclosure of board remuneration and shareholders’ “say on pay”, it 
is a best practice that “share retention policy” should be gradually introduced in the 
local corporate scene. In other words, such remuneration policy should be structured 
based on long-term performance-based reward approach as it will eventually benefit a 
corporation.  In order to retain top performers in corporations as well as to recruit more 
new young talents, it is important to create a sense of belonging in the corporations 
where they are currently or are going to be employed. It may be created via employees’ 
participation in the share option scheme of the corporations over a period of few years. 
The President and Chief Investment Officer of Fifth Third Asset Management, Keith 
Wirtz supported such reform of compensation arrangement by saying that “employees 
will have more certainty about their compensations because their bases are going up and 
it will be less tied to productivity” (Reuters, 2009). The comfort of certainty amongst 
employees will certainly create a sense of belonging since every stakeholder will have 
the opportunity to participate in the equity performance of the corporation. As such, this 
sense of belonging will slowly translate into a sense of corporate ownership.  
 
Distinctively, such best practice of “share retention policy” is different from the 
conventional pay-for-performance policy adopted by most of the corporations in 
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remunerating their employees who have performed well in the year of assessment. This 
kind of pay-for-performance policy is no stranger to many corporations as one of the 
ways to retain top performers from resigning or leaving the corporations. The modes of 
remuneration may be that of cash bonus payment, stock options or increase in salaries. 
Most often than not, this remuneration policy will only generate short-term results as it 
does not guarantee the long-term success of a corporation. It is likely that there will be 
an unease atmosphere created in the workplace due to dissatisfaction by some 
employees who do not receive good bonuses. Some of these employees may even leave 
the corporation since they do not feel appreciated by their bosses.  
 
In relation to the conventional pay-for-performance policy, some commentators debated 
that executive compensation based on stock options may have adverse impact on the 
share price of a corporation. To illustrate this, Dionne (2003) lambasted the Enron case 
where “several members of the board were privy to information about Enron’s 
management practices—overcompensation of certain executives and board members 
and disclosure of false statistics on the firm’s growth potential to increase the value of 
shares and options—but chose to ignore this information or not to transmit it to 
shareholders”. For instance, the CEO of a corporation is rewarded with stock options 
worth millions in value. Such stock options create a huge gap in view of the CEO’s 
annual salary of few hundred thousand. This will prompt the top management team to 
push the value of shares through distorting means. Share price may be manipulated by 
tampering with the financial reports of a corporation. As such, dishonest managerial 
behavior is positively correlated with executive compensation in terms of stock options. 
Notwithstanding the likelihood of such misbehaviour, the nature and structure of “share 
retention policies” is distinguishable from the mere reward of stock options. The 
dividing line lies in the method of rewarding stock option throughout a certain period. 
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In other words, reward of stock options is usually given to the executives in full sum on 
an annual basis whereas shares are given in parts to the executives over a span of few 
years in the proposed “share retention policies”. 
 
In this regard, Lee (2003) agreed that “share retention policies” should be implemented 
by a corporation to mandate their employees to retain half of the shares granted. In 2009, 
it was reported that the gigantic Swiss bank, Credit Suisse changed its executive 
compensation structure by increasing the base salary of its executives at top managerial 
and board level. Part of the bonuses will also be deferred to a later date depending on 
the business performance and share price. In other words, the deferred bonuses which 
are in the forms of cash and stocks will be granted to the executives over a span of few 
years and will be restructured every year according to its business performance and 
equity (Hane, 2009). In the long run, minority shareholders may be better off as the 
corporate executives are naturally motivated to preserve the shareholder value when 
they are tied to the share retention benefits themselves. 
 
Another cause of excessive executive remuneration is that of undue management 
pressure on a board and remuneration committee. In this regard, Jensen and Murphy 
(2004) noted that remuneration committee rarely challenge the proposed executive 
remuneration packages by the management due to lack of time and resources. Such 
management’s indirect control disrupts the corporate governance system of a 
corporation as there is no separation of roles and responsibilities between the 
remuneration committee and the management. To make matter worse, most of the 
members of the committee are controlling directors who are holding the top 
management posts in the corporation. Hence, there shall be some best practices that can 
minimise management pressure on the remuneration policy of the management, 
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especially the CEO. Zinkin (2010) viewed that the remuneration policy of a CEO 
should be set to reinforce the values of the corporation. However, the measurement of 
values in a corporation is very subjective as there is no single set of ethical values that 
may justify the amount of income received by the CEO.  
 
On this note, Booth (2005) observed that a CEO has the ultimate control over board 
decision as most of the directors are selected by the CEO. The fact remains that “if you 
pay a CEO like a bureaucrat, he will act like a bureaucrat” (Jensen & Murphy, 1990). 
This reasons out that if the board is under the pressure to handsomely reward the 
management, they will surely be subordinate to the management who will dictate their 
directions upon the corporation. Be that as it may, it should be the board responsibility 
to determine the executive compensation as they owe fiduciary duty to shareholders. 
The board should move away from the claws of CEO in meddling with their duties of 
directing the management of a corporation. Furthermore, Reinhardt (2009) reviewed 
that board should stand to protect the interest of shareholders in having arms-length 
bargain with management over the executive remuneration policies. It was said that 
board should exercise their business judgment to decide on the executive remuneration 
packages. This goes back to the earlier discussion on the best practice of board 
independence from the management.  
 
To minimise management pressure, the remuneration committee should act as the first 
defence line against such unwanted influence and control from the management. In 
other words, remuneration committee should consist of all independent non-executive 
directors and shareholder representatives. Klein (2006) empirically found that “a CEO 
sitting on its board compensation committee has both the motivation and the access to 
manipulate earnings to maximize his overall compensation package”. Hence, a CEO 
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who is also the executive director of a corporation should not be allowed to sit in the 
committee as well. This is to avoid any unwanted manipulation of executive 
compensation scheme that favours the CEO and his team. Instead of being pressured by 
the board and management, the composition of the remuneration committee should 
allow representation by shareholders. The rationale behind this proposal is that of board 
accountability to their shareholders so that they do not bow down to the management 
pressure that controls their position and remuneration. Likewise, remuneration 
committee will naturally be inclined to rewarding themselves handsomely if the 
decision-making power lies in their own hands as directors of a corporation. Although 
they may be named as the independent directors, this is a mere facade of independence 
in reality. It is a fallacy to claim that as independent directors will exercise their 
independent judgment in the best interest of a corporation when there is conflict of 
interests with respect to the determination of their personal remuneration. As such, 
shareholder representation in the remuneration committee will eventually push directors 
to uphold their integrity and accountability to the corporation as a whole. It will create 
an impression in the mind of a board that shareholders are their paymaster. 
 
In conclusion, the best practices of remuneration policy should speak of board 
disclosure, transparency, shareholders’ say, sustainable long term value of a corporation 
as well as total independence from the management pressure. However, minority 
shareholders interest will still be at stake if a corporation is lack of proper internal 
control and risk management. Thence, the next section continues to discuss on the 
importance of sound internal control and best practices of good risk management and 
audit process. 
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5.11 Internal Control – Risk Management and Audit Process 
 
 In essence, a corporation that has sound internal control system may be able to preserve 
shareholder value and protect minority interest via good risk management and auditing 
process. This section does not intend to reinvent the wheel by discussing the mounting 
benefits of risk management and the auditing process but rather seek to propose 
governance best practices in a corporation’s internal control system. The significance is 
also reflected in Section 167A of the Companies Act 1965 which requires a public-
listed corporation to establish an internal control system to provide a reasonable 
assurance that the corporate assets are properly protected against any unauthorized 
disposition or loss. 
 
Basically, a sound internal control system is largely depending on the effective 
implementation of strong risk management and proper auditing process in a corporation. 
Spira and Page (2003) observed that risk management is closely intertwined with the 
internal control system of which the degree of its management is a form of 
accountability in a corporate governance framework. However, it is difficult to spell out 
the appropriate degree of risk management in a corporation. This is simply because 
different corporation will have different level of risks involved in its business activities 
and corporate structure. As such, board accountability rests on the effectiveness of the 
mechanisms of monitoring and managing the exponential risks faced by a corporation. 
Good risk assessment and management will eventually lead to good internal control 
system. Another important engine of internal control system is that of sound auditing 
process. The following sub-sections will unravel how these best practices of risk 
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management and auditing process may be enhanced in order to protect minority 
shareholders. Firstly, there shall be a proper integration of risk intelligence governance. 
Secondly, a Chief Risk Officer shall be appointed to oversee the risk exposure of a 
corporation. Lastly, an independent audit process should be put in place to facilitate 
better internal control within a corporation. 
 
5.11.1 Integration of Risk Intelligence Governance 
 
Any risk element is vital in the pursuit of creative business solution, innovative products, 
competitive business edge and maximising shareholder wealth. Although vigorous risk-
taking by a corporation is indisputable, but a calculated risk-taking is what a board 
should undertake to have a risk intelligent corporation. The best practice of risk 
intelligence governance fosters the corporate strength, resources and business acumen 
required to cope with the any contingency faced by the corporation. In this regard, risk 
intelligent governance is all about preserving shareholder value and creating more 
shareholder value at the same time. 
 
Essentially, there are various risk intelligent mechanisms and measures that a board 
should integrate with the central governance system of a corporation. A board should 
adopt a well-designed risk intelligent action plan and best practices that sound as 
follows: 
 
a) Define the scope and level of different existing and potential risks posed to the 
corporation. A board should set the right tone for the appropriate level of 
corporation’s risk appetite at the outset. This common definition of risk is 
applicable to all departments supporting the corporation. Hence, the board’s 
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policies must not cause a corporation to engage in risk-taking activities that 
exceed the acceptable risk level. The management and officers of the 
corporation may discharge their risk responsibilities in line with the risk 
management best practices of the corporation.  
 
b) Set a strong tone at the top for independence, professionalism and ethical culture 
as an example to the auditors and the management in their efforts towards fraud 
prevention and reporting system. A board should take the lead to direct the 
management and the auditors in implementing such preventive measures in their 
risk management planning process. 
 
c) Craft a crisis management plan by taking into account of the risks the company 
faces whilst weighing their consequential effects upon a corporation in the short 
run and the long run. Risk intelligence governance also entails the need to have a 
crisis response and management plan in event that the risk materialised to create 
adverse impact upon the corporation. A well-thought crisis management plan 
can literally protect the interest of shareholders at the brink of financial crisis or 
business catastrophes. Perhaps, lessons should be learnt from the recent oil spill 
disaster at BP which is one of the largest oil conglomerates in the world. It is 
interesting to note that there was no crisis response plan at BP of which BP 
could immediately react to prevent and manage the oil spill disaster. It took the 
board at BP so long to create and implement their crisis response plan. Their 
plan which was divided into three phases, amongst others, includes the initial 
phase of disposal of assets worth USD10 billion to provide sufficient resources, 
the revision of safety measures to prevent future oil spill and the final phase of 
CEO replacement due to public scrutiny and government pressure. The delay in 
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executing an effective risk management plan had caused multi-millions losses to 
their shareholders which in turn diminished their shareholder value. 
 
d) Evaluate the risk performance and risk governance structure between the board 
and the committees. This is to gauge the effectiveness of risk management 
framework in relation to the corporate performance. Should the framework fail 
to improve corporate performance or minimise risk exposure, the board may 
engage the assistance of independent auditors or external party to reassess 
whether their risk-intelligent approach is responsive and workable to the risk 
impact. If need be, the risk governance structure should be revamped to enhance 
the scope of the board’s risk oversight role. 
 
e) Hold frequent meetings or robust dialogues with the responsible risk officers and 
committees to further comprehend the underlying risks in relation to the 
business activities and management of the corporation. The board should not be 
contended with the risk assessment report presented by the committee or 
management. The board may challenge the management or committees or 
propose some new risk measures while probing into the risk report. 
 
f) Chart a plan for close collaboration and coordination amongst all the 
departments within a corporation via a risk intelligence sharing system. It is 
noted that some actions taken by the officers in one department may create a 
domino effect upon the other departments of the corporation. For instance, the 
sales department decided to discontinue a sales transaction with another party 
without prior consultation or sharing of such decision to the legal department. 
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As a result, the corporation is made vulnerable to floodgates of claims and legal 
suits by the party concerned.  
 
g) Designate the risk management committee as the central control of risk 
intelligence and management. All information should be kept properly in record 
and relayed to the board at monthly risk reporting meeting. The board and the 
management would have the aptitude to access the risk exposure of a 
corporation and swiftly response to them when needed. Inevitably, such 
information gathering mechanism acts as the main brainpower of directors who 
are the minds and intelligence of the corporation. 
 
h) Educate the officers and staffs in the corporation. All employees should be 
trained to understand the risks exposure and how to cope with such risks as well 
as what amounts to fraud and how to effectively report any suspicious fraudulent 
acts from bottom to the top. 
 
i) Restructure the composition of the risk management committee which is usually 
consists of directors rather than other officers in the corporation. Directors may 
not have the required resources and time to handle every piece of information in 
relation to risk management plans and processes. Hence, it is proposed that the 
risk management committee should also consist of key executives of the 
corporation like the CEO, the Chief Financial Officer, the Chief Operating 
Officer, the Head of each department, the auditors and other top personnel. 
Having these officers, the risk management committee will be able to decide and 
take action in response to any imminent risk or emergency situation.  
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j) Review the risk management policies and strategies regularly and benchmark the 
policies with the latest development in other countries. Any risk management 
plan is a continuing developmental process. It is not an end itself but a means to 
the ends of protecting the best interest of the corporation. The board should take 
recognisance of the evolvement of corporate strategies and policies as well as 
the changing climate of the business and financial status in the corporation. Such 
ever-changing corporate environment would bring about never-ending 
antecedent risks to the corporation.  
 
k) Design a proper guideline or manual on effective risk monitoring and 
management for the reference of the corporation. Such guideline must be 
tailored corporate and business strategies according to the short term, medium 
term and long term risk exposure. Having a comprehensive manual, the 
management may carry out their duties according to standard operating 
procedures and indication of risks laid down in the guidelines. 
 
l) Shoulder the responsibilities of risk oversight as part of their fiduciary duties to 
the corporation. The conventional practice of leaving risk oversight 
responsibilities to the risk management or audit committee should be changed. 
Normally, the board prefers to leave the job of risk management to their 
designated risk department or the risk management committee. Although some 
corporations in the banking and insurance industries do have a department or 
division to oversee risk management, the board should not be relieved of their 
responsibilities in risk management. Rather, the board should exercise their 
overall risk oversight role in relation to monitoring and supervising the risk 
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management functions carried out by the relevant departments or board 
committee.  
 
m) Review the financial standing of a corporation regularly to determine whether 
there is any financial over-leveraging or over-gearing problems such as 
excessive borrowings from creditors in comparison with the corporation’s assets 
and capacities to pay back the borrowings. This is to avoid the potential risks of 
winding-up proceedings being initiated by the creditors for failure to repay the 
debts. An effective reporting system should be implemented by the board so that 
they may be alerted of any sign of over-leveraging. Even if the board decides to 
proceed with excessive borrowings due to the nature of their business, it is their 
duty to ensure that such risk exposure of over-leveraging is properly assessed 
and well managed. For instance, most corporations that involve in the 
construction industry would require huge capital layout in the initial phase of 
their projects since the usual practice of payment is made progressively based on 
the stages of completion. 
 
n) Implement an internal anti-fraud control and reporting system. This internal 
system must be able to detect fraud when there is smell of “smoke” in the 
corporation. The “smoke” meant here is that of the fraud risk. The internal audit 
function of a corporation should facilitate the effective enforcement of such a 
system. A good starting point will be from the establishment of a whistle-
blowing framework for every employee to identify any indication of fraud 
amongst the staffs and report it to the board. There shall be no exception to the 
top management team. The identity of any whistleblower must be protected with 
utmost confidentiality by the board. The board may clandestinely devise an 
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incentive scheme to reward the particular whistleblower from a specific fund 
allocated for such whistle-blowing action. 
 
o) Appoint an independent compliance officer to act as a whistleblower for the 
external fraud reporting system. His main duties will be to examine the records 
and to scrutinise the actions of the board and the management on a regular basis. 
This compliance officer must be independent from the authority and control of 
the board and management. To be truly independent, this compliance officer 
should be selected from a pool of qualified and independent compliance officers 
gathered by the regulators. As such, they are under the duties to identify any 
wrongdoing or fraudulent activity and to report it to the relevant authority or 
agency. For instance, if there is any non-compliance with the securities laws, the 
appropriate authority will be the Securities Commission Malaysia. Such 
compliance function is different from the internal audit function in a 
corporation. The compliance officer looks at actions and activities beyond the 
mere reported financial figures and data on papers. This fraud reporting system 
is closely intertwined with the whistle-blowing provisions under the new 
Whistleblower Protection Act 2010. 
 
p) The use of information technology that may support and facilitate the 
communication from top to bottom and vice versa. For instance, an information 
technology system may be created to enhance the financial or fraud reporting 
mechanism without exposing the true identity of the whistleblower.  
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q) Appoint a Chief Risk Management Officer from the board to undertake the risk 
oversight role. There is more discussion about this in the following sub-section 
5.11.2. 
 
Having said, the aforesaid action plan is not exhaustive in nature. It requires the board 
to adapt the plan based on the need of their business and the nature of their corporation. 
The said plan should not be implemented in “silo” since it should facilitate other 
governance best practices. It is reiterated here that a board who fails to plan is planning 
to fail.  
 
5.11.2 Chief Risk Management Officer 
 
Strictly speaking, a corporation may have the best risk management mechanisms and 
control in their governance system. However, it is pointless to have the best system 
without an effective monitoring mechanism to implement such risk management 
practices. Essentially, risk management best practices depend on how fast a monitoring 
mechanism or body detects any mishap or error in the governance system of a 
corporation (Douglas, 1986).The focus of monitoring should be put on any red flags 
arising from those untoward incidents that happened in a corporation. The identified red 
flags should sufficiently draw the board’s attention to the questions of board 
responsibility and corporate performance so that the appropriate actions may be taken. 
 
Notably, most of the public corporations in Malaysia do not have any officer to be in 
charge of the risk management of the corporation. Unlike other financial institutions, 
the responsibility of risk management is usually left at the shoulders of the internal 
auditors and the audit committee. These corporations often lose sight of the fact that 
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internal auditors or the audit committee will only focus on the corporation’s financial 
risks during financial reporting process. It is equally important that the board should 
aware or be informed of other kinds of risk associated with the business activities and 
corporate actions of the corporation. In the absence of clear mechanism put in place for 
risk monitoring, such risks will not be easily identified by the board or management. 
Even if some of the post-financial disclosures risks may be recognised by the board, it 
would not enable the board to adopt effective measures to minimise the risks. This is 
due to the reason that the identified risks would have impacted the corporations to a 
certain extent. The real test lies in how fast the board or management can response to 
the risk exposed as well as how they can deal with the said risk diligently. 
 
Notwithstanding that some corporations may have their own risk management 
department or risk officers, these officers are not appointed from the board of directors. 
In practice, such risk management department is only tasked to collect and compile risk 
reports from all departments in a corporation. Most often than not, their duties are to 
directly report to the Chief Executive Officer or to the board indirectly in relation to the 
risks posed by the information gathered from these departments. As a result, 
communication of any risks arose within a corporation will have to pass through few 
layers before reaching the board for their appropriate actions and decisions. To better 
manage risks, it is highly recommended that a Chief Risk Officer is appointed from 
among directors for the purpose of enhancing board accountability. The job function of 
a Chief Risk Officer is mainly to identify and access any risk accrued to the company’s 
operations including tabling risk assessment reports to the board on a timely basis.  
 
Having a Chief Risk officer, the board could ensure that their corporate plans and 
strategies are regularly assessed and reviewed in relation to any potential risks. From 
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time to time, the implementation of business activities and corporate actions are also 
closely monitored by the Chief Risk Officer who will in turn report them to the board. 
Depending on the level of the risk exposed, the Chief Risk Officer may promptly decide 
to take actions or measures to contain and reduce the risks without going through the 
board. This is because delay in managing risk may bring disastrous effects upon the 
corporation as time is of essence in risk management.   
 
Furthermore, the Chief Risk Officer will better understand the risk appetite of a 
corporation as he or she is also one of the directors on the board. As part of the decision 
makers, the Chief Risk Officer will be able to propose appropriate controlling and 
preventive measures to the board based on the risk appetite and direction of the 
corporation. With effective risk monitoring mechanism, the board will have early 
opportunity to assess their corporate strategies and if necessary, to tailor their strategies 
in accordance with the risk level of the corporation. Perhaps, time may also be allocated 
for due deliberation and approvals on risk-related matters during board meetings.  
 
For instance, the local insurance industry in Malaysia is also starting to acknowledge 
the importance of having a risk officer on the board to assure effective risk management 
of an insurance corporation. The President and Chief Executive Officer of ING 
Insurance Bhd, Datuk Dr Nirmala Menon strongly supports the idea of appointing a 
head of risk to manage the risk exposure of an insurer. She reasoned that “the board 
would be able to clearly understand a company's risks and accept any deviations from 
the risk strategy and appetite that have been set as well as form the second line of 
defence for the company”. The CEO of Prudential Assurance Malaysia Bhd, Charlie E 
Oropeza also viewed that “boards and senior management of local insurers will not only 
need to have a greater appreciation of the risk sissues involved, but must also be able to 
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manage a greater alignment between business strategy and risk” (The Star News, 
January 13, 2011). However, the duties of aligning the business strategies and inherent 
risks should rest on the shoulder of the Chief Risk Officer who oversees the risk 
management in the corporation. The board may better appreciate the risk involved when 
they have a Chief Risk Officer to advise them during board meetings. This best practice 
of appointing a Chief Risk Officer should be further expanded to the other industries 
and public-listed corporations. 
 
In short, it is undeniable that the Chief Risk Officer is central to the sound internal 
control system of a corporation due to his roles and responsibilities to the governance 
system. Having the right integrity and independence, he is not only the eyes and ears of 
shareholders who may not be involved in the daily operation of a corporation but he 
may also act as the alarm call for any red flags of misconduct or problem in the 
corporation. Hence, such warnings are important in preventing any untoward 
malpractices that may affect minority interest. 
 
5.11.3 Revamping Audit Process 
 
If a Chief Risk Officer is deemed to be the second line of defence for minority 
shareholders, the audit committee and auditors of a corporation would perceive 
themselves as the last line of defence for shareholders. This is because most auditors 
will only find out the financial irregularities prior to the quarterly and annual financial 
reporting of a corporation for a particular year. However, it is high time that the auditors 
should change such a mindset in moving towards becoming the frontier of protection for 
minority shareholders. Even if the auditors only discover the financial irregularities at a 
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later stage of the governance system, they may play their role to prevent such misdeed 
from depriving minority interests.  
 
Most of the time, an auditor will always rely on the accounting reform made by the 
country in the hope for better accounting and auditing principles. It is not sufficient to 
have a set of comprehensive accounting principles in place when corporation merely 
complies with them in form and not in substance. Notwithstanding the accounting 
reforms in Korea, Choi (2001) was still pessimistic about the actual outcome from such 
reform where the “accounting cultural environment still remains qualitatively not very 
much different from what it used to be before the crisis”. Hilb (2006) highlighted the 
flourishing of “creative auditing” cases that led to corporate malfeasances. Such 
“creative auditing” includes share manipulation, fraudulent financial reporting and 
overstatement of revenue. He proposed that board auditing function should be enhanced 
via various monitoring mechanisms of supervision, controlling and examination. The 
discussion on the case studies of Enron and Transmile scandal in chapter 3 clearly 
necessitates the significance of auditors since auditors’ failure to exercise duty of care 
and diligence was one of the reasons of corporate collapse. As such, there is an ardent 
need to revamp the entire internal and external audit process. 
 
In this context, Fan and Wong (2001) identified several reasons why external auditors 
are not effective in monitoring the corporation. It was argued that the most significant 
reason is due to the inefficacy of the audit committees in selecting the external auditors. 
The authors blamed the regulatory frameworks in Asia that failed to ensure that the 
external auditors are motivated to be independent and credible in monitoring the 
corporation. A myriad of corporate malfeasance cases also showed that boards sought to 
shift the burden of auditing and supervision of the corporate accounts to the appointed 
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auditors. Auditors are mostly blamed by the board for their refusal to issue an audited 
report in time. Looking at the duties of an auditor, it is clear that they will only be able 
to form their opinion on the affairs of a corporation if there is adequate documents and 
sufficient information as provided by the corporation. Such inordinate delay in 
submission of audited financial statements to the authority may be partly caused by 
missing documents, insufficient data and figures, inappropriate accounting principles, 
detection of fraudulent records or reluctance of auditors to tailor the report based on the 
whims and fancies of the board. 
 
In the Malaysian High Court case of Teoh Peng Phe v. Wan & Co. [2001]31, Kang 
Hwee Gee J recognised that auditor is the watchdog of the company by quoting the 
statement of Walter Woon, the author of Company Law, 2nd Edn: “If he smells a rat, he 
must bark.” The Teoh Peng Phe case is topical as it addresses the relationship between 
an external auditor and the corporation as the watchdog in relation to the affairs of the 
corporation. However, most auditors, in practice, do not really act as the watchdogs of 
the corporation they are engaged with. It is an anomaly to say that external auditors 
would oversee the affairs of the corporation since they are only obliged to express their 
opinion on whether the financial accounts of the corporation reflect a fair and true view 
of the state of affairs of the corporation. Obviously, they are not involved in the day-to-
day operation and activities of the corporation. Most often than not, their opinions 
pertaining to the financial accounts of a corporation are heavily formed based on the 
documents, receipts, invoices, vouchers and other accounting records presented to them 
by the audit committee or the board. As a result, it is very difficult to ascertain the 
accuracy of the figures and statements as well as the authenticity of the documents 
provided for examination. To make matter worse, external auditors often chose not to 
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disclose any information related to any inconsistency in the financial statements in order 
to maintain the business relationships with the corporation.  
 
Pertaining to the audit process, the audit committee is expected to be accountable to the 
corporation, in particular minority shareholders, for ensuring that their financial 
interests are protected. Even though the external auditors are considered as outsiders to 
the corporation, they are equally required by law to exercise their utmost 
professionalism in carrying out duties of auditing. It follows that there are several 
governance best practices that may improve the audit process in a corporation: 
 
a) The audit committee and the external auditors should always wear the coloured 
sceptical glasses in inspecting the underlying financial information of a 
corporation.  
 
i. Ho (2003) was of the view that an auditor must be sceptical while 
examining the records and transactions shown by the management but 
they are not expected to look into the genuineness of those transactions. 
This view is not really acceptable in the modern world when fictitious 
sales and inflated figures are the order of the day. The external auditors 
should not merely discharge their duties by stating in their reports that 
the financial statement presents a “true and fair view” of the 
corporation’s financial status. Rather, they should actively perform 
verification on the accuracy and authenticity of those transactions or 
financial information given by the management. This can be done with 
the similar culture of scepticism in the audit committee. Such 
questioning mindset should not be seen as a challenge to the authority 
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and entrustment of the management. It should be perceived as an 
injection of professionalism objectivity in the audit process without 
causing unfriendly environment.  
 
ii. In essence, scepticism touches on the verification of information via 
forceful question, independent examination of the sources and focused 
attention to discrepancies. Hence, the practice of scepticism may enhance 
the integrity of the management and board ethics in the audit process.  
 
b) It is of utmost importance that the audit committee should preserve their 
integrity as an independent watchdog over the affairs of the corporation.  
 
i. With regard to the independence of the audit committee, Felo, 
Krishnamurthy and Solieri (2003) commented on Enron case where they 
were six experts in its audit committee – an accounting emeritus 
professor, an accounting professional and two top executives of other 
firms. However, it is interesting to note that the Enron’s audit committee 
failed to detect the accounting abnormalities of the corporation since 
they had obviously relied on the authenticity of financial data provided 
by the management.  
 
ii. In Sheahan v. Verco (2001)32, the Australian Supreme Court ruled that 
“directors cannot be required to make their own further investigations or 
to ‘audit’ the accounts provided, unless they have particular 
responsibilities or expertise, and they can only be required to seek more 
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information if the company’s accounts, together with any other 
information from the company’s executives, put them on enquiry”. The 
audit committee should regularly seek financial information from the 
management or the board rather than doing so at the end of the financial 
year.  
 
c) The board should review the composition of the audit committee in order to 
determine its qualification and independence. It should be ensured that the audit 
committee members are qualified in terms of knowledge, experience and 
expertise in effectively carrying out their duties. Financial literary test may be 
performed upon the audit committee so that they are aware of the financial and 
accounting issues concerning the business of the corporation. If they are not 
found to be lack of competency, the audit committee should be mandated to 
attend more training and education programs to enhance their financial literacy. 
As for purpose of independence, the board may also engage the service of 
independent advisor in restructuring the composition of the audit committee to 
include more independent members such as the independent auditors, financial 
consultants and the legal experts. 
 
d) Non-executive directors should also actively advise the audit committee in their 
capacity as a director who owes a fiduciary duty to the corporation. Since they 
are not involved in the daily management of the corporation, they are in a better 
position to exercise their independent judgment. Adillah, Zulkarnain and 
Shamsher (2006) noted that “the non-executive directors in the office of the 
audit committee perform an advisory function to the executive directors and are 
expected to exercise the standard of care and skill of the person in that position”.  
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Aiman (2009) argued that the non-executive directors breach their duty of care if 
they fail to obtain information pertaining to the financial status and activity of 
the corporation. She was of the view that it is not the duty of the auditors to 
warrant that all the financial statements provided is accurate since it is the duty 
of directors to prepare the statements correctly. Hence, it is strongly proposed 
that the audit committee in a corporation should be composed of the non-
executive directors and independent directors. 
 
e) There shall be change of cultural tone at the top. The New York’s Blue Ribbon 
Committee report (1999) recommended that the “performance of audit 
committees must be founded in the practices and attitudes of the entire board of 
directors”. The board should send the clear message across the whole 
corporation that fraudulent audit practices are strictly prohibited and those who 
have committed the same will be reported to the relevant authority for further 
criminal actions. The board should also set a good example of integrity, 
independence, ethics and scepticism.  
 
f) The board should help to nurture communication between the audit committee, 
management, internal auditors and external auditors beyond the scheduled 
meetings. Such close collaboration would ensure that the monitoring 
mechanisms are effectively implemented. Chtourou, Bedard and Courteau 
(2001) opined that for the sake of independence and competence, the audit 
committee should be active in holding meetings with the management and 
board. A direct reporting mechanism should be created so that those who 
involve in the audit process may communicate with each other without any 
barrier or bureaucratic issues. 
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g) The audit committee should have an effective oversight of the internal auditing 
process. The internal audit function is essential to the execution of the 
committee’s governance best practices. An internal audit charter may be 
designed to pledge the loyalty of the internal auditors towards the corporation 
that they serve. Their values are certainly different from that of the external 
auditors who are not the integral of the corporation. Hence, the internal auditors 
shall demonstrate the same integrity of independence and professionalism in 
their audit approach and reporting duties. 
 
In this regard, it will be important to step up measures on internal control within a 
corporation as part of good corporate governance best practices to protect minority 
shareholders. Having stronger presence and voice, the institutional investors should also 
play their eminent role as part of the shareholder activism. It is important that 
“institutional investors should implement greater internal controls to monitor their 
corporate governance programs, redirecting the resources expended on activism to their 
highest valued use” (Romano, 2000). The Illustration 5.8 below succinctly sums up the 
foregoing discussion on the best practices of internal control in a given governance 
system of a corporation. 
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Illustration 5.8: Best practices of internal control 
 
5.12 Lifting the Corporate Veil to a New Level of Accountability – 
Redefining Separate Legal Personality  
 
A corporation may have a comprehensive internal control system, full board disclosure 
and transparency as well as increased shareholders’ rights and powers based on the 
discussion above. However, the fact remains that directors and managers come and go. 
It is shareholders and other stakeholders who will end up with huge losses and debts if a 
corporation is not well-managed due to corruption and corporate malpractices. Even if a 
corporation may have an excellent business model or bright investment prospect, there 
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is still no guarantee that the corporation will be safe from any malpractice on the part of 
the board and management. Notwithstanding that a corporation may have an effective 
implementation of the corporate governance best practices amongst the board and the 
management, it still requires a highly responsible team of board and management to 
create long-term value for its shareholders. As such, the focus on corporate governance 
should be on “finding the optimal level of liability to be imposed on company directors 
and officers” (Harris, 2008). Nonetheless, it is a mind-bogging game to find the optimal 
level of liability to be imposed on directors and officers of a corporation since there is 
no single standard of fiduciary duties which is often subjected to the court’s 
interpretation. To make matter worse, the notion of “separate legal personality” seems 
to provide a broad shield for directors to evade from their responsibilities. Therefore, it 
is significant to ascertain the objective and purpose of “separate legal personality” 
before delving into corporate governance best practices of lifting corporate veil for 
enhanced board accountability. It is noted that the notion of “separate legal personality” 
is used in the entire context of discussion here as it may be used interchangeably with 
the words “separate legal entity” elsewhere. 
 
In relation to the “separate legal personality”, Hofmann (2005) elaborated that the board 
is conferred with excessive powers and control as a corporation cannot act without the 
executives or directors once it came into existence. Blair and Stout (2006) added that a 
corporation may legally own the assets acquired through the capital and borrowings of 
the investors and creditors for the purpose of business expediency. Such legal 
ownership of assets unknowingly creates a situation where the assets of a corporation 
may be abused by directors or management via siphoning out of money or transfer of 
assets to themselves. As a result, shareholders often find that the corporation they 
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invested in turns out to be a mere empty shell loaded with enormous debts and liabilities 
when they decided to exit from the corporation.  
 
Most often than not, the general court approach in Malaysia has inclined towards 
casting aside the “separate legal personality” rule and lifting the corporate veil in order 
to “have a crack at it to do justice” - Yap Sing Hock & Anor. v. Public Prosecutor 
[1993]33 and Law Kam Loy & Anor v. Boltex Sdn Bhd & Ors. [2005]34. Courts had also 
pierced through the corporate veil in cases where the notion of “separate legal 
personalities” was used to evade contractual obligations by using a corporation as a 
“mere cloak or sham” - Sunrise Sdn. Bhd. v. First Profile (M) Sdn. Bhd. & Anor. 
[1997]35. However, it is noted that court will only do so in exceptional cases as stated in 
the case of Ong Thean Chye & Ors v. Tiew Choy Chai & Anor [2011]36 where “the 
courts will respect the company’s integrity and will decline to lift the veil of 
incorporation”. In terms of corporate governance best practices, the notion of “separate 
legal personality” is still considerably useful for directors to evade responsibilities as 
the court only looked at the corporate structure, true ownership and control, exceptional 
fraudulent cases and other purposes of justice. Often, courts overlooked the facts that 
directors failed to exercise their business judgment in the best interest of the corporation 
as well as breached their fiduciary duties by cloaking under the notion of “separate legal 
personality”. 
 
All in all, it can be deduced from the foregoing arguments and cases that the notion of 
the “separate legal personality” has gradually evolved into a tool which provides 
directors and management the opportunity to exploit a corporation for their own 
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benefits. The unscrupulous board may also use a corporation to shield them from any 
arising liability from their misbehaviour or misconducts. In the United State Court of 
Appeal case of Grayan Ltd [1995]37, Henry L.J. ruled that “the concept of limited 
liability and the sophistication of our corporate law offer great privileges and great 
opportunities for those who wish to trade under that regime”. As such, it is highly 
unlikely that any losses suffered in the event of corporate failure will be borne by 
directors and management unless the malpractice falls under the exception to the 
“separate legal personality” where clear intentional fraud or blatant disregard of 
statutory duties can be proven. 
 
As a result, it can be said that the Solomon principles on “separate legal personality” do 
not favour the application of corporate governance best practices. Speaking of this, 
directors will not be held liable for any losses or liabilities incurred onto a corporation 
unless there is any intention to defraud the corporation. Directors seek to hide behind 
the corporate veil of Solomon principle to escape from such liabilities or breach of 
business judgment rule. As such, board accountability is largely restricted to the 
principles laid down in the Solomon case. In this regard, it is imperative that sound 
corporate governance practices should be implemented to take a corporation to a new 
level of board accountability. The remainder of this section will discuss on the 
appropriate application of the principles of “business judgment rule” and “fiduciary 
duties” in lifting the corporate veil casted by the “separate legal personality” notion. 
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5.12.1 Refining the Business Judgment Rule 
 
This section seeks to redefine the statutory business judgment rule and to translate its 
proper application into the corporate governance best practices. The nexus between the 
statutory rule and governance best practices will be thoroughly considered for the 
purpose of determining a new level of board accountability to the corporation. Hence, it 
is necessary to first decipher the statutory business judgment rule as enshrined in the 
Malaysian company law in order to further scrutinise the application of this rule under 
the Corprimacy norm. 
 
Since the inception of the business judgment rule in Malaysia, it has always been 
perceived by the corporate world as a safe haven that protects directors from being held 
accountable for their business judgments as long as it is made with honest and 
reasonable belief that the it is in the best interest of the company and for a proper 
purpose. In essence, the business judgment rule is “a presumption that in making a 
business decision, directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis in good faith 
and in the honest belief that the action was taken in the best interests of the company” 
(Aronson v. Lewis, 1984). In other words, the board of directors’ decisions would be 
effectively safeguarded from liability for any breach of their duty of care so long as 
there is proper basis that supports the decision whereby all material information readily 
available to the knowledge of the board has been taken into account in the decision 
making process. As such, it seems that the rule has unknowingly provided an alternate 
back door for directors to hide their evil actions behind the corporate veil and to pursue 
their personal interest underneath the boardroom carpet. 
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Nonetheless, the American Law Institute's Principles of Corporate Governance (1992) 
observed that the main basis to support the existence of the business judgment rule is 
due to the need “to protect honest directors and officers from the risks inherent in 
hindsight reviews of their unsuccessful decisions, and to avoid the risk of stifling 
innovation and venturesome business activity.” Hansen (1993) explained that the core 
principle of the business judgment rule is deference to directors' decision-making based 
on judicial reluctance to review a business decision and to avoid directors from being 
risk averse in their decisions or actions. In Alaska Plastics, Inc. v. Coppock (1980)38, it 
was expressed in such a way that business judgment rule represents the fact that “judges 
are not business experts”. This is the reason why judges are reluctant to override the 
board’s judgment provided that the board decision is reasonable. In this regard, the 
reference to the term “judges are not business experts” in that case would mean that the 
court will abstain itself from second guessing the directors’ business decisions as the 
court also recognises “judicial restraint and abstention” (Bainbridge, 2004) for there is a 
need to shield directors from liability for the risky ventures necessary for corporate 
survivorship.  
 
Although the need for the business judgment rule is not disputed here, the general 
perception of “safe haven” would be altered accordingly if the rule is revisited in the 
context of Corprimacy. In the true legal sense, this “safe haven” does not simply mean 
that the directors’ duties are relaxed to the extent that directors may make decisions or 
take corporate actions according to their own whims and fancies. Instead of being 
considered as a “safe haven”, the rule shall be interpreted as to provide the court a 
yardstick to examine a director’s business judgment in order to determine whether a 
director has satisfactorily discharged his duties with the requisite level of skill, care and 
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diligence. Moreover, there is no concrete evidence to show that corporate performance 
would deteriorate if directors are not protected from being personally liable for 
erroneous business judgment. By way of analogy, high standard of duty of care in other 
fields of practice does not seem to deter qualified professionals like lawyers and doctors 
from making wise judgments so long they are made based on the relevant professional 
skills, knowledge and ethics. Such duty of care and skill is codified as the fiduciary 
duties in the company law. 
 
To satisfy the requirement of statutory fiduciary duties, Section 132(1B) of the 
Companies Act 1965 succinctly spells out the need to exercise the business judgment 
rule in accordance to the principles of good faith for a proper purpose, the duty to avoid 
material personal interest in the subject matter of the business judgment as well as the 
reasonable belief that the business judgment is an informed judgment and in the best 
interest of the corporation. From the perusal of this provision, it can be seen that the 
significance of the term ‘business judgment’ cannot easily be ignored in determining 
whether the director has breached his duty of reasonable care, skill and diligence. The 
subject matter of a business judgment is essential to the existence of the business 
judgment rule. This is because the business judgment rule would not be applicable if the 
director does not make a business judgment in practice. Moreover, the requirement of 
‘business judgment’ is clearly embedded in all four essential elements that constitute the 
fulfilment of the duty as stipulated under 132(1B) of the Companies Act 1965. In this 
context, the term “business judgment” is broadly defined under Section 132(6) of the 
Companies Act 1965 to mean “any decision on whether or not to take action in respect 
of a matter relevant to the business of the company”. Directors must have exercised his 
judgment in relation to the business affairs of a corporation only in order to invoke the 
use of the business judgment rule as a protection from breach of director’s duties. In 
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other words, the rational exercise of judgment by the director concerning the business of 
a corporation is an important condition precedent of the rule. This is the first step in 
determining whether the director has made the business judgment in the best interest of 
the corporation.  
 
Secondly, Section 132(1B)(a) states to the effect that if a director has made the business 
judgment in good faith for a proper purpose, he will be shielded from liability for 
breach of his duty even if these judgments turned out badly. With regard to the 
principles of good faith and proper purpose, Section 132(1) of the Companies Act 1965 
provides that “a director of a company shall at all times exercise his powers for a proper 
purpose and in good faith in the best interest of the company”. Prior to the amendment 
of Companies Act 1965 in 2007, the original provision read as “A director shall at all 
times act honestly and use reasonable diligence in the discharge of the duties of his 
office”. The scope of the duties and liabilities of a director has since be widened and 
clarified in a more business sense. 
 
As embedded in Section 132(1) of the Companies Act 1965, both the principles of good 
faith and proper purpose are considerably crucial in determining whether directors had 
really acted in the best interest of the corporation. This is because the two principles 
form part and parcel of the provision as it uses “and” for them to be read conjunctively. 
In the United Kingdom’s case of Howard Smith Ltd v Ampol Petroleum Ltd [1974]39, 
the directors were held liable for breach of duties as the transaction has been motivated 
by some improper purpose regardless of the fact that they had acted in the best interest 
of the corporation. In that case, the directors had exercised their powers to allocate 
shares to another corporation which had made an offer to bid in a takeover transaction. 
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It was alleged by the directors that the said allotment was intended to raise capital for 
the corporation. However, it was proven otherwise that the directors had allotted the 
shares with the intention to yield powers over the entire corporation. As evident by the 
aforesaid case, a director will still be liable under Section 132(1) of the Companies Act 
1965 if the transaction was intended for other collateral purpose which was improper 
with regard to its purpose even though it may be done in good faith in the best interest 
of the corporation. Hence, the directors may exercise their powers for purposes other 
than those related to the transaction as long as the purposes were intended to benefit the 
whole corporation. The test of “good faith” was also subsequently laid down by the 
House of Lords to mean the “bona fide exercise of the power in the interest of company” 
without any motivation of self-interest. Hence, the directors have the duty to avoid any 
conflict of interest in order to exercise their business judgment in good faith. 
 
Thirdly, corporate governance best practices tend to equate “business judgment rule” 
with good quality of decision-making process. To enhance the quality of decision 
making process, it is proposed here that the element of commercial sense should be 
injected into the “business judgment rule”. The Chairman of the Australian Securities 
and Investments Commission, Lucy (2006) addressed the commercial reality of the 
directors’ legal responsibilities that a director “should pursue the commercial objectives 
of the company to whom you are responsible in a manner consistent with meeting your 
legal obligations”. In Grimes v. Donald (1996)40 , the Delaware Court provided an 
example of how commercial reality shall be read into the business judgment – “a board 
which has decided to manufacture bricks has less freedom to decide to make bottles. In 
a world of scarcity, a decision to do one thing will commit a board to a certain course of 
action and make it costly and difficult (indeed, sometimes impossible) to change course 
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and do another”. In this regard, a board may not simply change their decision if it does 
not make commercial sense to do so. In other words, a board is required to make good 
business decisions that are not in contravention with the law. To be honest and fair, a 
director should not seek refuge behind the protection of the business judgment rule so 
long that the decision makes commercial sense.  
 
Similarly, the business judgment rule in Singapore is rather relaxed in the sense that the 
court would be reluctant to interfere with the decision of a director as it would not be 
flexible and commercial viable to do so. In ECRC Land Pte Ltd v. Wing On Ho 
Christopher [2004]41, the Singapore court viewed that “the court should not substitute 
its own decisions in place of those made by directors in the honest and reasonable belief 
that they were for the best interest of the company, even if those decisions turned out 
subsequently to be money-losing ones”. Based on strong policy considerations, it was 
also observed by VK Rajah JC in Vita Health Laboratories Pte Ltd and Others v. Pang 
Seng Meng [2004]42 that: 
 
It is the role of the marketplace and not the function of the court to punish and 
censure directors who have in good faith, made incorrect commercial decisions. 
Directors should not be coerced into exercising defensive commercial judgment, 
motivated largely by anxiety over legal accountability and consequences. Bona 
fide entrepreneurs and honest commercial men should not fear that business 
failure entails legal liability. A company provides a vehicle for limited liability 
and facilitates the assumption and distribution of commercial risk. Undue legal 
interference will dampen, if not stifle, the appetite for commercial risk and 
entrepreneurship. 
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As we can see, the judicial approach in Singapore has also underpinned the Corprimacy 
norm that this dissertation propounds to be the adopted in formulating a new model of 
corporate governance in Malaysia. Comparatively, the underlying principles of business 
judgment rule are that of “good faith” and “commercial probity”. Although directors are 
not supposed to be legally reprimanded to make correct commercial decision, they 
should adopt the best practice of making judgment that makes commercial sense and 
creates values for the corporation.  
 
Fourthly, should any conflict of interest arise, the director is obliged to act in the best 
interest of a corporation in a way that promotes the principles of Corprimacy. Blair and 
Stout (1999) argued that “the business judgment rule also requires directors to 
demonstrate that they honestly believed they were acting in the best interests of the 
company.” The business judgment rules would not be applicable in situation where a 
director does not make an informed and independent decision based on what he 
considers in good faith to be best interest of the corporation. Hence, it is necessary that 
a director should prioritise the best interest of a corporation in exercising their business 
judgment. This best practice strikes in consonance with the Corprimacy notion that 
corporation should be managed for the interest of all shareholders and other 
stakeholders involved. In doing so, Blair (2003) observed that directors should consider 
the impact of their decision upon every stakeholder in terms of the overall goals of the 
corporation.  
 
Last but not least, a director can be held personally liable for failing to exercise his 
business judgment in good faith for the best interest of the corporation. In the United 
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States case of Joy v. North (1983)43, the court ruled that “the fact is that liability is 
rarely imposed upon corporate directors or officers simply for bad judgment and this 
reluctance to impose liability for unsuccessful business decisions has been doctrinally 
labelled the business judgment rule”. The court recognised that the business judgment 
rule has sheltered the directors or officers from liability for making bad judgment. On 
this note, Bainbridge (2003) reiterated that it is important to have a proper balance of 
accountability and authority in a governance system. He was of the view that 
accountability and discretionary authority are both interdependent of which the 
“directors cannot be held accountable without undermining their discretionary 
authority”. However, the issue of personal accountability is not about taking away the 
discretionary power of directors in deciding on a subject matter. Accountability speaks 
of the personal responsibility of a director in exercising his business judgment in a 
manner that is accountable to the corporation. It is intended to hold those responsible 
personally liable for the acts or purported acts of the corporation. A director should seek 
to strike a balance between his discretionary authority and his accountability to a 
corporation as both these elements should go in parallel with one another. The 
Illustration 5.9 below represents the necessary balancing act of a director in avoiding 
personal liability for his action or decision. 
 
                                                            
43
 (1983) 460 U.S. 1051. 
241 
 
 
Illustration 5.9: Balancing act between the discretionary authority and the board 
accountability 
 
Whilst the ‘business judgment rule’ was initially introduced in 2000 in Australia, 
Greenhow (1999) clearly elucidated the reason why the word ‘judgment’ is used instead 
of ‘decision’ as the latter only connotes majority decision made by the board whereas 
the word “judgment” represents judgment of the individual directors sitting in the board. 
To put it simply, directors rely on their personal business judgment to reach a particular 
finding which may or may not lead to the final board decision. Such individual business 
judgment is not binding upon the board as it remains the assessment of each director 
before voting for or against the majority decision. Hence, it is the personal exercise of 
judgment by a director that is in question when it comes to personal accountability. 
There is no reason why a director may not be held personally accountable for his breach 
of business judgment rule. In the Australian case of Clackwell v. Moray [1991]44, the 
Supreme Court was of the view that “the abandonment of any proper consideration of 
relevant facts, the admitted failure to exercise an independent discretion and the mere 
doing of what was thought that the majority shareholder wanted cannot in these 
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circumstances have amounted to the bona fide exercise of discretion required of a 
director”. In other words, directors should put on their thinking cap and critically 
examine the facts presented to them whilst exercising their discretion in good faith. 
They shall not merely rubber-stamp the majority board decision without first exercising 
their business judgment. In view of the new level of personal accountability, directors 
are no longer allowed to hide behind the business judgment rule. 
 
However, the court in the Singapore case of Planassurance PAC Formerly known as 
Patrick Lee PAC v Gaelic Inns Pte Ltd (2007) 45  held that the directors are not 
personally accountable for the “accuracy and integrity of all of a company's financial 
statements”. It is sad to note that the learned judge obviously failed to consider the 
significance of business judgment rule where the directors shall seek to make an 
informed judgment on the accuracy and authenticity of the financial records. As 
directors of the corporation, they may not allow the auditors or management to exercise 
the business judgment on their behalf. This is because they owe the fiduciary duties 
towards the corporation as a whole. This point has been reaffirmed in the case of Credit 
Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Communications Corp. (1991)46 in which the 
duties of director are reinstated as fiduciaries to the corporation and its stakeholders as a 
whole. It was stated that “the board had an obligation to the community of interest that 
sustained the corporation, to exercise judgment in an informed, good faith effort to 
maximize the corporation’s long-term wealth creating capacity”. This judgment rhymes 
in tandem with the notion of Corprimacy in which directors owe fiduciary duties to 
consider the best interest of a corporation including its stakeholders as a whole. Harping 
back on the rationale behind the business judgment rule, it is clear that its application is 
intended to strike a balance between corporation maximising shareholder wealth by 
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making innovative business decisions while creating a comprehensive model of 
governance and corporate management structures based on the gist of Corprimacy.  
 
In regard of the business judgment’s standard, the test remains an objective one and will 
differ following the size, structure and nature of the business of the particular 
corporation. For instance, the business judgment rule applies differently in these two 
most commonly found corporate structures in Malaysia, namely the public listed 
corporation and private corporations. This is due to the fact that the responsibilities the 
directors shoulder in both structures of such entities vary from one and another – on one 
hand, public listed corporations usually entail directors to assume the supervisory role 
whilst on the other hand, most of the private corporations require directors to perform 
both the managerial and governance functions. As such, this new level of accountability 
may assist the court in objectively determining whether directors have breach their 
statutory fiduciary duties and business judgment rule based on their compliance with the 
corporate governance best practices. The Illustration 5.10 below shows that the 
corporate governance best practices are formulated to facilitate directors in properly and 
responsibly discharging their statutory duties. 
 
244 
 
 
Illustration 5.10: Interrelation between the business judgment rule and the directors’ 
statutory duties 
 
In short, Corprimacy notion requires directors to be considered as one legal personality 
with a corporation in practice. As part of the governance best practices, corporate veil 
should be lifted when directors failed to exercise their business judgment in good faith 
for the best interest of the corporation. The Corprimacy approach towards the terms 
“best interest of the corporation” has been discussed at length in chapter 4 of this 
dissertation. Furthermore, they may also breach the business judgment rule if their 
judgment does not make commercial sense to a corporation. Such new level of 
accountability may protect minority shareholders from the business catastrophe created 
by those directors who breached the business judgment rule. It bypasses the exception 
to the Solomon principles where minority shareholders are vulnerably protected until 
the court ruled in favour of intentional fraud on the part of the directors. Further, it is 
important to tie this business judgment rule with the knot of enhancing the fiduciary 
duties for the purpose of higher board accountability. 
BUSINESS 
JUDGMENT RULE
DIRECTORS' 
STATUTORY 
DUTIES
Common law 
duties to act with
Reasonable care
Due diligence
Duty of loyalty 
and good faith
Duty to act in 
good faith and in 
the best interest of 
the company
Duty to use power 
for a proper 
purpose
Duty to avoid 
conflicts of 
interests See Illustration 5.1 above
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5.12.2 Enhancing the Fiduciary Duties 
 
To further lift the corporate veil, the notion of Corprimacy encourages the enhancement 
of directors’ fiduciary duties via the formulation of corporate governance best practices. 
The court will have to look at the governance best practices of a corporation to peep 
behind the veil of incorporation.  
 
Having superior power over shareholders, the board is statutorily bound to manage the 
corporations on behalf of shareholders based on the principle of separation of ownership 
and control. Given the power of decision-making, the board has wide discretion in 
directing and managing the affairs of the corporation. Bainbridge (2002) described this 
“statutory decision-making model” as “one in which the board acts and shareholders, at 
most, react”. Most often than not, corporate faces the verge of downfall when directors 
betrayed the duty of loyalty that is entrusted onto them by the corporation and its 
shareholders to manage and direct corporate affairs in the best interest of a corporation 
(Blair, 2002). Denis and McConnell (2003) commented that although the board is 
established to employ, dismiss, supervise and remunerate the management, board 
efficacy is hardly seen in practice. As such, it is vital to create an efficient board that 
strictly adheres to the corporate governance best practices as part of their fiduciary 
duties. 
 
In relation to the directors’ fiduciary duties, Arrow (1974) sought to advocate a new 
level of accountability corresponding with the relevant authority of an organ in the 
corporation. It was termed as “management by exception” where the management 
decisions are “reviewed only when performance is sufficiently degraded from 
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expectations”. To put it simply, the board will not manage a corporation by default but 
will only do so based on exceptional mismanagement. The board will not question the 
decision of the management unless there is some unexpected deterioration in the 
corporate performance. Such irregular board supervisory mechanism may not be the 
best practice in lifting the corporate veil in governance related matters. If a board senses 
any unsatisfactory corporate performance at any one point of time, it is their duty to 
identify the problem and sort it out with the management before everything is too late.  
 
Although this practice of “management by exception” may save the board ample time 
so that they may focus on other board policy issues, it is the board’s continuous duty to 
supervise the management and direct a corporation in the event of mismanagement. 
Manning (1984) stated that most board action “does not consist of taking affirmative 
action on individual matters; it is instead a continuing flow of supervisory process, 
punctuated only occasionally by a discrete transactional decision.” There shall not be 
any break in the supervisory chain of the board notwithstanding that the management is 
delegated with the authority to manage the corporation. The board should regularly 
monitor and correct any error in the management. In the United Kingdom’s case of Re 
Barings Plc (No 5)(2000)47, the Court of Appeal held that “the exercise of the power of 
delegation does not absolve a director from the duty to supervise the discharge of the 
delegated functions.” 
 
To facilitate the discharge of fiduciary duty by the directors, an officer of a corporation 
should also be trustworthy and honest in managing the corporation. They should not 
hide any information that may affect the decision-making process of the board. German 
(2009) opined that “because the corporation can only act through its board of directors, 
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officers owe a duty of complete candor to the board so that the board can make 
informed decisions in managing the business of the corporation”. As such, Corprimacy 
requires that the management owes a duty of candor to the corporation that they serve. 
 
At times, the management team will find ways to conceal facts and information from 
the boardroom. Such concealment may be driven by personal interest, fear of board 
despise, instruction of CEO and other factors. It is always too late when corporate 
performance drops drastically and act of malpractice starts to unfold in the corporation. 
In this context, it is apparent that the board owes a duty to oversee the information 
disclosed by the management as well as to closely watch over the conducts of the 
management. Directors will be considered to have breached this duty if they 
unreasonably relied on the information without making independent assessment and 
verification. Be that as it may, the board faces mounting challenges to examine the 
accuracy of any disclosed information due to the lack of independence from the CEO 
who also sits in the board as a director. In view of this, it will be even harder for the 
board to confront the management team on facts or information which is “swept under 
the office’s carpet”. Such hidden information is not easily available or accessible by the 
board who has duly delegated the authority of management to the officers of the 
corporation.  
 
Marshall and Beltrami (1990) argued that “the company's system of control is often 
dependent on the close involvement of the directors, who are better acquainted with the 
employees and officers. If there is fraud by an employee of the company, a director may 
be more likely to have his suspicions aroused than would his counterpart in a large, 
anonymous, public company.” Although it may be correct to say that the justification of 
directors’ reliance on the management is correlated with the size and structure of the 
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corporation involved, it should not be a valid reason for a director to rely unreasonably 
on the management in a public corporation. This is due to shareholders’ expectation that 
the board of directors will exercise their utmost function as a supervisory board. What 
more when it is a public-listed corporation, directors bear higher responsibilities and 
duties to ensure that the management is vigilantly monitored and constantly supervised. 
As huge shareholders’ interests are at stake, the level of accountability and transparency 
on the part of the board should increase accordingly.  
 
In the effort to avoid conflict of interest, it is proposed that directors should not abuse 
their knowledge and position in taking advantage of such conflict for their personal 
benefits. The duty to avoid conflict of interest was reaffirmed in a Malaysian High 
Court case of Pharmmalaysia Bhd v. Dinesh Kumar Jashbhai Nagjibha Patel & Ors 
[2004]48 where Abdul Malik Ishak J quoted the words of Charlesworth and Cain on 
Company Law (12th edn) at p. 371 that “the fiduciary duties of directors are to exercise 
their powers for the purposes for which they were conferred and bona fide for the 
benefit of the company as a whole and not to put themselves in a position in which their 
duties to the company and their personal interests may conflict”. However, such duty to 
avoid conflict of interest may be amplified via the governance best practices of 
refraining from using the director’s fiduciary position to reap benefit out of any conflict 
of interest. It can be seen in the Australian case of Hospital Products Ltd v. United 
States Surgical Corporation & Ors [1984]49 where the High Court illustrated that “a 
fiduciary is liable to account for a profit or benefit if it was obtained: (1) in 
circumstances where there was a conflict, or possible conflict of interest and duty; or (2) 
by reason of the fiduciary position or by reason of the fiduciary taking advantage of 
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opportunity or knowledge which he derived in consequence of his occupation of the 
fiduciary position”. 
 
Furthermore, a director is required to adopt the governance best practices of actively 
participating in a meeting in order to remain sceptical about the information provided by 
the management. Samsar (2007) commented on the foreign judicial view pertaining to 
the fiduciary duty of care that a director owes to the company. He explained that the test 
of objectivity has been applied in the Australian case of Daniels v Anderson (1995)50 
where the duty varies according to the size of the corporation and the experience of the 
directors. On the other hand, the English case of Re Cardiff Savings Bank [1892]51 (The 
Marquis of Bute's) held that the directors owe a higher duty to exercise their business 
judgment by making recommendations during board meetings than merely attending 
those meetings. It means that directors would breach their duties of care for not actively 
participate in the board meetings. 
 
Moreover, failure by a director to probe further into the affairs of a corporation whether 
by negligent or otherwise should be regarded as a breach of duty.  It is required that a 
director should have an “inquiring mind” in supervising corporate affairs (Vita Health 
Laboratories Pte Ltd v Pang Seng Meng, 2004) 52 . This is due to the reason that 
negligence or failure to act on the part of the director may show bad faith in making 
decisions. In Ryan v. Gifford (2007)53, the United States Delaware court ruled that bad 
faith of directors “may be shown where the fiduciary intentionally acts with a purpose 
other than that of advancing the best interests of the corporation, where the fiduciary 
acts with the intent to violate applicable positive law, or where the fiduciary 
                                                            
50
 (1995) 16 ACSR 607. 
51
 [1892] 2 Ch 100. 
52
 [2004] 4 SLR 162, at 171. 
53
 918 A.2d 341, 345 (Del. Ch. 2007). 
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intentionally fails to act in the face of a known duty to act, demonstrating a conscious 
disregard for his duties”. Although individual director may not be held liable for the 
decision or actions of the other directors, Victor (2001) opined that they should voice 
out their differing opinions pertaining to the decision of the other directors or take 
affirmative measures to prevent any such decision from materialising. 
 
In the event of financial difficulties, directors owe fiduciary duties to the creditors of the 
corporation. This should be similarly applicable to the management where the duty of 
enhancing shareholders value would shift towards preserving value for creditors when a 
corporation faces financial crisis (Apreda, 2002). In a Singaporean case, Tong Tien See 
Construction Pte Ltd (in liquidation) v Tong Tien See & Ors (2002) 3 SLR 76, the court 
recognised the duties of director to the creditors during financial instability of the 
corporation. It was said that “when a company is insolvent, the interests of its creditors 
become dominant factor in what constitutes the benefit of the company as a whole”. The 
aforesaid case speaks of the interest of creditors that should represent the benefit of a 
corporation as a whole when a corporation is insolvent. The rationale behind the 
judgment of the case is fairly understandable as directors may not simply dispose of the 
company assets. This is due to the reason that the creditors have the right over the assets 
of the corporation when it is at the stage of liquidation and winding-up.  
 
In conclusion, directors should be refrained from seeking refuge behind the notion of 
“separate legal personality” as well as the “business judgment rule” as they should bear 
higher level of accountability to the corporation and shareholders as a whole. However, 
some scholars viewed that the increase in board accountability is likely to have adverse 
effect that could shy away competent candidates from joining the board of a corporation 
due to fear of exorbitant liabilities on the brink of prestige and perquisites. Harner (2009) 
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argued that “this tension can lead to ‘carrot’ or ‘stick’ proposals to encourage good 
corporate governance”. One must understand that lifting the corporate veil to impose 
higher board accountability will not create a situation of ‘carrot’ or ‘stick’ proposals to 
promote good corporate governance. This is due to the simple reason that higher board 
accountability will necessitate higher commitment to the duties entrusted upon directors 
to oversee and direct the affairs of the corporation. Neither the failure of management to 
disclose any information nor the incompetence of management should be an excuse 
used by the board to escape from liability. If any director feels that they are not at par 
with the standard of governance best practices, they shall relinquish their directorship 
post or refuse to hold any such post. Good corporate governance practices shall not give 
way to the ease of board hiring at the expense of the best interest of the corporation. 
 
By looking at the governance best practices in the corporate charter, the court will not 
hesitate to find directors personally liable for their breach of business judgment rule and 
the fiduciary duties owed to the corporation at large. Recently, the Court of Appeal 
upheld the 6-month imprisonment upon the former directors of MEMS Technology 
Berhad who knowingly authorised the submission of misleading financial statements to 
the Bursa Malaysia which involved over RM30 million fictitious sales. In fact, one of 
the directors was also the substantial shareholders of the company. As we can see from 
this case, the general court approach of merely examining the corporate structure and 
control has gradually been directed towards the corporate governance best practices of a 
corporation. Such shift of approach is aimed to determine whether the majority 
shareholders who are also the directors on the board have duly exercised their business 
judgment to act or decide in good faith for the best interest of the corporation. It is 
necessary to protect minority shareholders who have no board representation at all. The 
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Illustration 5.11 below clearly addresses the lifting of corporate veil in board 
accountability.  
 
 
Illustration 5.11: Corporate veil in board accountability 
 
5.13 Conclusion 
 
Desirably, an optimal corporate governance structures should be designed to balance the 
rights of various stakeholders of a corporation without jeopardising the rights and 
interests of shareholders or compromising the creative thinking of directors in their 
decision making process. In a nutshell, the foregoing discussion has critically examined 
and spelled out a set of corporate governance best practices that promote such balanced 
decision-making process without compromising the board accountability and 
independence. Accordingly, this set of best practices is formulated in the concluding 
chapter 6 where its primary objective is to protect minority shareholders. All these best 
CORPORATION
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practices will eventually lead to higher transparency and board accountability as shown 
in Illustration 5.12 below. 
 
 
Illustration 5.12: Path to higher transparency and board accountability 
Enhanced 
fiduciary duties
Redefining 
business 
judgment rule
Lifitng of 
corproate veil
Higher 
Transparency 
and Board 
Accountability
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CHAPTER 6 
 
RESULT: 
FORMULATION OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE BEST PRACTICES 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The background to this study has been addressed in chapter 1 of this dissertation where 
literature review was carried out to identify the knowledge gap in the existing 
governance-related literatures of which the research question and objectives were 
established. Corporate governance principles and issues were also succinctly laid down 
in chapter 2. In this regard, the current development of Malaysian corporate governance 
framework was also examined in chapter 3 to highlight its defects in protecting minority 
shareholders. Following this, chapter 4 moved on to create the new paradigm of 
Corprimacy which has laid down the concept behind the formulation of corporate 
governance best practices in this dissertation. Such formulation of best practices was 
discussed at length in chapter 5 and thus, this chapter extracted the said best practices 
for the purpose of formulating a set of corporate governance best practices. 
 
As can be seen from the case studies discussed in previous chapters, the lack of 
compliance with the corporate governance best practices has led to weak protection of 
minority shareholders. Hence, it is of utmost importance to formulate a set of corporate 
governance best practices that would act as the golden parachute for the successful 
landing of minority shareholders on corporate goldmine. The words “golden parachute” 
is used as part of the title of this dissertation in order to indicate the need for minority 
shareholders to equip themselves with the necessary tool before a corporation collapses. 
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If and when the corporate governance best practices set forth in this dissertation are 
effectively and properly implemented, these practices will be able to act as protective 
measures for minority shareholders.  
 
6.2 Formulation of Corporate Governance Best Practices 
 
With regard to the research question on what are the corporate governance best 
practices that could be implemented to protect minority shareholders, the study in this 
dissertation has led to the formulation of a set of corporate governance best practices 
consisting of 10 key areas of best practices that should be incorporated into the existing 
Malaysian corporate governance framework. Such research question is in line with the 
research objectives of this dissertation which have also been achieved in terms of 
formulating corporate governance best practices for the protection of minority 
shareholders.  
 
As outlined in Illustration 1.1 in chapter 1, there are 7 essential elements that constitute 
the pillars of corporate governance best practices. Bearing in mind these pillars, the 
remainder of this chapter spelled out the formulated set of corporate governance best 
practices based on the main thesis of this dissertation – the protection of minority 
shareholders based on the discussions and analysis made in this dissertation. 
 
6.2.1 Avoiding conflict of interests 
 
This study brings to light that avoiding conflict of interests is one of the essential 
elements of interaction under the pillar of best practices. Recognising the potential 
conflicts of interests between the board and minority shareholders within a corporation, 
256 
 
this dissertation proposes 4 best practices that a director should adhere to in managing 
the conflicts of interests: 
1. The board should enhance the disclosure requirement for related-party 
transactions via the extended disclosure of any person who is known to a 
particular director. The director should disclose any person that he knows 
of in a transaction for the best interest of the corporation. This includes 
friends or their family members that a director is associated with. It will 
then be left to the board to decide whether the disclosed interest would 
adversely affect the best interest of the corporation as a whole. Currently, 
Section 131 of Companies Act 1965 merely requires the disclosure of 
persons connected (as defined in Section 122A) to the interested 
directors in a related-party transaction. 
 
2. The board should implement a sound response system that could actually 
enable directors to quickly identify and resolve any conflict of interests 
within a corporation. Directors should first understand the types and 
natures of the conflicting interests faced by the corporation so that the 
best interest of the corporation is upheld. The directors must be able to 
identify the potential conflict of interest with their current core business 
activity as a result of any contradictory commercial interest. 
 
3. A Chairman, who is also the director of the corporation, should abstain 
from chairing all board and management meetings in connection with 
any related-party transactions. 
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4. The board should seek the opinions, advices or valuation from an 
external independent party or professionals regarding all transactions 
affecting the interest of shareholders, especially minority shareholders. 
In all decision-making process relating to the interest of minority 
shareholders or related-party transaction, a board should be inculcated 
with the highest possible business ethics and sound corporate culture for 
strict self-discipline and constant board regulation since they are 
accountable to the corporation as a whole under the concept of 
Corprimacy. 
 
6.2.2 Enhanced board disclosures and transparency 
 
This study also finds that enhanced board disclosure and transparency are considered as 
one of the key rudiments of disclosure and transparency under the pillar of best 
practices. In this regard, this dissertation highlights 4 best practices that would provide 
minority shareholders with the opportunity to savour their investments as well as 
sufficient notice to act rationally and swiftly in the event of any imminent corporate 
scandal:  
1. The board should disclose to the Bursa and the public pertaining to the 
various factors that they have considered in justifying that a particular 
transaction is in the best interests of a corporation by going beyond mere 
statement of “best interest of the corporation and its shareholders”. 
 
2. A director is obliged to disclose any interest or connection that he may 
have or know of in a particular transaction including any third party 
interest directly or indirectly related to him that may be at variance with 
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the interest of the corporate entity as a result of the transaction. It should 
be extended and not limited to only related-party transaction and 
interested matters. 
 
3. The board should disclose all the information relating to the background 
and identity of the actual beneficial owners of the shares held by their 
nominees. 
 
4. The board should implement enhanced disclosure best practices which 
are beyond the mandatory disclosure requirement set under the Bursa’s 
Listing Requirements. 
  
6.2.3 Increased integrity of independent directors 
 
This study also observes that board disclosure and transparency could be enhanced with 
the increased integrity of independent directors as it represents the element of board of 
directors and committees under the pillar of best practices. This dissertation 
recommends 8 best practices that uphold the integrity of an independent director: 
1. An independent director shall possess the necessary skill, knowledge and 
experience to independently assess the board decision based on the 
intrinsic value of the subject matter discussed in board meeting. They 
shall be able to stand on their own feet whilst making individual decision. 
 
2. The independent directors shall uphold their integrity by using their 
knowledge and experience to detect any irregularity in the board decision 
or action. 
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3. An independent director shall have the minimum qualification or 
working experience on business administration or financial matters or at 
least possess some basic knowledge on the business activity of the 
corporation that they are hired. 
 
4. The board shall regularly conduct assessment test upon the independent 
directors to determine whether they are still capable of exercising 
independent mind whilst making decision within the board. If they are 
not able to be truly independent, the board should consider replacing 
them with new independent directors. 
 
5. The independent directors shall constantly acquire more relevant 
information regarding the business activities and financial affairs of a 
corporation even if they are merely independent non-executive directors 
of the corporation. 
 
6. An independent director should not accept whatever information fed by 
the board or management during meetings. But they should carefully 
sieve through the information and critically scrutinise them in the 
presence of the board. 
 
7. The independent directors should adhere to the statutory business 
judgment rule whilst deciding in the best interest of the corporation. 
They should introduce elements of objectivity and impartiality into the 
board decisions due to their independent stand. 
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8. The Chairman of a corporation should be an independent director in 
order to ensure that independence starts at the helm. 
  
6.2.4 Modernising board independence from the management 
 
This study also reveals that modernised board independence constitutes the element of 
monitoring under the pillar of best practices. This dissertation suggests 6 best practices 
that promote modernised board independence: 
1. The board shall be independent from the influence and control of the 
management apart from self-independence within the board. 
 
2. The board shall have an inquiring mindset whilst relying on the 
information given by the management. The board shall actively query 
such information in order to form their own independent and informed 
judgment. 
 
3. The Chairman could be the one who sets the right tone and precedent in 
the board since they often have the final say to reject or accept the 
proposal by the management. 
 
4. The board should seek to avoid the situation of CEO duality where the 
CEO is also the managing director or the Chairman and director of the 
corporation. In other words, the board should ensure that the roles of the 
chairman and CEO are not assumed by the same person in the 
corporation. 
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5. The CEO shall not act as the chairman during board meetings in order to 
warrant that the board could be totally independent from the influence of 
the management. 
 
6. The board shall maintain a healthy professional working relationship 
with the management team in a corporation as they should not get too 
personally attached with the CEO or other top executives. Such 
professional relationship will ensure that the board is able to challenge 
the actions of the management whilst exercising their monitoring 
function over the affairs of the corporation.  
  
6.2.5 Active Board Involvement in Strategic Planning and other 
Management related matters 
  
This study also discovers that active board involvement in strategic planning and other 
management related matters forms the element of monitoring under the pillar of best 
practices. This dissertation advocated 4 best practices that encourage such active board 
involvement: 
1. Directors should actively participate in the process of charting the course 
for corporate planning and strategies, rather than merely rubber-stamping 
the proposed corporate plans submitted by the management. 
 
2. Directors shall endeavour their best to obtain as much information as 
possible from the management or other sources on a regular basis. The 
board should understand that having the best corporate strategies does 
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not necessarily lead to the implementation of best practices. It is the 
quality of the information that the board acquires that would lead to the 
formation of corporate strategies which are in the best interest of the 
corporation. 
 
3. The board shall not unreasonably rely on the information given by the 
management in the course of charting the strategic planning and policies 
for the corporation. 
 
4. The board should form a collaborative working relationship with the 
CEO in term of strategy setting and policy formulation. This does not 
mean that the CEO should take over the board’s role of formulating 
strategies and policies. It is rather a win-win situation of beneficial 
partnership in managing and directing the corporation. 
  
6.2.6 Corporate Cultural Reform and Board Ethics 
 
This study also propounds that corporate cultural reform and board ethics reflect the 
elements of business practices and ethics under the pillar of best practices. This 
dissertation advances 11 best practices that stimulate such cultural and ethical reform: 
1. The board shall undertake to set the tone from the top to bottom via the 
formulation of a set of board ethics and governance standard within the 
corporation.  
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2. The board shall gradually depart from the corporate cultural norms of 
complying with the majority rather than voicing out one’s constructive 
dissent and views. 
 
3. The Chairman shall encourage the board to generate more contentious 
arguments during board discussions or meetings. 
 
4. Dissenting views of directors shall be recorded in the board minute and 
the rejection of the views by the board shall be reasonably explained 
thereafter. This is to create a constructive board discussion on one hand 
and to prompt more directors to have their own views rather than 
sticking to a pack of “yes” directors. At the end of the day, proactive 
debate amongst directors is the intended objective. 
 
5. The Chairman shall play the vital role of building up his very own 
confidence and reputation amongst the board in order to gain respect and 
trust from his fellow directors. He shall be able to point out the 
wrongdoings or other acts of non-compliance with the corporation’s 
governance best practices which are committed by any director. 
 
6. The Chairman shall act fearlessly in convening an inquiry team to 
independently pursue investigation on any suspected corporate 
malpractices or complaints received from within or outside of the 
corporation.  
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7. The board may invite representatives amongst the employees or staffs in 
a corporation to channel their concerns and opinions pertaining to a 
particular board action or decision. To do this, the board must convince 
the employees that they may confide in them pertaining to any matters 
that would affect the best interest of the corporation.  
 
8. The board shall set the tone from top in enforcing substance over form 
when it comes to implementing the best practices of corporate 
governance. This would inadvertently create a commendable culture in 
which the employees may trust the board to exercise their supervisory 
authority in the best interest of the corporation. 
 
9. The board should portray good leadership and ethics to the entire 
corporation in order to improve board efficacy in upholding good 
business ethics. 
 
10. The board shall form a group of independent representatives from the 
employees that acts as an intelligence-gathering team for the corporation 
in order to stimulate whistle-blowing and good corporate culture. The 
team may also provide routine feedback gathered from the employees 
directly to the board on the improvement to the governance system 
within the corporation. 
 
11. The board should draft their Article of Association based on the 
Corprimacy notion that the best interest of a corporation is the pivotal 
consideration. It should include a set of corporate governance best 
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practices that bind the relationships amongst the members of the 
corporation.  
  
6.2.7 Shareholders’ Rights and Powers 
  
This study also contemplates that shareholders’ rights and powers articulate two 
elements of monitoring and interaction under the pillar of best practices. This 
dissertation puts forward 4 best practices that attest to shareholders’ rights and powers: 
1. The board should move away from the “comply or explain” principle in 
implementing corporate governance best practices. The board would 
have to explain and convince shareholders that it is in the best interest of 
the corporation not to comply with certain best practices. 
 
2. The board shall devise a set of corporate governance best practices which 
suits the corporation and disclose their full compliance with the best 
practices in the annual report.  
 
3. The board should also explain to shareholders on the actions taken to 
implement the best practices and the reasons for any non-compliance 
with the best practices. It is recommended that such governance best 
practices shall form part and parcel of the corporation’s Article of 
Association. 
 
4. The board should allow shareholders to have more say in corporate 
strategic decisions and corporate governance related matters. Shareholder 
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representatives may be invited by the board to attend board meetings on 
the corporate strategies and governance related matters. 
 
5. Prior to any AGM, shareholders should be given the opportunity to 
submit to the corporation their proposals on various corporate 
governance issues so that such issues can be discussed during the AGM. 
 
6. Directors should ensure that the investor relations are regularly discussed 
amongst the board, management and shareholder representatives in order 
to enhance shareholder communication. 
 
7. The board shall maintain regular engagement with shareholders apart 
from the general meetings in order to provide timely information 
pertaining to the affairs and activities of the corporation. The board may 
also obtain constructive feedback or response from shareholders on 
relevant issues affecting the corporation. 
 
8. Board engagement with shareholders may also be enhanced via the 
adoption of technology, namely teleconferencing, video conferencing, 
emails and other electronic communication. 
 
9. The Chairman shall briefly educate shareholders of their rights to 
participate, vote and challenge the board during the general meetings. 
 
10. The board shall seek to create a transparent nomination process that 
accommodates the voices of shareholders. Although the board is in a 
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better position to understand the need of a corporation, there shall be a 
good mix of directors consisting of industry experts, financial and 
business professionals as well as selected representatives from amongst 
shareholders, in particular minority shareholders. 
 
11. The board shall encourage shareholders to actively participate in the 
board nomination process by creating a proxy access rule for 
shareholders to nominate their choice of directors in the corporation. 
Such proxy access rule may be implemented via the establishment of 
procedures for the inclusion of shareholders’ director nominations in the 
corporation’s agenda. 
 
12. The board shall implement a proxy disclosure best practice which allows 
a corporation to reason out why each director is nominated based on their 
qualification and background. 
 
13. The board shall consult with shareholders with regard to the selection of 
candidates for directorships by the nomination committee before the 
whole voting process takes place. The mechanism for such consultation 
may be established according to the procedures explained in sub-chapter 
5.9.2 of this dissertation. 
 
14. The Nominating Committee shall consist mostly of independent directors 
and shareholder representative. 
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15. The board shall ensure that shareholders are provided with the avenue to 
vote on the corporation’s agendas via a proper electronic mechanism or 
other convenient channel in the event that they are not able to attend the 
general meeting. 
  
6.2.8 Executive remuneration policy 
 
This study also demonstrates that executive remuneration policy proves to be the 
element of board of directors and committees under the pillar of best practices. This 
dissertation enunciates 8 best practices that ensure a transparent and reasonable 
executive remuneration policy: 
1. The remuneration committee should spell out the executive 
compensation policies and packages in details in the annual report. 
 
2. The board should devise some models of executive compensation based 
on reasonable quantitative and qualitative criterions that benefit a 
corporation in the long run. 
 
3. The board should implement the policies on “say on pay” where 
shareholders are given the right to vote on the remuneration policy and 
package of a corporation. Such vote to amend the policy may be binding 
or advisory in nature depending on the needs of the corporation. 
 
4. The board should adopt the share retention policy where the rewards of 
stock options are given in parts to the executives over a span of few 
years. 
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5. The board should not subdue to the management pressure on the 
remuneration policy of the executives. 
 
6. Board remuneration policy should be structured to compensate and 
reward directors based on long-term commitment approach. 
 
7. The board should exercise their business judgment to decide on the 
executive remuneration packages based on the best interest of the 
corporation. 
 
8. The Remuneration Committee shall consist of all independent non-
executive directors and shareholder representatives. 
 
6.2.9 Internal control 
 
This study also postulates that there are 3 crucial sub-areas under the main umbrella of 
internal control which constitute the element of risk performance and management 
under the pillar of best practices. They are as follows:  
  
6.2.9.1 Integration of Risk intelligence governance 
 
This dissertation pointed out 20 best practices that create an integration of risk 
intelligence governance:  
1. The board should define the scope and level of different existing and 
potential risks posed to a corporation. 
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2. The board should set a strong tone at the top for independence, 
professionalism and ethical culture as an example to the auditors and the 
management in their efforts towards fraud prevention and reporting 
system. 
 
3. The board should craft a crisis management plan by taking into account 
of the risks the company faces whilst weighing their consequential 
effects upon a corporation in the short run and the long run. 
 
4. The board should evaluate the risk performance and risk governance 
structure between the board and the committees. 
 
5. The board should hold frequent meetings or robust dialogues with the 
responsible risk officers and committees to further comprehend the 
underlying risks in relation to the business activities and management of 
a corporation.  
 
6. The board should chart a plan for close collaboration and coordination 
amongst all the departments within a corporation via a risk intelligence 
sharing system. 
 
7. The board should designate the risk management committee as the 
central control of risk intelligence and management. 
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8. The board should educate the officers and staffs in a corporation. All 
employees should be trained to understand the risks exposure and how to 
cope with such risks as well as what amounts to fraud and how to 
effectively report any suspicious fraudulent acts from bottom to the top. 
 
9. The board should restructure the composition of the risk management 
committee which is usually consists of directors rather than other officers 
in a corporation.  
 
10. The board should review the risk management policies and strategies 
regularly and benchmark the policies with the latest development in 
other countries. 
 
11. The board should design a proper guideline or manual on effective risk 
monitoring and management for the reference of a corporation. 
 
12. The board should shoulder the responsibilities of risk oversight as part of 
their fiduciary duties to a corporation. 
 
13. The board should review the financial standing of a corporation regularly 
to determine whether there is any financial over-leveraging or over-
gearing problems such as excessive borrowings from creditors in 
comparison with the corporation’s assets and capacities to pay back the 
borrowings. 
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14. The board should implement an internal anti-fraud control and reporting 
system to detect fraud and corporate malfeasance. 
 
15. The board should appoint an independent compliance officer to act as a 
whistleblower for the external fraud reporting system. 
 
16. The board should implement the use of information technology system 
that would enhance the financial or fraud reporting mechanism without 
exposing the true identity of the whistleblower. 
 
17. The board shall always weigh their business decisions against the 
corporation’s risk appetite. Any deviation from the risk measure set by 
the corporation shall not exceed the bearable risk exposure of the 
corporation. In other words, thorough risk-benefit analysis shall be 
meticulously carried out by the board and the management prior to any 
major decision or action that may affect the operation of the corporation.  
 
18. The board shall put in place a mechanism for crafting of risk strategy, 
regular measurement of risk exposure level and constant revision of risk 
policy. 
 
19. There shall be a clear separation of roles between the risk management 
committee and the risk management department. 
 
20. The board should appoint a Chief Risk Management Officer from the 
board to undertake the risk oversight role. 
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6.2.9.2 Chief Risk Management Officer 
 
This dissertation emphasises on 2 best practices relating to the duties and roles of a 
Chief Risk Management Officer:  
1. The Chief Risk Officer is mainly to identify and access any risk accrued 
to the company’s operations including tabling risk assessment reports to 
the board on a timely basis. 
 
2. Depending on the level of the risk exposed, the Chief Risk Officer may 
promptly decide to take actions or measures to contain and reduce the 
risks without going through the board. 
  
6.2.9.3 Revamping audit process 
 
This dissertation underscores 8 best practices that push for the reform of audit process:
  
1. The audit committee must be sceptical while examining the records and 
transactions shown by the management. They should actively perform 
verification on the accuracy and authenticity of those transactions or 
financial information given by the management. 
 
2. The audit committee should regularly seek financial information from 
the management or the board rather than doing so at the end of the 
financial year. 
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3. The board should review the composition of the audit committee in order 
to determine its qualification and independence. It should be ensured that 
the audit committee members are qualified in terms of knowledge, 
experience and expertise in effectively carrying out their duties. 
Financial literary test may be performed upon the audit committee so that 
they are aware of the financial and accounting issues concerning the 
business of a corporation. If they are not found to be lack of competency, 
the audit committee should be mandated to attend more training and 
education programs to enhance their financial literacy. As for purpose of 
independence, the board may also engage the service of independent 
advisor in restructuring the composition of the audit committee to 
include more independent members such as the independent auditors, 
financial consultants and the legal experts. 
 
4. Non-executive directors should also actively advise the audit committee 
in their capacity as a director who owes a fiduciary duty to a corporation. 
 
5. The board should send the clear message across the whole corporation 
that fraudulent audit practices are strictly prohibited and those who have 
committed the same will be reported to the relevant authority for further 
criminal actions. 
 
6. The board should help to nurture regular communication and close 
collaboration between the audit committee, management, internal 
auditors and external auditors beyond the scheduled meetings. 
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7. The audit committee should have an effective oversight of the internal 
auditing process. An internal audit charter may be designed to pledge the 
loyalty of the internal auditors towards the corporation that they serve. 
 
8. External auditor shall be regularly reviewed by the board based on its 
independence and merits and if need be, changed in order to maintain 
audit professionalism and board responsibility. 
  
6.2.10 Board accountability 
  
This study also asserts that board accountability shapes the core element of legal and 
regulatory under the pillar of best practices. This dissertation sets forth 15 best practices 
that champion higher board accountability:  
1. The board should adopt the best practice of making judgment that makes 
commercial sense and creates values for a corporation. 
 
2. Should any conflict of interest arise, the director is obliged to act in the 
best interest of a corporation in a way that promotes the principles of 
Corprimacy. 
 
3. The board should consider the impact of their decision upon every 
stakeholder in terms of the overall goals of a corporation. 
 
4. The Chairman should ensure that each director is personally accountable 
for individual decision or action. 
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5. A director is required to adopt the governance best practices of actively 
participating in a meeting in order to remain sceptical about the 
information provided by the management. 
 
6. Directors should bear an inquiring mind towards the papers and reports 
submitted by the management. They should probe behind the data and 
figures provided in order to obtain the correct information. With such 
information in hands, the directors would be able to direct more incisive 
and challenging questions towards the integrity of the management. 
 
7. Directors owe fiduciary duties to the creditors of a corporation in the 
event of financial difficulties or insolvency. 
 
8. A director should act like an owner of a corporation who masters the 
knowledge of the industry and business involved. A director may not be 
expected to have the sector expertise but he should at least develop the 
knowledge as regards the art of business in the industry. 
 
9. Attending training on the skills of managing a company will not be 
sufficient for the directors to first know the company business and the 
industry dynamics. Directors should be prepared to roll up their sleeves 
to visit the factories, to actively acquire information on the business 
operation, to meet their customers or clients and so on. Deeper 
understanding on the corporate operation and policy as a whole would 
definitely increase the directors’ contributions to board discussions or 
meetings. 
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10. Responsible board stewardship does not end on the basis of “noses in, 
fingers out” where directors only direct the corporate policies and 
strategy development whilst the management implements them in 
carrying out the business activities of a corporation. Directors should 
shoulder personal responsibilities in steering the governance mechanism 
of the corporation which includes risk monitoring, internal control, 
executive remuneration and so forth. This goes back to the fundamental 
roles of directors in governing and overseeing the entire corporation. In 
other words, a director shall be a leader that holds responsible 
stewardship which shapes the governance best practices of the 
corporation.  
 
11. Directors should not rush on making hasty decisions on the key issues 
affecting the business and operation of a corporation. Due to only several 
meetings per year, directors should have control over the agenda of their 
board meeting via prioritisation of important matters to be discussed. The 
setting of agenda should not be left at the absolute discretion of the 
management team. 
 
12. Directors should manage their board meetings effectively by not 
divulging too much time on usual management issues and insignificant 
operational matters. Rather, more attention should be given to strategic 
discussion on setting key performance targets, executing risk 
management measures as well as reviewing their strategies and policies 
according to the business development of a corporation. The meeting 
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shall comprise more of fruitful discussion than lengthy briefings or 
presentations by the management. For this, directors shall be well-
equipped with the necessary information and issues at hand before 
attending any board meeting. 
 
13. The board should be responsible in ensuring that they have full access to 
company information that is timelier and of higher quality via a proper 
implementation of centralised information access system for the board. 
 
14. The board should not simply discharge their duties and responsibilities 
due to their busy schedule of works or constraint of time to probe further. 
If the board requires more company-provide support assistance, they 
should not hesitate to hire more research staffs to assist them on 
complicated corporate matters prior to board discussion in meetings. 
This support system will also lead to more constructive board 
discussions. 
 
15. The board should also conduct annual key performance assessment of 
each director in order to measure the extent of individual contribution 
and accountability to a corporation as a whole. 
 
6.3 Conclusion 
 
In short, board accountability, independence and integrity are the principles that shall be 
the hallmark of corporate governance best practices for the protection of minority 
shareholders. Be that as it may, all the aforesaid best practices cannot stand alone. They 
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must be collectively implemented as a whole in order to afford full effective protection 
to minority shareholders. For instance, one of the corporate governance best practices 
stated above empowers shareholders to present their views or suggestions to the board 
regarding corporate governance issues within a corporation during the general meetings. 
However, such enhancement of shareholder democracy and involvement will not 
sustain without the implementation of responsible board stewardship. An irresponsible 
board leadership will choose to ignore shareholders views and restrain their 
involvement in the general meeting. Hence, it can be inferred that the combination of all 
best practices will make the golden parachute of minority shareholders stronger and 
safer for a successful landing of minority shareholders on corporate goldmine. 
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